



Celebrating 20 Years of HRWG:  
Preventing Lethal Violence Neighborhood by Neighborhood

Proceedings of the 2012  
Homicide Research Working Group  
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Program Chair: Christine E. Rasche  
Local Arrangements Co-Chairs: Dick & Carolyn Rebecca Block

Edited by  
Jeffery R. Osborne  
*The Graduate Center*  
*John Jay College of Criminal Justice*  
*City University of New York*

C. Gabrielle Salfati  
*John Jay College of Criminal Justice*  
*City University of New York*

Ashton Boston  
*Department of Sociology*  
*University of Central Florida*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS <sup>2012</sup>

The editors would like to thank all of the organizers and participants of the 2012 meeting for their contributions and help in organizing these proceedings. Special thanks go out to the program chair, Christine E. Rasche and the local arrangements co-chairs, Dick and Carolyn Rebecca Block. We would also like to thank Franklyn E. Zimring for providing the Keynote Address during our reception.

## ABOUT THE HOMICIDE RESEARCH WORKING GROUP

The Homicide Research Working Group (HRWG) is an international and interdisciplinary organization of volunteers dedicated to cooperation among researchers and practitioners who are trying to understand and limit lethal violence. The HRWG has the following goals:

- ❖ To forge links between research, epidemiology and practical programs to reduce levels of mortality from violence;
- ❖ To promote improved data quality and the linking of diverse homicide data sources;
- ❖ To foster collaborative, interdisciplinary research on lethal and non-lethal violence;
- ❖ To encourage more efficient sharing of technologies for measuring and analyzing homicide;
- ❖ To create and maintain a communication network among those collecting, maintaining, and analyzing homicide data sets; and
- ❖ To generate a stronger working relationship among homicide researchers.

More information about the HRWG, as well as publications from previous meetings can be found at the HRWG website: <http://homicideworkinggroup.cos.ucf.edu/index.php>

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## FOREWARD

Christine E. Rasche  
University of North Florida **2012**

It is an honor to provide the “Foreword” to this issue of the Proceedings of the Homicide Research Working Group (HRWG) Annual Symposium for 2012. It was also an honor to serve as the Program Director for the 2012 HRWG meetings, especially as this was the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the founding of the HRWG and of our annual summer research conferences.

Having the 2012 conference take place in Chicago was symbolically fitting, since it has been just a little over a century since landmark judicial and research changes in the American justice system occurred there. Chicago is the location of the first separate Juvenile Court in the U.S., created in 1899. As one of the first papers in this volume reminds us (See Bell, herein), this first juvenile court was the result of efforts by social work pioneer Jane Addams and her colleagues to intervene in the lives of destitute immigrant children lost in the turmoil of urban growth at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, who were often flung into adult jails when caught up in criminal acts. The Juvenile Court was the novel response to this social problem. These reformers were also instrumental in the creation in the early 1910s of the Psychopathic Institute (later to be called the Institute for Juvenile Research) which has been pursuing research toward understanding the causes of juvenile delinquency ever since. Of course, Chicago is also the home of the University of Chicago, where the first American sociology degree program was created in the early 1900s and the famous “Chicago School” of criminological theory was founded. A century later we are still struggling to answer some of the same questions pursued by those early 20<sup>th</sup> Century pioneers. In recognition of these historical roots, after a Keynote Address by eminent scholar Franklyn Zimring, this year’s symposium panels began with two presentations addressing Chicago’s research history (Chapter 2, herein) which flesh out these critical developments in criminology and homicide research.

It was also fitting that these 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary meetings took place in Chicago because it is the home of Drs. Richard and Becky Block, the widely recognized homicide research pioneers, creators and guardians of the Chicago Homicide Dataset—who also happen to be the founders of the HRWG. It was the Blocks who recognized in the early 1990s that research on various aspects of homicide and lethal violence was being pursued separately in a variety of disciplines with little communication across disciplinary lines. Criminologists (or sociologists, political scientists or psychologists) seemed largely unfamiliar with the homicide research work of health professionals, law enforcement professionals, and other practitioners—and vice versa. To facilitate a cross-disciplinary dialogue, the Blocks took the initiative of scheduling an inaugural meeting for interested homicide researchers at the American Society of Criminology annual conference in 1991. An overflow crowd showed up for this preliminary presentation of current research and methodological problems, which ultimately led to the formation of the Homicide Research Working Group to pursue these issues. A decision was then made to hold a longer conference of interested researchers and

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practitioners in the summer of 1992. The University of Michigan in Ann Arbor served as the host for this first summer conference, which has since occurred in locations as diverse as the FBI Academy in Quantico, VA, the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, CA, the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, GA, Statistics Canada in Ottawa, Canada, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick, GA—in addition to a number of universities around the nation.

From that very first summer conference, the HRWG developed a program format and protocol which was a little different from that usually found at academic meetings. Because the purpose of the group was to share research and ideas, and help each other with methodological and theoretical challenges across disciplinary boundaries, it was decided to make all presentations *plenary*. This means that only one presentation occurs at a time and all conference attendees are expected to participate in all presentations over the course of the three-day symposium. It was also determined from the beginning that presentations should only take up half of the time allotted to a session, with the other half of the time being allocated to discussion and Q&A. For this reason, readers of these Proceedings will see that many sessions have a record of the Q&A sessions following the presentations. Some of these are very brief, which says more about the difficulty of capturing the discussion that followed most panels than it does the nature of the discussion itself. Each session at HRWG conferences has an assigned “Recorder” whose job it is to try to capture the give-and-take of the discussion, but the recorders often find this job more difficult than imagined. Nonetheless, this conference format—plenary presentations followed by the same amount of time devoted to discussion—is one of the signature features of the HRWG summer conferences, and has led to often vibrant dialogues about research and the challenges faced in trying to understand homicide and lethal violence.

Another feature of the HRWG conference format is a welcoming attitude toward sessions which present works in progress, research dilemmas or open issues in homicide research. As in all areas of scientific inquiry, there are practical problems in conducting homicide research, and the summer conference is a unique opportunity to pose those problems to a vibrant cross-section of researchers with an expertise in all kinds of archival, qualitative, and quantitative methods of inquiry. Over the last 20 years, these discussions have ranged from assisting graduate students in sorting out homicide data collection problems, to assisting the FBI in deciding how to report in the *Uniform Crime Reports* the 3000 deaths that took place on September 11, 2001. Big or little, the discussions about methods and research protocols are a common feature of HRWG conference discussions.

One final word about the presentations which readers will find in the pages that follow: a wide spectrum of issues related to homicide and lethal are represented here. From the history of research in Chicago, to factors in lethal violence, to the dynamics of homicide, to data-sharing and access, to theory testing, to responses to homicide, to analyses of current controversies such as the “Stand Your Ground” laws—all these were covered in 2012 and are typical of the breadth of the topics at HRWG conferences. In addition, more than a dozen posters were also displayed by researchers, set up on the first day of the conference and remaining up throughout for review and discussion. These proceedings are a permanent

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record of all that diversity in homicide and lethal research.

Twenty years ago when the HRWG was founded, I am not sure that any of us expected that the group would still be going strong two decades later! While cross-disciplinary dialogue was the explicit goal, it has been surprising and refreshing to see the diversity of participants who have attended the summer conferences from a wide variety of academic disciplines and practitioner professions—and to participate in the richness of research presentations and discussions which have ensued! We hope this Proceedings has captured some of that richness and encourage readers to join us at an upcoming summer conference.

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CHAPTER 1

KEYNOTE ADDRESS FOR THE 2012 MEETING

Presenters:


Franklyn E. Zimring, William G. Simon Professor of Law and Wolfen  
Distinguished Scholar, Berkeley Law, University of California,  
Berkeley, CA

American Crime and Lethal Violence:  
Three Empirical Mysteries

Franklyn E. Zimring **2012**

Professor of Law, UC Berkeley


Figure 5.23. Homicide Trends, United States and Canada, after 1961 .



Note: Canada, 1961: 1.28 = 100  
United States, 1961: 1.48 per 100,000 = 100


Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1970-2003, *Uniform Crime Report* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office); Statistics Canada, Integrated Meta Data Base (IMDB), Ottawa; data compiled by Professor Anthony Doob .

## *Violence and the Growth of Crime*



**Figure 2.3.** Trends in murder and theft rates, England and Wales, 1950–1971.  
*Source:* Archer and Gartner 1984.

**Figure 8.2.** Percentage of 1990 Crime Volume that Varies in the Next 19 Years, Seven Index Offenses.



*Source:* Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Report*.

2012

CHAPTER 2

CHICAGO RESEARCH HISTORY  
FROM SHAW AND MCKAY TO THE PRESENT

Presenters:

Carl C. Bell, C.E.O./President, Community Health Council, Inc., Director of the Institute for Juvenile Research, Professor of Psychiatry and Public Health and Director of Public and Community Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, University of Illinois at Chicago

Richard Block, Loyola University, Chicago  
Carolyn Rebecca Block, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority  
(retired)

Chair:

Tom McEwen, McEwen and Associates, LLC

## History of the First Juvenile Court and the Institute for Juvenile Research

2012

Carl C. Bell, M.D.

C.E.O./President - Community Mental Health Council, Inc.  
Director of the Institute for Juvenile Research, Professor Psychiatry and Public Health,  
Director of Public & Community Psychiatry - Department of Psychiatry, University of  
Illinois at Chicago

Before 1871, the year of the Chicago fire, Chicago's population was 300,000 people. Twenty years after the Chicago fire in 1891, Chicago's population was a little over a million people. By 1910's Chicago's population had risen to over two million, and by the mid 1920's the population was three million. This growth was driven by European immigration resulting in over 70% of Chicago's population being either foreign-born or first-generation immigrant. Because times were hard, parents were working overtime to scrape out a living, and children, who had to work to contribute to the family's livelihood, were "ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-clothed, illiterate, and wholly untrained and unfitted for any occupation." The results were families, who, due to being disrupted by poverty and unfamiliar community circumstances as result of immigration were not able to flourish (Beuttler & Bell, 2010, p. 4).

Flourishing is defined as having: 1) Positive emotions (i.e. emotional well-being); Positive affect - Regularly cheerful, interested in life, in good spirits, happy, calm and peaceful, full of life; and an Avowed quality of life - Mostly or highly satisfied with life overall or in domains of life; 2) Positive psychological functioning (i.e. psychological well-being) - Self-acceptance - Holds positive attitudes toward self, acknowledges, likes most parts of self, personality; Personal growth - Seeks challenges, has insight into own potential, feels a sense of continued development; Purpose in life - Finds own life has direction and meaning; Environmental mastery - Exercises ability to select, manage, and mold personal environs to suit needs; Autonomy - Is guided by own, socially accepted, internal standards and values; and Positive relations with others - Has, or can form, warm, trusting personal relationships; and 3) Positive social functioning (i.e., social well-being) - Social acceptance - Holds positive attitudes toward, acknowledges, and is accepting of human differences; Social actualization - Believes people, groups, and society have potential and can evolve or grow positively; Social contribution - Sees own daily activities as useful to and valued by society and others; Social coherence - Interested in society and social life and finds them meaningful and somewhat intelligible; and Social integration - A sense of belonging to, and comfort and support from, a community (Keyes, 2007).

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The reality that the new European immigrants were not doing well was also found in the extraordinarily high rates of European immigrant's domestic violence in Chicago from 1875 to 1920 (Adler, 2003). Accordingly, in 1889, Jane Addams (1860-1935) founded Hull House on Chicago's Near West Side as a social settlement house "to aid in the solution of the social

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and industrial problems which are engendered by the modern conditions of life in a great city." Beuttler and Bell, 2010, p. 5). Jane Addams was quoted as saying, "Children over ten years of age were arrested, held in the police stations, tried in the police courts. If convicted they were usually fined and if the fine was not paid sent to the city prison. However, often they were let off because justices could neither tolerate sending children to Bridewell nor bear in themselves guilty of the harsh folly of compelling poverty-stricken parents to pay fines. No exchange of court records existed and the same children could be in and out of various police stations an indefinite number of times, more hardened and more skillful with each experience." (Addams, 2004, p. 133).

In their efforts to change the harsh conditions besetting Chicago's European immigrant youth, in 1899 Jane Addams and her colleagues felt the need to establish a Juvenile Court in Illinois to distinguish between delinquency and criminality. Because the State of Illinois was concerned about the rising rates of juvenile delinquency, the first Juvenile Court in the United States was established. The procedures of this new institution were not to be adversarial, rather it was "primarily protective and educational rather than punitive, and the commission of a child to a correctional institutions is deemed to be for his welfare and not for the sole purpose of inflicting penalty." (Beuttler & Bell, 2010, p. 5). Ten years later, in 1909, these foresighted women convinced the State of Illinois to discover the cause of delinquency and the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute (later called the Institute for Juvenile Research - IJR) was created, and the neurologist - William Healy, M.D. was hired to be the first director.

Dr. Healy was charged with not only studying the delinquent's biological aspects of brain functioning and IQ, but also the delinquent's social factors, attitudes, and motivations (Schowalter, 2000). These studies determined that there was no relationship between biological heredity and criminality. Later, IJR researchers Shaw and McKay (1942) noted delinquency was due less to biological, ethnic, or cultural factors and more due to social disruption eroding formal and informal social control in specific transitional neighborhoods (delinquency areas) in a city. Fifty years ago, the science was not as advanced as it is now. The research designs were qualitative instead of being quantitative, and much of the Institute for Juvenile Research's research was mostly biographical. Thus, the statistical methodology was very primitive by today's standards and multivariate influences could not be adequately studied statistically. However, despite this lack of scientific methodology, it is interesting that the Institute for Juvenile Research's observations were correct. Their observations were it was not the biology of the delinquent children they were studying, but rather it was the lack of social fabric in the new immigrant communities. Sampson et al (1997) learned in 49 equally poor Chicago, African-American neighborhoods there were six neighborhoods that lacked "collective efficacy." These neighborhoods had high rates of violence. Neighborhoods that had "collective efficacy" had residents who spoke to one another's youth and monitored their behavior in the community. Accordingly, there were very low rates of violence (Sampson et al, 1997). Of course, this finding predated the seminal research of Sampson et al (1997) that coined the term "collective efficacy" by fifty years. The IJR researchers learned that approaching delinquent youth with a positive, strength-based approach was a good strategy to prevent or intervene in youth delinquency.

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## **The Shift from a “Child Welfare” Juvenile Justice System to a Punitive Juvenile Justice System**

As social policy tends to swing back and forth like a pendulum, this effective, century-old rehabilitation approach to juvenile delinquency has slowly eroded since the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Juvenile court began to move from rehabilitation to retribution after the 1967 Gault case (Gault, 1967). Gerald Gault was a 15-year-old boy who was adjudicated a delinquent by an Arizona juvenile court for making “lewd” phone calls. As a result, he was committed to the Arizona State Industrial School until his 21st birthday. As was typical of juvenile court in those days, he was not afforded counsel or opportunity to confront or cross-examine his accuser. In addition, he was not offered privilege against self-incrimination. After the hearing, he was afforded no right to appeal to a higher court, yet the case finally reached the Supreme Court. The maximum penalty Gault could have received if he were an adult was a \$5-\$50 fine or no longer than two months in jail. At 18, he would have had substantial constitutional and state statutory rights. The Supreme Court chided the juvenile court for its pretension of paternalism and blasted the juvenile court model as inadequate for the dispensation of justice. Due to the Gault decision, juveniles began to be given their Miranda rights and access to counsel. Gradually, the juvenile court began to move away from a system of rehabilitation to one of due process with resultant criminalization of delinquent juvenile behavior. Beyond the Gault decision, public pressure has demanded protection of society; the public perceived an upsurge in violent juvenile offenders that challenged rehabilitation over punishment. “Dangerous” juveniles are increasingly transferred to the adult criminal justice system, where consequences are much harsher. Expansion of this segment of confined population has revealed that spread of juvenile violence, issues of juvenile competency, healthcare needs, and prevention strategies are areas in need of immediate attention.

### **Research Support to Return to a “Child Welfare” Juvenile Justice System**

Late in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, rigorous neurobiological research illustrates youth do not fully develop their capacity for affect regulation (which facilitates judgment, deductive reasoning, and discernment) until age 26. Prior to that, the limbic system (which engages flight, fight, or freeze behaviors) is the first part of the brain to develop. Therefore, youthful brains are underdeveloped with respect to affect regulation. Metaphorically, emotions and their expression are the “gasoline” that propels the lives of adolescents and adults, and judgment steers the vehicle on course and applies the brakes and steering when necessary to maneuver through life. In other words, youth are neuro-developmentally predisposed to being “all gasoline, no brakes, and no steering wheel” or having poor affect regulation that is etiologically significant in juvenile delinquent behaviors (Bell and McBride, 2010). These findings show that modern research has re-learned that we must protect children and adolescents from their dangerous rambunctious behavior. Thus, families and society need to develop psychosocial infrastructure that support youth and their families. The recent National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine report - Preventing Mental, Emotional, and Behavioral Disorders Among Young People: Progress and Possibilities (NRC & IOM,

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2009) comprehensively catalogues the scientific evidence supporting this approach to unruly juvenile behavior.

With the need to protect society coupled with recent research revealing brain and child development, the situation around juvenile delinquency becomes complex (Steinberg, 2009). Unfortunately, the heavy focus on protecting society with the absence of recognition of child development is preventing the shift from a punitive to a “child welfare” juvenile justice system.

## **Dynamics Preventing the Shift Back to a “Child Welfare” Juvenile Justice System**


In the 1980’s, under the leadership of James Ralph, M.D., the National Institute of Mental Health began a public health initiative to address the issue of homicide prevention. Shortly thereafter, Surgeon General Koop declared homicide a public health issue, and the nation’s public health system began to veer away from their criminal justice approach to some types of homicide (Koop, 1985). Because of juvenile’s poor affect regulation capacity, youth are a large contributor to impulsive, interpersonal altercation violence. Accordingly, youth became a major focus in the National prevention efforts. Unfortunately, for some elements of society, this initiative increased the fear of crime in the American public. We soon witnessed an extraordinary incarceration growth in both the adult and juvenile criminal justice system. Despite there being different types of violence (Bell, 2002), the media portrayed the major cause of violence as “drug related.” Therefore, in 1985, the percentage of sentenced drug offenders was approximately 13 percent, but currently, thanks to the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy (National Drug Control Strategy, 1989) it is more than 30%. Much of the growth in the incarceration of non-violent, drug offenders was fueled by media depictions and political rhetoric about “drug related violence” (Baker and Bell, 1999), and not sound facts (Douglas and Bell, 2011). Accordingly, slowly but surely the complexion of the youth in the Juvenile Justice system shifted from people without color to people of color. Accompanying this shift in color was the continued swing toward retribution and this modification and its impact has been called the “New Jim Crow” (Alexander, 2010). This shift was accompanied by the circulation of the myth of “super predators.” Despite the evidence described in Dr. Satcher’s (the 16<sup>th</sup> Surgeon General) Youth Violence Report, these myths continue to pervade law enforcement, the courts, and the correctional system (US Public Health Service, 2001).

Thus, the pendulum has swung back to where it was more than a hundred years ago. This swing has occurred despite significant research in both mental health and criminal justice that shows the punitive approach to youth actually harms their chances to rehabilitate (see Lipsey et al, 2010). Therefore, it increases their chances to commit further crime. On the other hand, the strength-based approach increases the chances that youth will develop into responsible adults who positively contribute to society.

Lipsey et al. Improving the Effectiveness of Juvenile Justice Programs: A New Perspective on Evidence-Based Practice. Washington, D.C.: Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, 2010

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**Figure 1.** Mean recidivism effects for the program categories representing control and therapeutic philosophies



History, modern science, & personal experience are clear – handling rambunctious, delinquent youth using a strength-based approach that involves creating social fabric around youth, ensuring youth are connected to caring adults, have robust social and emotional skills, are being monitored for appropriate social behaviors, have opportunities to develop a sense of self-esteem, and who have opportunities to transform traumatic childhood experiences into areas of mastery is the right way to go (Bell, et al, 2002).

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## Mapping Chicago's Crime Problems: The First Chicago School and Today

2012

Richard Block  
Loyola University Chicago  
Carolyn R Block  
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (Retired)

In 1900, Chicago was a very rapidly growing and very innovative city. Chicago was a city of well-defined neighborhoods. It was also a city with great racial and ethnic divides. Chicago was a city with an impoverished immigrant population living in horrendous conditions and a city which was notorious for its corruption and violence. How could the city be improved? The city's establishment and the University of Chicago looked to "social engineering to do this". The greatest legacy of this was the "Burnham Plan" that resulted in a system of inland parks for the recreation and civilizing of industrial workers and the lakefront parks for more elite residents. It also resulted in the location of the Cook County Jail and Court House that you will see tomorrow. Sociology and Social Work (AKA Administration) were also part of this engineering. The first step for these disciplines was to know the problem especially in poor neighborhoods. Mapping was often used to describe the problem.

What was Chicago like from 1900—1930


- A. Like today a city of neighborhoods with distinct characteristics, many dominated or identified with a specific ethnic or racial group. Crime and vice were concentrated in a few high crime and high vice neighborhoods.
- B. Chicago was growing through an influx of immigrants mostly from eastern and southern Europe and Ireland to feed the factories. Many living in terrible conditions. ---- see *The Jungle* and Abbott and Breckenridge.
- C. The black population increased very rapidly during and after WWI with plenty of work, but very little housing and extreme overcrowding. Racial Segregation was enforced by violence (especially bombings) and restrictive covenants. In *A Raisin in the Sun*, Lorraine Hansbury depicts her father's struggles.
- D. From the fire of 1871 onward, the progressive Chicago elite believed in social engineering Examples—the Burnham plan and the establishment of many parks as rural spaces to civilize the immigrant population.

Key events that indicated the need for change.

Labor unrest


2012

1. The Haymarket Riot/massacre
2. The Pullman strike
3. The founding of the IWW—(a threat to capitalism) and beliefs such as Darrow's that the real criminals were the rich---not the poor. The difference was in definition and power.
4. *The Jungle*, Upton Sinclair's depiction of the terrible living conditions in Back of the years and the terrible working condition in the stock yards. Literature not science gives credence to the problem, but what was the problem---the need for revolution, better sanitary conditions in slaughter houses, or too many immigrants. In maps, this was portrayed by Hull House residents in 1895.




5. The race riot of 1919 began on 29<sup>th</sup> street beach and was uncontrolled by local police. From 1917-1921, there were 58 home Bombings, mostly of blacks in white areas threatened by black expansion. The police arrested only one white for the bombings. There were no arrests even when police knew about the attack before it occurred. The 1919 white riots resulted in a report, *The Negro in Chicago*. The city was so segregated that initially the researchers could not rent an office because the study team was integrated.

## The Negro in Chicago 1921




6. Prohibition, organized crime and police corruption. The city was gaining the worldwide reputation for being a violent and corrupt place that it retains today. Hurt business and civic pride. The Illinois Crime Survey used maps to describe the problem of violence (1929). The following two maps, done by Clifford Shaw, depict the development of the concentric zone theory. A third map depicts the distribution of homicides in Chicago at the height of the beer wars in 1927.

Home of Male  
Offenders Ages  
10-17 Contacted  
By the Chicago  
Police 1926  
Illinois Crime Survey  
1928  
Clifford Shaw



Homicide was mapped and analyzed as a problem of recent Black and European immigrants.



## Three Examples of Social Engineering to Reduce Crime

1. The invention of the juvenile court 1899 first required the invention of juvenile delinquency as opposed to adult criminality. Juvenile delinquents are seen as diseased and need a diagnosis for recovery. They were recoverable if they got away from bad parents and neighborhoods, and the city environment.
2. Attempts to help integrate immigrant populations--- Hull House did many good things but also tried to adopt immigrants to a particular Americanized viewpoint. Hull house closed in 2012.
- 15 3. While social control was officially a police function, the Chicago police were notoriously corrupt; therefore, informal social control became more important. The Chicago Area Project begun by Clifford Shaw was designed to develop neighborhood social control. The role of police was down played.

In this presentation, these maps and others of the First Chicago School are compared to very



similar maps of today, and the use of mapping in the evaluation of CeaseFire will be presented. I found that while crime and homicide remains concentrated in a few neighborhoods, these neighborhoods are more likely to be on the periphery of the city. If the concentric zone model was every viable and not a result of the mapping technique, it is no longer viable today. Mapping of CeaseFire demonstrated it success in some neighborhoods in contrast to comparison neighborhoods but not in others.

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2012

CHAPTER 3

FACTORS IN LETHAL VIOLENCE

Presenters:

Greg S. Weaver, Auburn University  
James C. McCutcheon, University of Central Florida  
Lin Huff-Corzine, University of Central Florida  
Jay Corzine, University of Central Florida  
Jordan Vrbas, Auburn University

Kristie L. Alfonso, University of Central Florida

Vance McLaughlin, Jacksonville State University

Joakim Sturup, Department of Forensic Psychiatry, National Board of  
Forensic Medicine, Division of Social and Forensic Psychiatry,  
Karolinska Institutet, Sweden  
Sven Granath, Stockholm County Police (Clinical)

Chair:

17 Wendy Regoeczi, Cleveland State University

## Drug Transportation Routes and Homicide: Highways to Hell

Greg S. Weaver, *Auburn University*  
James McCutcheon, *University of Central Florida*  
Lin Huff-Corzine, *University of Central Florida*  
Jay Corzine, *University of Central Florida*  
Jordan Vrbas, *Auburn University*

*This paper was presented at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Homicide Research Working Group, Chicago, Illinois, June 6-9, 2012. Correspondence to Greg S. Weaver, Department of Sociology, Auburn University, 7030 Haley Center, Auburn, AL 36849-5209; (334) 844-5049; [weavegs@auburn.edu](mailto:weavegs@auburn.edu).*

### **A Preliminary Analysis of Highway Drug Transportation Corridors and Homicide**

Law enforcement agencies and other analysts have long assumed that easy access to illicit drugs affects levels of drug use and abuse, as well as associated problems such as violent crime (Sharp, 1994; Ousey & Lee, 2004). Since approximately four-fifths of illicit drugs in the U.S. are of foreign origin (MacDonald & Zagaris, 1992), the transportation of drugs from points-of-entry in the Southwest and the eastern and western seaboard to urban markets in the Midwest, the Pacific Northwest, and the opposite coasts frequently employs major east-west (e.g., I-10, I-80) and north-south (e.g., I-95) interstate highways. The networks of interstate highways are connected with a larger network of state highways. In the course of transportation such highways are used as connectors and alternative routes for travelers. Such routes can also be used as drug corridors as all drugs sold must reach their final destination. Law enforcement officials and substance abuse treatment providers in communities near “drug transportation corridors” have expressed concern about their impact on local drug use and associated crime.

The fear that proximity to drug corridors will worsen local drug problems finds frequent expression in newspapers, law enforcement bulletins, and other publications (cf. *New York Times*, 1995; Warshaw and Daly, 1996). Reports from the Community Epidemiology Work Group echo these sentiments. Location along major interstate highways has been identified as an important factor in drug use in several cities, including Atlanta (Stark-Elifson, Hatch, and Jenkins, 1996), Boston (Clark, Elliott, and Krakow, 1996), and New Orleans (Thorton-Collins). Drug use and drug markets have been identified as a strong contributing factor to levels of violent crime, including homicide, at the city level (Goldstein, 1985), with 80 percent or more of homicide victims and offenders having a prior drug arrest on their record.

<sup>18</sup> A theoretical model supporting the belief that communities located along a drug corridor will experience an increased drug supply is provided by Galle & Taeuber (1966) in their analysis of intervening opportunities on the flow of migrants between U.S. metropolitan areas. They assert that only some portion of migrants will reach their intended destination; the proportion that do so is an inverse function of the distance traveled and the number of

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intervening opportunities. Galle and Taeuber's idea has been applied to several empirical areas, including crime (Elffers et al., 2008), but to our knowledge, there have been no studies focusing on the linkage between state highway drug transportation routes and levels of associated drug use and attendant crime. The "drug corridor hypothesis" would hold that only some portion of drugs will reach their intended markets; some quantity of drugs will instead be distributed in intermediate communities that provide potential market opportunities. The current analysis is a first step toward expanding our knowledge in this area. Specifically, we address the question, "Does location along a drug corridor, or pipeline, increase homicide rates at the county level, when controlling for theoretically relevant socioeconomic and demographic variables?"

## **Methods**

The units of analysis for this study are Georgia counties (N=159). Georgia serves as a useful state for a preliminary analysis of the drug corridor hypothesis for several reasons. First, Georgia is a diverse state with significant numbers of rural and urban counties and substantial county-level variation on several variables that are frequently linked to variation in homicide rates, including poverty, percent Black, and percent female-headed households. Second, the intersection of demographic and socioeconomic indicators within Georgia may produce fewer problems with multicollinearity than in many macro-level studies of crime. Specifically, several counties concentrated in the Atlanta MSA have significant percentages of African Americans but are above the median values for measures of socioeconomic status. This pattern reflects the development of enclaves of middle-class African Americans in the Atlanta suburbs during recent decades. Third, the number of state routes in Georgia is sufficient for proper variance among the units of analysis.

### Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the following analysis is the county-level homicide rate for the three years beginning in January 2007 and ending in December 2009. The numbers of homicides in each county come from the monthly reports obtained from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation Crime Statistics (<http://services.georgia.gov/gbi/crimestats/displayReports.do>).

### Independent Variables

Our primary theoretical variable identifies the total miles of state highway. The variable is taken from data available in *The Georgia County Guide* (2011), published by the University of Georgia. Finally, drug-related arrests may be a better indicator of the level of illegal drug use, however, and after consideration of the advantages and shortcomings of various data available for use with counties, we opted for the number of persons admitted to the Georgia Department of Corrections for calendar years 2008 and 2009 (Georgia Department of Corrections, 2010a, 2010b) as the measure of drug market activity. The numbers of admissions by county were summed for 2008 and 2009, and the total was divided by the county population then multiplied by 100,000 to establish a rate (DRUGMART).

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Several other variables were included in the analyses based on their past usage in macro-level homicide research and their expected theoretical significance. Minority representation in the population was measured by two variables, percent Black (Percent Black) and percent Hispanic (Percent Hispanic). The percentage Hispanic variable was logged to correct for skewness. Two county population characteristics were controlled; LOGPOP, the log of the total population corrected for skewness, and POPCHANG, the percent change in the county population between 2000 and 2010. Low economic status was measured by the percent of the county population below the poverty line (POVERTY), while the percentage of households with children that were headed by women (FEMALEHH) was included as an indicator of family disorganization. The location within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and in a high intensity drug trafficking area (HIDTA) were included as markers of a county's position in the urban-rural continuum and to distinguish counties in which drug trafficking concerns, and supposedly interdiction/enforcement efforts, are enhanced. Finally, a spatial auto-correlation variable was created to detect if surrounding counties rates have an impact on each unit of analysis.

Currently, researchers are in a transitional stage in relation to the availability of county-level census data. Some early results from the 2010 Census have been released, and county population and population change were taken from this source (Georgia Info, 2011). For several variables, however, the most recent data available are from the five-year (2005 to 2009) estimates of the American Community Survey (ACS), and county data for percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent poverty, and percent female-headed households were taken from this source (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). MSA status was taken from Economic Yearbook for Georgia MSAs (University of Georgia, 2010), while HIDTA status was obtained from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (2009).

## **Analysis**

As with most macro-level studies of homicide, the numbers for Georgia counties are not normally distributed. Approximately 25 percent have no recorded homicides over the three-year period, 2007 to 2009. Under these circumstances, the use of OLS is not appropriate. Because the homicide are over-dispersed, meaning that the variance is greater than the mean, the models were estimated using the negative binomial regression (NBR) option available in STATA 11 with the homicide count as the dependent variable and the log of the population as the offset. Incident rate ratios are utilized for greater ease of interpretation.

## **Results**

In preliminary diagnostics (not shown), it was determined that multicollinearity was not a problem in estimating the model. Specifically, all VIFs were under 4, a conservative criterion for identifying possible bias in the model results (Fisher and Mason, 1981). This finding is somewhat surprising in that macro-level studies of homicide and other crimes frequently encounter multicollinearity as a problem for model estimation (Land, McCall, and Cohen, 1990), but its relative absence in our analyses may reflect the particular demographics of Georgia counties noted above.

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The results of the negative binomial regression model are reported in Table 1. Most important, the coefficient for state highways (strts) is positive and significant ( $z = 3.60$ ). This finding supports the hypothesis derived from Galle and Taeuber (1966) that proximity to a drug transportation corridor is conducive to higher levels of homicide. Additionally, drug arrest is a positive significant predictor of homicides.

Three additional variables in the model are significantly related to homicide rates in Georgia counties. Consistent with most prior research in this area, both measures of minority representation, higher concentrations of Black and Hispanic minorities, are related to increased levels of homicide. Moreover, even with several controls for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, counties within a MSA have significantly higher homicide rates than those not in an MSA. This finding is expected because more urbanized areas typically have higher rates of several serious criminal offenses, including homicide.

Perhaps most surprising is the lack of significance for poverty, a common indicator of low economic status, and percent female-headed households with children, a variable that is typically used as a measure of family disorganization. Both findings may reflect the geographical location of the present study. Messner (1982) found poverty to be strongly related to homicide outside the South, but not in the Southern states. And, most inquiries that report family disorganization to impact homicide have used urban neighborhoods, cities, or MSAs as units of analysis. Prior research including a measure of family disorganization at the county level has been sparse.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

The most important finding from the current study is that increases in state highways augments county homicide rates in the State of Georgia. This pattern lends credence to the common concerns expressed by law enforcement and others that proximity to drug transportation routes is inimical to a community's well-being through a spillover effect. As noted above, an existing body of work in migration would logically lead to the prediction of a positive relationship between drug corridors and a range of problems linked to levels of drug use.

Obviously, the results reported in this paper are only a beginning. Further attention needs to focus on alternative explanations for the positive effect of state highway proximity on homicide levels. State highways are conducive to the transportation of drugs and other products, both legal and illegal, but they also convey people. It is possible that the increased numbers of individuals passing through counties located on interstates are conducive to enhanced violence through mechanism other than enhanced drug use and selling. Finally, the current analysis needs to be extended to include other crimes, regardless of whether they are linked to drug use.

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Table 1:

Negative Binomial Regression of County Homicides in Georgia (2007-9) and State Highways (N=159)

Homicide Count	IRR	SE	z	P> z
<i>Explanatory variable</i>				
State Highways	1.00	.00	2.13	.03
Drug Arrests	1.00	.00	3.06	.00
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Percent Black	1.02	.01	3.17	.00
Percent Hispanic (logged)	2.55	.70	3.39	.00
Socio-Economic Status	.86	.15	-.89	.38
Spatial Auto-Correlation	1.00	.00	.50	.95
MSA	1.96	.36	3.67	.00
HIDTA	.62	.31	-.95	.34
Population Change	.96	.01	-.59	.56
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> : .1312				



## Differences and Similarities in US and Canadian Homicide Rates

Kristie L. Afonso **2012**  
University of Central Florida

### **Introduction**

Canada is often regarded as a nation with friendly people and low crime rates. Kenneth Dowler (2004) suggests that Canadians derive a sense of cultural identity through viewing themselves as being dissimilar to Americans. Given that a vast majority of Canada's population lives around 70 miles from the U.S. border this idea of dissimilarity is intriguing. Within this view also comes the perceptions that Canadians have of Americans which includes believing that Americans have high rates of poverty, crime, and poor race relations (Dowler, 2004). Interestingly while Canadians regard America as a land of high crime they report having a higher level of fear related to victimization than Americans do (Roberts, 2001).

### **Crime, Homicide and Our Two Countries**

Statistics obtained from the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics reveals that homicide rates in Canada peaked in the 1970s and then gradually declined over the preceding decades with a marked drop occurring in the 1990s (Statistics Canada, 2006). The year 2006 also showed a 10% drop in homicides in Canada with a homicide rate of 1.85 victims per 100,000 population, in comparison the United States had a homicide rate of 5.69 victims per 100,000 population (Statistics Canada, 2006). Theories surrounding the cause of drop in homicides for the U.S. look at the drug market and availability of guns as mitigating factors. While research conducted on the crime drop in Canada takes a look at the changing demographics of the country throughout that time period. The overall number of victims of homicides in Canada may be lower than that of the United States but similar trends do emerge (Spratt & Cesaroni, 2002). Both countries saw increases in homicides through to the 1980s when rates began to vary on a yearly basis and as previously mentioned the 1990s saw a drop in homicides for both countries (Spratt & Cesaroni, 2002).

The United States and Canada do have marked differences when it comes to crime and homicide. Ouimet (1999) finds two interesting factors that show differences between crime trends in the United States and Canada. The first of these factors deals directly with homicide and shows a link between the homicide rates and the greater amount of access to firearms within the United States (Ouimet, 1999). The second factor shows that a greater proportion of crime is committed within the largest cities in the United States (Ouimet, 1999). Attempts to fight crime require the use of large prisons and a well-trained police force. Policing policies and the use of prison show wide variances between the two countries. One of the differences between the two countries is seen in the fact that the United States has a much larger police force than that of Canada. According to Ouimet (2002) courts in the United States are more

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likely to sentence offenders to prison and hand out longer sentences this in turn has led the U.S. to having a prison population which is over four times greater than that found in Canada.

In this paper homicide rates from a 5 year period spanning the years 2001-2006 are compiled for six cities. The six cities are broken down into three Canadian cities and three U.S. cities and are compared to each other based on population. Indicators of social disorganization are presented for the six cities in order to establish both similarities and differences. Finally, factors stemming from social disorganization and a discussion of demographics are considered as possible explanations for the differences in homicide rates prevalent in the United States and Canada.

## **Social Disorganization Theory**

After widely falling out of favor with criminological thought of the time Shaw and McKay's model of social disorganization has been revitalized within current literature. Social disorganization theory is able to link demographics and structures with the ability of a community to exert informal social control as well as maintain order (Jacob, 2006). Shaw and McKay's (1942) research into delinquency rates in Chicago formed the basis for their theory and had its earliest beginnings rooted in criminality. Further research into social disorganization and crime has found that crime arises within a community when there is a lack of common values and cohesion.

Sampson (1987) shows a link between knowing ones neighbors and feeling confident that they would intercede should a crime occur. The less trust a person has in their neighbors the less overall social cohesion there is within a community. A number of measures are used as indicators of social disorganization. Sampson and Groves (1989) conducted a study in which they used residential mobility, socioeconomic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and family disruption as factors that could lead to social disorganization and increases in crime. In this paper socioeconomic status as well as ethnic heterogeneity will be used as indicators of social disorganization.

## **Demographics**

The use of demographics in studying crime has been used extensively to try to explain why some areas experience increases in crime while others are experiencing decreases. Sprott and Cesaroni (2002) note that while a multitude of factors can be used to study homicide trends in the United States the use of demographics is one of the only factors that can also be used for Canada. This is due to the fact that there are major differences between the homicides that occur in the U.S. and Canada. The United States sees more homicides committed by acquaintances and strangers whereas in Canada more homicides occur at the hands of a family member. Canada also sees a lower rate of gun related homicides.

Research conducted using demographics to explore changes in homicide rates has heavily focused on the changing age structure of a population. Fox (2000) and Levitt (1999) found that the changing age structure of the United States accounted for little change in the number

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of homicides. When used to predict the total number of homicides that would occur over later decades, age structure was not found to be an accurate measure. In contrast research done by Ouimet (2000) provides support for using demographics as a possible explanation for the decline of homicides in Canada. If one accepts that the vast majority of homicides are committed by people under the age of 30 then it is possible that Canada's large baby boom population may play a role in why there are lower rates of homicide. Simply put the population has aged out of what is considered normal in terms of offender characteristics. While the issue of demographics is not directly addressed within this comparative analysis it is important to consider the possibility that demographics could play a role when it comes to explaining homicide numbers.

## **Method**

The homicide data for this study were compiled from the Canadian Centre for Criminal Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada, and the Uniform Crime Report conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The U.S. and Canadian censuses as well as the American Community Survey were used to compile the population and social disorganization indicators. The U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada were used to obtain the census data.

## **Design**

A total of 6 cities were chosen for this study and were broken down into 3 U.S. cities and 3 Canadian cities. The 3 chosen U.S. cities were Los Angeles, Jacksonville, and Houston. The 3 chosen Canadian cities were Vancouver, Toronto, and Edmonton.<sup>1</sup> Based on population sizes cities were compared to each other on all chosen factors.<sup>2</sup> The pairings of cities were comprised of Toronto and Los Angeles, Jacksonville and Edmonton, and Houston and Vancouver. The majority of research comparing homicide rates for the United States and Canada focuses on the rates for the entire country. This study uses large cities of comparable populations in order to make evaluations based on social disorganization more generalizable.

## **Homicide Rates**

Homicide data was compiled for a 5 year period from 2001 to 2006. These years were chosen due to the way the Canadian census is conducted. The U.S. Census also played a role in choosing these years due to the fact that one had been conducted in 2000. The addition of the American Community Survey has made it possible to get more frequent U.S. data and made it possible to get data within the 5 year subset. The total number of homicides for each city are shown in Tables 1 to 3.

<sup>1</sup> The cities chosen include Houston, Texas, Los Angeles, California, Jacksonville, Florida, Edmonton, Alberta, Vancouver, British Columbia, and Toronto, Ontario.

<sup>2</sup> Populations were considered comparable if they generally mirrored that of the other city.

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## **Social Disorganization Measures**

The chosen factors of social disorganization were socioeconomic status and ethnic heterogeneity. U.S. census data from the year 2000 and the American Community Survey collected for the years 2005-2009 were used to obtain the data for the United States. Canadian Census data from the years 2001 and 2006 were used to compile the Canadian data. Median family income was the chosen variable to indicate socioeconomic status as it provides a baseline for each city. Census data was again used in order to assess ethnic heterogeneity. The heterogeneity of the population was measured by using the census data and calculating the percent of the population that was a defined minority and then calculating the percent change for each group over the 5 year period. Canada defines minority groups as East/Southeast Asians, Arab/West Asians, Blacks, Latin Americans and other or mixed minorities (Statistics Canada, 1999). For the United States defined minority groups included Blacks, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, other and mixed minorities.

## **Data Analysis**

The method of analysis used for this study is that of comparative analysis. Comparisons are made for each city pairing based on all the outlined measures. All data is presented in tables and graphs showing each chosen pairing. Comparisons are then drawn between the United States and Canada based on these findings.

## **Results**

Homicide data presented in Tables 1 through 3 show that over the 5 year period researched homicides fluctuated for each city. An increase in homicides was shown for each city with the exception of Los Angeles which saw its lowest number of homicides during the 5 year period in 2006. The chosen indicators of social disorganization showed an interesting trend within the United States where with the exception of Jacksonville the majority population grew in number while minority populations tended to decrease. Canadian cities saw the opposite effect with minority populations growing and the majority population declining. All 6 cities also saw increases in median household income.

## **Homicides**

Data collected for each of the city pairings revealed relatively similar patterns. While the Canadian cities had a lower rate of homicides then their American counterparts similar trends do emerge. Table 1 shows the comparison data for the number of homicides that occurred for the years 2000 to 2006 in the cities of Toronto and Los Angeles. As evidenced in the table Los Angeles experienced a spike in homicides between 2001 and 2002. In 2003 homicide begins to decrease in Los Angeles and then continue to fluctuate until another decrease is seen in 2006. In contrast Toronto's homicides continue to rise slightly until 2006 where there is a slight fall. As the table also shows Toronto's homicide rate tends to stay rather stagnant during the 5 year period.

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A comparison of Houston and Vancouver shows that both cities experienced an overall increase in homicides. Houston sees a small drop in homicide in 2002 and then a steady increase occurs through to 2006. Table 2 shows the comparison of the two cities and as is shown in Table 1 the Canadian city has a rather stagnant pattern of homicides. Vancouver experiences a large increase in homicides between 2001 and 2002 and then continues to fluctuate on a yearly basis over the rest of the time period.

The comparison of Jacksonville and Edmonton yielded similar findings to the other two pairings. Both cities experienced overall increases in homicide with fluctuations occurring on an almost yearly basis. In staying consistent with previous findings Table 3 shows these fluctuations as well as shows that more homicides occurred in 2006 then did in 2001. One interesting trend is seen in Table 3 that is not seen in the others. Edmonton as opposed to the other two Canadian cities does not stay nearly as stagnant instead there are marked periods of both increases and decreases in homicides.

## **Social Disorganization Indicators**

The chosen indicators of social disorganization for this study included ethnic heterogeneity and socioeconomic status. A major limitation was found when doing research concerning an attempt to try to find the number of people living below the poverty line in Canada for each of the chosen cities. Canada does not have a designated poverty line and therefore these numbers are not obtainable.<sup>3</sup> Median household income became the chosen measure of socioeconomic status in order to accommodate this issue. Ethnic heterogeneity was assessed by collecting census data and then calculating the percent change for each group listed. The majority population was defined as being white because for all 6 cities that was the largest ethnic/racial population group.

Toronto and Los Angeles both saw increases in total population over the 5 year period researched. Toronto however saw decreases within the majority population and increases in all other minority areas. In contrast Los Angeles experienced an increase in majority population and decreases in all other minority groups with the exception of Asians. Table 4 shows the comparison data for both cities in terms of their ethnic makeup.<sup>4</sup> Table 7 shows the median income for all the compared cities. For both Toronto and Los Angeles increases in median household income was experienced. Similarly to Los Angeles and Toronto both Vancouver and Houston also experienced population growth over the course of 5 years. Houston experienced a large growth in the majority population and suffered a small decline

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<sup>3</sup> Further conducted research found statements regarding why Canada does not have a defined poverty line and the majority of the reasons cited that the government did not feel it was necessary to define poverty for the Country. A definition would be formed if there was enough public outcry regarding the matter.

<sup>4</sup> Due to the way Canadian census data are collected, percentages of people in each ethnic group are estimates. In order to make this data compatible with U.S. Census data subgroups of Asians were combined to form an overall population. Canada also considers Latin Americans a separate group and they were not included in this table. Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders were added to the other group.

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in some of the minority categories. Table 5 shows that in comparison to Houston Vancouver saw a decrease in the majority population and an increase in minorities. This seems to be an ongoing trend within the Canadian cities and may be one of the reasons that homicides have increased over this time period as well. Median household income as shown in Table 7 increased for both cities. This may be attributable to the economic situation of the time period and the ever growing cost of living.

Comparing Edmonton and Jacksonville saw trends similar to the previous two pairings. One interesting difference was found for Jacksonville concerning ethnic populations. Jacksonville was the only U.S. city in which the majority population actually declined. Edmonton held true to the previous findings and saw a decline in the majority population as well which is illustrated in Table 6. In keeping with the already established trend Table 7 shows the increase in median household income that had been viewed with the previous comparisons.

The median household income for each city is presented in Table 7. For Toronto the 2001 median income was \$59,502 and in 2006 it rose to \$64,128. In comparison Los Angeles had a median income of \$36,687 in 2001 and in 2006 it increased to \$48,570. Vancouver had a median income of \$49,940 in 2001 and in 2006 it climbed to \$55,231. Houston also saw increases in median income from \$36,616 in 2001 to \$42,797 in 2006. Rounding out the Canadian cities Edmonton had a median income of \$46,698 in 2001 and \$57,085 by 2006. In comparison Jacksonville had an income of \$40,316 in 2001 and \$48,514 in 2006.

Table 1: Homicide Data for Los Angeles and Toronto




Table 2: Homicide Data for Houston and Vancouver





Table 3: Homicide Data for Jacksonville and Edmonton



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## Social Disorganization Indicators

Table 4: Percent of Ethnic Population for Los Angeles and Toronto

	Los Angeles (2001)	Los Angeles (2006)	Percent Change	Toronto (2001)	Toronto (2006)	Percent Change
White	46.9%	50.3%	+ 3.7%	63.1%	57.1%	- 6.0%
Black	11.2%	9.8%	- 1.4%	6.6%	6.9%	+ 0.3%
Asian	10.0%	10.7%	+ 0.7%	26.3%	31.8%	+ 5.5%
Indian/Aboriginal	.8%	.5%	- 0.3%	.44%	.52%	+ 0.08%
Other	20.9%	26.0%	+ 6.0%	1.4%	0.9%	+ .05%
Two or more	5.2%	2.8%	- 2.4%	0.7%	1.1%	+ 0.4%

Table 5: Percent of Ethnic Population for Houston and Vancouver

	Houston (2001)	Houston (2006)	Percent Change	Vancouver (2001)	Vancouver (2006)	Percent Change
White	49.3%	56.0%	+ 6.7%	63.1%	58.2%	- 4.9%
Black	25.3%	23.4%	- 1.9%	.94%	.98%	+ 0.4%
Asian	5.3%	5.7%	+ 0.4%	34.2%	38.4%	+ 4.2%
Indian/Aboriginal	0.4%	0.4%	0%	1.9%	1.9%	0%
Other	16.6%	13.3%	- 3.3%	.17%	.13%	- 0.04%
Two or More	3.1%	1.2%	- 1.9%	.63%	1.0%	+ .37%

Table 6: Percent of Ethnic Population for Jacksonville and Edmonton

	Jacksonville (2001)	Jacksonville (2006)	Percent Change	Edmonton (2001)	Edmonton (2006)	Percent Change
White	64.5%	61.9%	- 2.6%	79.8%	77.0%	- 2.8%
Black	29.0%	30.3%	+ 1.3%	1.9%	2.6%	+ 0.7%
Asian	2.8%	3.6%	+ 0.8%	15.9%	17.9%	+ 2%
Indian/Aboriginal	0.3%	0.3%	0%	4.6%	5.2%	+ 0.6%
Other	1.4%	2.0%	+ 0.6%	0.2%	.17%	- 0.03%
Two or More	2.0%	2.0%	0%	0.4%	.68%	+ 0.28%



Table 7: Median Household Income for all Six Cities





Table 8: Population Growth For all Six Cities



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Vance McLaughlin

## Abstract

2012

Between 1911 and 1912, in towns along the Southern Pacific railroad line running through Louisiana and Texas, a minimum of twelve African-American families were murdered in their homes. All the murders occurred at night and an ax was used to fracture the skulls of the victims. Only one person, Clementine Barnabet, was ever punished for any of these homicides.

## Introduction

This paper is an excerpt from a larger study of familial ax murders in the United States between 1911 and 1912. Twelve of these murders occurred in Southwest Louisiana and Texas, with African-American victims. The chart below provides the date, location, number of victims, and the names of ten of these families.

DATE	LOCATION	# OF VICTIMS	NAMES
1/28/1911	Crowley, LA	3	William J. Byers, wife, and child
2/24/1911	Lafayette, LA	4	Alexander and Meme Andrus and two children
3/21/1911	San Antonio, TX	5	Alfred and Elizabeth Casaway and three children
11/27/1911	Lafayette, LA	6	Norbert and Azema Randall and five children
June 1911	Crowley, LA	4	Warner family (1 child not killed)
January 1912	Crowley, LA	6	Wexford family (a baby was born the day before)
12/19/1911	Rayne, LA	5	Mother and four children
1/18/1912	Crowley, LA	4	Mother and three children
1/21/1912	Lake Charles, LA	5	Felix Broussard, his wife, and three children
2/19/1912	Beaumont, TX	4	Hattie Dove and three children
3/27/1912	Glidden, TX	6	Lyle Finucane, Ellen Monroe and her four children
4/11/1912	San Antonio, TX	5	William Burton, his wife, two children and Leon Evers

The first murder identified for this study was of Walter J. Byers, his wife, and child. Their bodies were found on February 3, 1911, three days after they were murdered, at their home in Crowley, Louisiana. Byers and his wife were members of a local unnamed church. It is thought that the perpetrator gained entrance through a rear window and left no useable clues (Whole family, 1911).

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Three weeks later, and 30 miles east, the bodies of the Andrus family, Alexander, Meme, Joachim and Agnes, were found in Lafayette. They were all found lying in bed and the murder weapon was on the floor. Two days later, Raymond Barnabet was arrested, and then released for lack of evidence (Resume of Case, 1935). Chief Detective Peck believed that the murders of the Andrus family were caused by either jealousy or revenge and that a number of people were involved (Has clue, 1911).

A month later, over four hundred miles west of Lafayette, the Casaway family was murdered in San Antonio. Alfred and his wife Elizabeth, along with three children were the victims. This is the only instance where one of the family, Elizabeth, was white. Alfred was in bed with his daughter Louise at the foot of the bed. Both of the backs of their heads were crushed. The rest of the bodies were in an adjoining room on the north side of the house. Elizabeth was on the bed with her daughter Josie lying across her feet with her brains exposed. The five-month-old son, Carlyle, was probably in his mother's arms. As in the Andrus murders, the ax was found at the scene and nothing of value had been stolen (Family of, 1911).

Raymond Barnabet was rearrested in July for the Andrus murders and remained in jail until his trial on October 19<sup>th</sup>. During the trial, Raymond did not take the stand. He sat dejectedly behind the defense table, muttering "Goodbye" and "Mo foutu" (I am gone) loud enough for the jury to hear. Three members of his household were witnesses called by the prosecution, though some of their testimony was decidedly contradictory. Dina Porter, his companion, and his son, Zepherin, disagreed on major points. Raymond's chief protagonist was his daughter, Clementine. She testified that he arrived home, the night of the Andrus murders, with his blue shirt covered in blood and brains. She said her father bragged that he killed a whole family that night and told Clementine to wash the blood out of his clothes, which she did. Zepherin confirmed the bloody clothes and stated that his father said he had killed the Andrus family. Porter denied seeing bloody clothes or hearing a confession, but was forced to admit that Raymond had threatened to kill her a month earlier. Both children testified they feared for their life if their father was not found guilty. A fourth witness, called by the defense, was a neighbor whose family occupied half of the house where the Barnabet's lived. She directly contradicted much of what Clementine said. Despite this, Barnabet was found guilty and sentenced to hang (Resume of Case, 1935).

Barnabet's three attorneys appealed his conviction on a number of grounds. One unique motion was that their client had been intoxicated during his trial. Raymond had drained a smuggled bottle of wine in his cell before he was taken into the courtroom. A new trial was ordered for Raymond, but he remained in custody, because he was too poor to post bond (Court Records of Appeal Request for Raymond Barnabet, 1912).

Five weeks after the verdict, while Raymond was in jail, Norbert Randall, his wife Azema, and three of their children and a nephew, were found murdered in their home in Lafayette on November 27<sup>th</sup>. The two adults were found in their bed while the four youngsters were found on another bed. A child's bloody footprint was found by the bed and it is conjectured that victim was thrown back on the bed before being killed. This would be the only case

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where a victim was shot. Norbert had a bullet in his brain that had entered through his forehead. An ax had cut the mosquito netting covering his bed. One difference between the Andrus and Randall murders was that the Andrus' had been killed with the sharp edge of an ax while the Randall's had been killed with the blunt side (Resume of Case, 1935).

Shortly after the bodies were discovered, Clementine Barnabet was arrested. Clementine was living a block away with Mr. Guidry, as a housekeeper. Blood was found on the latch of the rear gate. Clementine's room was searched and her clothes had blood on them. Many arrests were made, including that of Edwin Charles and Gregory Porter. They were with Clementine on the night of the murder indicted for murdering family (Negress is, 1912). It was thought that her clothes and room had human blood and brains. This was confirmed after the evidence was sent to New Orleans and examined by Dr. Metz. He would declare that the blood and brains on an Andrus pillowcase matched the blood and brains on Barnabet's clothes (Louisiana state, 1912)

It wasn't until January 20, 1912 that King Harrison was arrested. He had set up Sacrifice Sect churches in a number of small towns, including Crowley and Lafayette, along the Southern Pacific railroad route. Harrison said his headquarters were near Lake Charles. He denied teaching anything that would incite criminal acts. He told the Sheriff that on the night of the Randall family murder, he had been walking near the house and Clementine had told him to leave the area because a street corner fight had taken place and the police were on the way (Negro woman, 1912).

After Clementine's arrest, the African-American community was in a state of terror. Enterprising sadists use this environment to send extortion letters. Sanctified church ministers were arrested and then released. One minister, convicted felon Abraham Nelson, had been caught in people's homes, and when caught, would quote from the Bible. On March 1<sup>st</sup>, a hoodoo man, unconnected to the murders, was killed resisting arrest at Lake Charles. He had used the fear of murder to sell charms of protection and offered to "wire" homes to secure them from evil (Resume of Case, 1912).

Both Barnabets were still incarcerated when on January 21, 1912, Felix Broussard, his wife and three children were murdered in Lake Charles, Louisiana, 76 miles west of Lafayette. The above murder had the following written on a wall: "When he maketh inquisition for blood he forgetteth not the cry of the humble", which was an almost verbatim quote of the Bible's twelfth verse of the ninth psalm. On the inside of the door was written "Human, five." (Blame fanatics, 1912)

The newspaper feature, "Voodoo's Horrors Break Out Again," was published by the *El Paso Gazette* on March 14<sup>th</sup>. It contained specific information on the Broussard murders including that the children had had pieces of paper separating their five fingers. It also mentions the Warner and Wexford murders that occurred in Crowley. The Warner family was killed in June of 1911 and the Wexford family was killed in January of 1912. The article focused on how the number five kept turning up, noting that Clementine said she had four accomplices. Using italics for emphasis, it stated in part:

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At Lafayette, it was five members of the Andrus family who were sacrificed. At the same place a few months later, five members of the Randall family had evidently been marked for slaughter, but a sixth, appearing upon the scene unexpectedly met the fate of his kinsmen. At Crowley, last June, four members of the Warner family had undoubtedly been doomed to perish, but one, a child, escaped, and only four went to their death. Two months ago, six members of the Wexford family perished at the hands of the fanatics but one was an infant that had been born a day before the tragedy and in all probability had not been taken into consideration when the plans for the human sacrifice were consummated. Now comes the Broussard family tragedy with the *five* victims, thus completing a series of sacrifices of *five* separate families, each evidently intended to involve *five* victims.

The article further stated that the blood of the parents had been collected in a bucket that was then moved to collect the blood of the children in the next room.

Three days after the Texas newspaper article appeared, Hattie Dove and her three children were killed in Beaumont. Mother and son, Ernest, were found in bed in front room. Ernest was hit with the blade of the ax, while the women were hit with the blunt end. One ax blow had missed and hit the wall. After the murders, the killer wiped his blood hands with a cloth and left the cloth and ax on the floor. The ax was owned by a man living two blocks away and his ax had been replaced with a different ax (Brutal murder, 1912).

A week after the murder of the Dove family, another mass family murder occurred in Glidden, Texas. Lyle Finucane, Ellen Monroe, and her four children were slain. Entrance to the house was made through a window and the police said robbery was the motive. Finucane and Ellen were found on the floor of one room. Ellen had attempted to escape based on her blood trail. The four children in the other room were in their night clothes. The ax was found at the house and the wash pan had been used to wash the blood from the killer's hands. Tracks of a man and woman's were found outside the house and two bloodhounds followed them. Two miles from the scene they stopped at a house and all were arrested who were inside. A pair of bloody shoes was found. Fields and his wife had come to Glidden the night before with a trunk and tried to buy a train ticket. No train was available so they returned home (Axman deals, 1912). Despite the circumstantial evidence, on June 1<sup>st</sup>, the jury deliberated an hour and brought in a not guilty verdict against Jim Fields.

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On April 1, 1912, in the Lafayette jail, Clementine admitted that she killed 17 people which included the four members of the Randall family, the four members of the Andrus family, a family of five in Rayne and a family of four at Crowley. She said her gang consisted of two other women and two men. At Rayne, they drew straws, and she was thus chosen to wield the axe, while the others watched. After killing the two adults she said, "It was an easy matter to get rid of the two small children. We thought it was better to kill them than to leave orphans, as they would suffer." Concerning the Andrus family, she stated, "We took the man and woman, placed them in a kneeling position beside the bed and left the house. I was one of the first to aid the relatives

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the next day and helped prepare the bodies for burial.” She was asked if victims were chosen for any particular reason. She answered, “No, these families were not selected particularly. We started out, not knowing who the victims would be.” (Negress confesses, 1912, p.1)

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“She was very self-contradictory, sometimes indicating that she had assistants in the murders and often boasting of having committed them, especially the Lafayette crimes alone. She said that she had used a gun only once and that was when she shot Randall after he was dead. From her account which was vile and repulsive, it was gleaned that Clementine was an unnatural moral pervert, who at times had strong desires to fondle people, and that when she had killed her victims, indulged in her passions to her heart’s content.” (Resume of Case, 1912, p.9).

Sheriff LaCoste believed a total of 35 African-Americans in Louisiana and Texas had been murdered. He said:

“We expect to show that the blood found on the bundle of woman’s clothes the morning after the murder of the Randall family here last fall was human blood and identical with the blood found on the bed clothes of the Randalls. This will be proven by a chemical analysis made by Dr. A.L. Metz, city chemist of New Orleans.” (Negro murderess, 1912). LaCoste added, “Clementine Barnabet is rational and I believe it is true, except as to details given with the purpose of confusing officers as to her accomplices.” (Negro woman, 1912, p. 13)

Late in the same day that Clementine confessed, Reverend Joseph Thibodeaux was arrested in New Iberia and transported to the Lafayette Jail. Thibodeaux claimed he was a root doctor and did not deal in charms but did tell fortunes by using cards and reading palms. He said one of his remedies was giving a patient a piece of paper with 25 letters in five lines. The patient was instructed, when they felt bad, to tear off one of the letters, roll it up in a ball, and swallow it. He said that anyone in possession of this paper was protected from harm, which seemed to contradict his statement that he did not sell charms. In an attempt to prove his credentials, he produced a letter from a Beaumont, Texas woman requesting his healing aid (Negro woman, 1912).

On April 4<sup>th</sup>, six indictments were returned by the grand jury, charging Clementine with the murders at the Randall residence. Her trial date will be set next week (Self-confessed slayer, 1912). Two days later, an arrested Reverend Thompson was intensely questioned about the Sacrifice Sect. A passage underlined in his King James Bible read “And now also the axe is laid unto the root of the tree, therefore every tree which bringeth forth not good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire.” Thompson seemed to be afflicted with a faulty memory but did admit that when members of his church became sanctified, they were told that they no longer could sin against God, and the criminal law did not constrain their actions. Clementine blamed Reverend Joseph Thibodeaux for planting the idea of murder in her mind (Murder taught, 1912). On April 8<sup>th</sup>, Clementine’s arraignment was canceled. She told a reporter that three additional families, totaling 13 victims, would be murdered in the near future near

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Lafayette. A woman was arrested who was thought to be Irene (Murderess not, 1912). By the end of April, a number of suspects had been arrested based on accusations that they were Clementine's accomplices. All of these arrestees were released (Resume of Case, 1935).

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In San Antonio, in June, an attempt was made to break into the Dashiell house at 111 Gibbs Street through the kitchen window. James Dashiell prepared himself in case another forced entry occurred. At four a.m. on August 16<sup>th</sup>, a man broke in through the kitchen window and struck Lois, James' wife, with an ax. She had her arm across her forehead which absorbed the blow. Her daughter Harriet was sleeping with her. She screamed and her husband, who occupied the next room with his son, Joseph, grabbed his revolver and fired several shots. (The other sons, John and James were sleeping in another room). All James could hear was the noise of the intruder and his first shot hit the side of the kitchen door near the top. James then thought the intruder went over the back fence and shot again, but later felt the intruder had gone around the house instead. The Dashiell house is located in the same part of the city as the Casaway and Burton homes. (Axman fails, 1912).

Clementine proved to be a difficult client for her three attorneys to defend. They first entered a plea of religious insanity. Bainbridge (1984), described it as, "The official nineteenth-century theory of insanity was a marvel of eclecticism. The root concept was the idea that stress could exhaust a constitutionally weak nervous system. Were the stress great enough, even the strongest mind would succumb. The sources of stress and exhaustion were many but could be grouped under the headings physical and moral." In addition, newspaper stories described her in unflattering terms.

That the woman is in the lowest scale of humanity and totally devoid of any sense of pity or ordinary conception of shame and disgrace is conclusive and borne out by her whole life, which has been pitched on the lowest plane of morality. The officers from years past have repeatedly driven her from town. While the woman at times seems practically insane, she yet has a certain intelligence and cunning. Ever since her incarceration she has successfully foiled the officers in their attempts to get at the true facts of the case, and when she deceives the officers by giving them some false clew (sic), she smiles with devilish delight and chuckles over her victory (Negress indicted, 1912, p. 1).

Clementine stated at her trial, "I am the woman of the sacrifice sect. I killed them all, men, women and babies, and I hugged the dead bodies to my heart. But I am not guilty of murder." Despite her attorneys' objections, she wanted her confession entered into the trial record. She felt if she was to be executed, an angel in a chariot of fire would save her life (Negress proposes, 1912, p. 2). Clementine was convicted of killing Mrs. Randall and sentenced to life in prison on October 25, 1912 (Butcheress guilty, 1912).

Five years later, in an article describing the Louisiana State Penitentiary, Clementine was briefly mentioned.

Examination by medical experts disclosed the fact that she was a pervert. She was given a life term in the penitentiary and when brought to Baton Rouge she was

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subjected to another examination. Prison surgeons performed an operation that restored her to normal condition. She has been at the woman's camp at Angola several years and has caused absolutely no trouble (Robinson, 1921, p. 41).

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The procedure used to "cure" Clementine is unknown. Lobotomies were not performed until ten years later in the United States. Clementine Barnabet was discharged on April 28, 1923.

## Conclusion

African-American victims of both serial and mass murder have received little attention, especially before 1920. One reason may be that these crimes were more apt to occur in the rural south, with little newspaper coverage and poor record keeping. Texas papers reported the murders in greater detail because they occurred in larger cities and most of the death certificates are readily accessible.

Clementine was the only person ever punished for any of the ax murders mentioned. There are a plethora of unanswered questions. Were any of the murders in Louisiana and Texas connected? If so, when did they start and stop? Other similar family murders were identified before and after the official count. On November 13, 1909, Edna Opelousas and her three children were murdered in Crowley (Slaughtered with, 1909). On November 11, 1912, days after the incarcerated Clementine vowed 30 more people would die before the new moon, William Walmsley, his wife Sallie, and their daughter were killed in Philadelphia, Mississippi (Axe sect, 1912). Another question is it possible for only one person to physically be able to kill so many people without assistance? In almost every case, a few suspects were arrested within two days after the bodies were found, only to be exonerated. Clementine's two brothers and father were among those arrested, but were released on lack of evidence.

One hundred years after the fact, it is difficult to proffer sound conclusions on many aspects of the crimes. An apt quote made by Winston Churchill, when referring to Russia in 1939, stated, "it is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma..." can also be said about the strange case of Clementine Barnabet.

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## Child Homicides in Sweden between 1990 to 1996 and 2002 to 2008

2012

Joakim Sturup, BSc, PhD<sup>56</sup>  
Sven Granath, BSc, PhD<sup>7</sup>

### Background

Homicide is classically defined as murder, manslaughter, infanticide and assault and causing another's death (Wolfgang, 1975). Studies from Finland (Lehti, Kääriäinen & Kiviuori, 2011) and Hungary (Törö, Feher, Farkas & Dunay, 2009) report a decrease in child homicides. This finding has also been reported from other countries (Gilbert et al, 2011; FBI, 2012).

The Finish study report a decrease in all types of child homicides except for maternal filicide-suicide (Lehti, Kääriäinen & Kiviuori, 2011). When parents kill their own children, this is often connected to the parents own suicide (the so called filicide-suicide). An American study report that two thirds of parents that commit filicide-suicide are males (Hatters Friedman, Hrouda, Holden, Noffsinger & Resnick, 2005).

In Sweden homicide is the fifth most common cause of death among children (National Board of Social Welfare, 2011). Research from Sweden also suggest that child homicides (victims under 15 years of age) has decreased from the 1990'ties in Sweden (National Council for Crime Prevention, 2011a), but no study has further examined this decrease and therefore this study was set up. The study is an extension of one of the authors' bachelor thesis (J. S).

### Method and material

#### Design

A consecutive study of all cases of homicide with a victim under 15 years of age in Sweden between 1990-1996 and 2002-2008.

#### Method

A national dataset on homicide called the ESDoLV-dataset (National Council for Crime Prevention, 2011a), covering all cases of criminal homicide during 1990-1996 and 2002-2008, was utilized to examine the issue, the dataset is an extension of a collaboration study of homicide during 2002-2008 in the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden (National Council for Crime Prevention, 2011b). Both solved and unsolved cases of homicide were included in the

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<sup>5</sup> Department of Forensic Psychiatry in Stockholm (Clinical), National Board of Forensic Medicine, Box 4044, 14104, Huddinge, Sweden. +56-(0)8-6071528

<sup>6</sup> Division of Social and Forensic Psychiatry (Academic), Karolinska Institutet, Sweden

<sup>7</sup> Stockholm County Police (Clinical), 10675, Stockholm

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dataset. Therefore, there is not always information about perpetrators connected to each case. However, a majority of the cases contains such information, since the clearance rate for homicide is high, and this is especially true for homicides against children. Information about perpetrators who committed suicide or died for other reasons before conviction is included in the data, and these cases are defined as solved.

## Definition

In the ESDoLV, homicide is defined as an intentional criminal act of violence by one or more human beings resulting in the death of one or more other human beings. This definition roughly covers the definition used in the United States National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) employed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003).

## Assessments of the cases

All assessments used the police files, the verdicts from the court (in solved cases) and a forensic psychiatric examination when that had been carried out. From this information a code schema were constructed holding information on the victim, the offender, type of violence, time and day, where the offence took place and so on (for a more thorough description please see appendix I in National Council for Crime Prevention, 2011b).

## Aggregated data

Data on the number of inhabitants were collected from Statistics Sweden ([www.scb.se](http://www.scb.se)). Data on (I) the economic situation among parents, (II) number of children in acute custody care by the social services, (III) the incidence of anti-depressive medication in the general population, (IV) the incidence of antipsychotic medication in the general population and (V) incidence of abortion were collected from official statistics at Statistic Sweden and the National Board of Social Welfare (National Board of Social Welfare, 2009; National Board of Social Welfare, 2010; Statistic Sweden, 2012; National Board of Social Welfare, 2012).

## Results

There were 62 cases of homicide against a child younger than 15 years in the first time period (9 per year) and 33 cases in the latter period (5 per year), resulting in 95 homicide cases. The rate per 100.000 inhabitants under the age of 15 were 0.55 in the first time period and 0.29 in the later. Only three of the cases were not solved giving an overall clearance rate of 97%. The clearance rate among cases of homicide against victims older than 15 were 80% (National Council for Crime Prevention, 2011a).

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There were 55 boys and 40 girls among the victims, and strangulation/suffocation were the most common method of killing (30%) followed by blunt violence (19%) and sharp violence (19%). Of the offenders were 60 males and 34 females (in one case the gender of the offender were unknown). Thirty one (33%) had committed an act of filicide-suicide, whereof 21 were

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
males (68%) and 10 females (32%).

Both female and male offenders decreased during the examined time periods. The largest decrease among the victims was found among victims older than 1 year but younger than 10 years.

**Table 1.** Intra-familial child homicide cases per 100.000 children with and without suicide in Sweden 1990-1996 and 2002-2008

Period	Intra-familial	Intra-familial with suicide	Total
<b>1990-1996 (n)</b>	0.29 (33)	0.21 (24)	0.50 (57)
<b>2002-2008 (n)</b>	0.18 (20)	0.06 (7)	0.24 (27)
<b>Change</b>	<b>-38% (-13)</b>	<b>-72% (-17)</b>	<b>-52% (-30)</b>


**Figure 1.** Rate of child homicides and number of daily doses of anti-depressive medication per 100 inhabitants in Sweden 1990-1996 and 2002-2008




Among the 62 cases in the first time period, 24 had successfully taken their own life (39%), while the figure for the latter period were 7 of 33 offenders (21%). The results imply that there was a, population adjusted decrease, of 72% of cases where the offender also committed suicide in the close future to the offense (the so called filicide-suicide). There were a decrease among both mothers and fathers.

On an aggregated level three factors were significantly correlated to the decrease in lethal violence towards children. These factors were I) the incidence of anti-depressive medication in the general population (Pearsons =-0.66), II) number of children in acute custody care by the social services (Pearsons =-0.64), and III) the economic situation among single parents (Pearsons =-0.25). There were no correlation between the incidence of abortion nor the incidence of antipsychotic medication in the general population and the number of child homicide cases.

**Figure 2.** Rate of child homicides and number children (age 0-20 years) in acute custody care by the social services per 100.000 children in Sweden 1990-1996 and 2002-2008



**Figure 2.** Rate of child homicides and number of parents that do not have 2000\$ for an economic emergency in Sweden 1990-1996 and 2002-2008



## Discussion

In Sweden the level of child homicides has decreased. This has been presented by research but no study has examined which cases that has decreased and as to why this is. The study suggests that most of the decrease is due to a reduction in filicide-suicide cases. These cases do not account for all of the decrease but is proposed to be the major cause. Looking at aggregated data three factors that may be related to the decrease in filicide-suicide cases are the economic situation among single parents, II) number of children on acute coercive care by the social services, and III) the incidence of anti-depressive medication in the general population. In difference to a Finish study (Lehti, Kääriäinen & Kiviuri, 2011) on child homicide this study found a reduction of maternal filicide-suicide as well as paternal filicide-suicide.

## Conclusion

There has been a decrease in child homicide in Sweden during the last 20 years. The main decrease is due to a reduction in cases of homicide-suicide among parents. Improved work by social services, mental health services and economic policy decisions has impact of the level of child homicides.

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CHAPTER 4 **2012**

DYNAMICS OF HOMICIDE:  
HOMICIDICAL INTERACTIONS

Presenters:

Thomas Dover, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Napoleon Reyes, Sonoma State University  
Victoria Titterington, Sam Houston State University

Richard M. Hough, Sr., University of West Florida  
Kimberly M. Tatum, University of West Florida

Chair: Lynn Addington, BJS Visiting Fellow

Recorder: James C. McCutcheon, University of Central Florida



## Toward Understanding Homicidal Interaction: A Computational Simulation Approach

2012

Thomas Dover, FBI Behavioral Science Unit

The dynamic quality of interaction is perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of criminal offending to capture. The complexity of an offender-victim interaction is further exacerbated because often, especially in murder, the behavior behind interaction is inferred through witness statements, crime scene attributes, or other indirect information.

Interpretation of crime scene attributes and other indirect information is problematic when activity that appears to be similar can arise from very different behavioral and cognitive origins. For instance, the use of bindings in a murder can provide the offender with a means to control the victim, a means of enhancing the offender's sexual gratification (i.e. bondage), or a means to quickly and efficiently move an unconscious or deceased victim. Bindings can be interpreted as one of the above, all of the above, or none of the above. The type of offender to be inferred from this information depends on the context and the interpretation. For this reason, the offender-victim interaction can only really be understood if considered in its entirety as a complex adaptive system.

We must begin to view murder not as a phenomenon but rather as one of many potential emergent outcomes of interaction. The offender-victim interaction is inextricably defined by the product of the interaction. In some planned murders, roles are defined from the inception of the interaction; in other, more impulsive acts of murder, the roles only become evident as the interaction becomes more dynamic.

Computational simulation offers a viable way to model and explore complex adaptive systems like offender-victim interactions. Simulations can be effectively used to explore theory, improve hypotheses, and design experiments that would be difficult to create in reality. Simulations can also be used to understand a complex system from the bottom-up. In a simulation, system components are identified, modeled, and assigned rules of interaction. These simple rule-sets give rise to adaptive behaviors that emerge and define the overall complex system.

Interactions are cyclical and involve action and reaction between actors. The offender-victim interaction is no exception. Ultimately, the interaction itself, and by extension the relationship between an offender and victim, is dynamic, iterative, and cumulative. This makes it ideal for computational modeling.


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To develop computational models that simulate offending behaviors, it is essential to identify a theoretical framework that can synthesize current understanding of violence and conceptualize murder as one of many potential outcomes of a complex adaptive system. One such cognitive architecture is the Offender Interaction Process Model (Dover, 2010). The OIPM proposes

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structuring offender-victim interaction as a task oriented process that outlines the steps that the offender must go through to achieve the (intended or unintended) outcome of murder. The OIPM is constructed of four primary phases: Strategic, Tactical, Execution, and Evaluation (see Figure 1). These four phases can be summarized as the development of a need (Strategic), method for satisfying the need (Tactical), action toward satisfying the need (Execution), and determining what happens next (Evaluation).

Figure 1




For instance, an offender's long-term *Strategic* foundation has placed him in the condition of an ongoing desire to get "high." To achieve this goal he must acquire drugs or property to exchange for drugs. This becomes his short-term strategic goal and the impetus for interaction. Once he has identified a personally acceptable means of acquiring property (i.e. robbery) and a suitable victim, he adjusts his method of approach and confrontation in the *Tactical* phase to account for perceived variations in the context and the victim. Perhaps the offender's tactical plan involves using a gun to give him, what he believes will be adequate instrumental control over the victim. However, once the offender steps into the *Execution* phase and begins the robbery, he may find that the victim resists more than expected. In truth, the victim's resistance is a source of dissonance or conflict with the offender's internal plan, to which the offender must now adapt. In this example, when the victim attempts to grab the gun the offender shoots and kills the victim. In the *Evaluation* phase, the offender may panic and set a new strategic goal of avoiding capture. This will set off a new cycle of the OIPM.

In the OIPM, "motivation" is viewed as an ongoing and dynamic product of the offender's progression through the different phases. There is no doubt that the above scenario is a murder. Yet there is a distinct difference between how, why, and when the robbery was formulated and how, why, and when the murder was formulated. The robbery preceded the murder and provided the initial impetus for the interaction. Had the event unfolded differently, the result may have simply been a robbery. The murder itself did not become part of the offender's interaction cycle until

the dynamic *Execution* phase. In the OIPM, "motivation" is not a singular concept. It is instead an accumulation of goal-setting behaviors that change and adapt over the course of the interaction. It is, therefore, not the offender's motivations that are of interest, but rather his motivational origins within the OIPM that provide an understanding of what drives the interaction. Within the OIPM, each phase is associated with specific motivational origins (see Figure 2).


Figure 2



Any computational model that attempts to make the implicit concepts of a theory explicit must rely on assumptions. The quality of the model is not dependent on the type of model, but instead the successful identification and implementation of the appropriate assumptions. In this way, simulations are powerful when exploring a concept or theory because they require the modeler to address the assumptions that go into a model and the questions of what to include and what to exclude.

As an example, this presentation will discuss the construction of a simple (yet emergently complex) offender simulation called the Offender Interaction NetLogo Model (OINM) created by T. Dover and W. Herche. The OINM was built in NetLogo, a multi-agent programmable modeling environment, and is a stylized representation of offender-victim interaction. The simulation utilizes the four phases of the OIPM to develop a systematic model of an offender. This model begins with an evolving strategic need, develops a method to interact and achieve that need, encounters a potential for dissonance, and evaluates the offender's ability to successfully achieve his goal based on his accumulated skill set compared to the victim's accumulated skill set. Figure 3 illustrates some of the visual elements included in the model to be further discussed during the presentation.

Figure 3



The OINM involves two different simulations working in conjunction with each other. The offender's internal processes are modeled using a system dynamics simulation that tracks the offender's rising and falling "need" affect. The "need" affect was a convenient way to quantify (and simplify) the offender's on-going exposure to stimuli that increase or decrease his interest in interacting externally.

The offender's externalization of his "need" to interact is presented as an agent-based simulation that gives the offender a spatial context in which he encounters victims with whom he can interact violently or non-violently. During the simulation, the offender's "need" affect interacts with two internal dynamic "envelopes." These "envelopes" represent the offender's propensity for interaction and violent affect. Given breaches of the envelopes by the offender's "need" affect the offender will change his current state and develop a strategic goal to interact non-violently, build violent long-term foundational elements, or interact violently.

The "envelopes" can be configured so that the offender regularly encounters violent affect prior to interaction. This configuration represents a "violent affect-based" interaction because it will result in a violent affect that builds to a violent interaction. This could be understood to represent an offender who develops long-term violent fantasies and then eventually acts upon them.

The "envelopes" can also be configured so that the offender will tend to interact prior to developing violent affect. This configuration is considered "interaction-based" because violent affect experienced by

the offender occurs after an interaction has already started. This configuration could be understood to represent an offender who does not initially plan or want to kill the victim, but after interacting with the victim the murder develops dynamically.

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The "envelopes" represent a simplified version of motivational origins and allow the model to map some OIPM motivational origins as violent affect-based and others as interaction-based. In the model, the offender's violent affect either precedes or follows the offender's need to interact, which ultimately defines the trajectory of the offender's violent interaction.

Building a bottom-up approach toward understanding offender-victim interaction via a computational simulation model represents a unique and perhaps novel approach in advancing the corpus of thought in this field. This exercise has provided a first step toward using computational methodologies to better understand the outcome of murder in the complex adaptive system of offender-victim interaction.

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## Recorder Notes for Toward Understanding Homicidal Interaction: A Computational Simulation Approach

2012

Vance McLaughlin: A police officer is walking to the car, how many times does he put his hands on the weapon. There are different levels where they are going to be keyed. There is a magic moment. Does the same thing work in homicide activities? I don't understand how there are so many different attributed you can account for.

Thomas Dover: Using a computational approach I can run this a thousand times and see that 1 time where the magic moment happens. This is where we look at those things closer. What is about the magic moment? It could be a lot of different things that are not predictable. This is not the only simulation I'm looking at.

Carl Bell: There has been a copy-cat contagion effect. A lot of suicides have been proceeded by other similar issues. How would you prove that there is a contagion effect?

Thomas Dover: There might be ways of proving that. Network simulation. The flooding of media networks...there are ways to map those out.

Dick Block: Can you contextualize the anchor points?

Thomas Dover: Yes

Dick Block: There are a lot of contextual things that can predict the crime

Thomas Dover: Yes, this is a very stylized way of looking at this. You can actually put this on map. You can have congregation areas like a school.. Known sites are way to reproduce this pattern. Maybe there is something we may not know about.

Mark Ridell: How do you respond to the people, what is the role of chaos theory. This is such a complex system. But how do you know which predictor is going to pop?

Thomas Dover: In chaos theory there is strange reactor. This tells us what the elements of this even actually are. You have to be very explicit about that attribute. Maybe there is something else going on that you haven't identified before. But there are other ways we can build learning systems. Genetic algorithms are one thing I am interested in looking at in understanding attributes that may predict evolutionary patterns.

## Intra-Group Interaction in Multiple-Offender Sexual Homicide

Napoleon C. Reyes **2012**  
Sonoma State University  
napoleoncreyes@sonoma.edu

Victoria B. Titterington  
Sam Houston State University  
titterington@shsu.edu

Few studies have examined the nature and extent of sexual homicide involving multiple offenders. This may be due to the rarity of the crime. While sexual homicide accounts for only 1% to 6% of reported homicides (Beech, Fisher, & Ward, 2005; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005; Hakkanen-Nyholm, Repo-Tiihonen, Lindbarg, Salenius, & Weizmann-Henelius, 2009; Roberts & Grossman, 1993), multiple-offender sexual homicide is believed to be even more rare.

Some scholars observe that group offenses in certain forms of violent crimes are becoming more prevalent. Juodis, Woodworth, Porter, and Brinke (2009) note that the number of multiple-offender homicides has risen dramatically since 1976, just as Hauffe and Porter (2009) believe that group rape is more common than once thought. Also, Bijleveld, Weerman, Looije, and Hendriks (2007) assert that juvenile sex offending often occurs in group context.

In an earlier study, Reyes & Titterington (2011) found that multiple-offender sexual homicide significantly differs from single-offender sexual homicide in terms of the victim's age, victim-offender relationship, and the severity of the injury sustained by the victim. They also noted that in multiple-offender cases, on average, only three out of five members of a group directly participated in the homicide and only four out of five members of a group directly participated in the sexual assault (Reyes & Titterington, 2011).

That not all members of a sexual homicide group directly participate in the actual killing or sexual assault is hardly surprising. In his examination of delinquent groups, Warr (1996) asserts that group members may play different roles in the commission of a crime - some may act as instigator and others as joiners. Sometimes, other members are simply used to facilitate the offense (Hart-Kerkhoffs, Vermeiren, Jansen, & Doreleijers, 2010). It could also be that other members choose to remain as spectators, experiencing power "by observing a fellow conspirator destroy human life" (Hickey, 2009, p. 193).

The present study seeks to identify the patterns of interaction between offenders in multiple-offender sexual homicide. Using data collected from 36 cases decided by the Philippine Supreme Court, it uses a grounded theory approach to uncover the group processes associated with this rare form of homicide.

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## Method

### Data

The data used for this study were collected from the Philippine Supreme Court reports of criminal cases involving homicide where there was an initial finding by the trial court that rape or attempted rape occurred. Using "rape" and "homicide" as key words, electronic search for these cases were done on the following databases: (1) the Philippine Supreme Court's electronic Jurisprudence Archive at <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/decisions/index.php>; and (2) the Arellano Law Foundation's LAWPHIL Project's electronic Philippine Jurisprudence Databank at <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/judjuris.html>. LAWPHIL's Philippine Jurisprudence Databank covers law reports from 1901 to the present and the Jurisprudence Archive contains law reports from 1996 to the present day.

The decision to use the Philippine Supreme Court law reports for this study was based on two considerations. First, as in the United States and the United Kingdom, sexual homicide does not have a specific category in the official crime statistics of the Philippines. Cases of intentional killings that contain a sexual element are reported by the Philippine National Police under the index crime category of murder or homicide. Second, under Philippine laws, all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is *reclusion perpetua* (i.e. imprisonment for 20 years and one day to 40 years), life imprisonment, or death go to the Philippine Supreme Court - the highest court in the Philippine legal system - on automatic review (Phil. Const., 1987; Phil. Rules of Court, 1964). These would include, among others, cases of rape with homicide, attempted rape with homicide, robbery with homicide and rape, and kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, which are all punishable by *reclusion perpetua* to death (Phil. Rev. Penal Code, 1932).

Though we recognize some disadvantages in using law reports to gather data on crime incidents, these law reports tend to reflect the actual nature of the offense more accurately than victim statements or police data since they rely on a variety of evidentiary sources (e.g. victim's statement, defendant's statement, forensic evidence, and witnesses' statements) (Porter & Alison, 2006).

### Case Criteria and Selection

This study used the definition of sexual homicide proposed by Ressler and his colleagues (1986, 1988), wherein homicide is "sexual in nature" if any of the following is present from the crime scene: (1) victim's lack of attire; (2) exposure of the sexual parts of the victim's body; (3) sexual positioning of the victim's body; (4) insertion of foreign objects into the victim's body cavities; (5) evidence of sexual intercourse (oral, anal, vaginal); and (6) evidence of substitute sexual activity, interest, or sadistic fantasy (Ressler et al., 1988, p. xiii). This definition allows the inclusion of sexually motivated homicide that has no obvious sexual element but without being too broad. It also does not assume that sexual homicides are premeditated acts from the outset (Chan, Heide, & Beauregard, 2010). Accordingly, a case was included in this study if the defendant or any of the defendants were convicted by the

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trial court of rape or any crime where homicide and rape were considered aggravating circumstances, and such conviction was (a.) affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court; or (b.) modified by the Philippine Supreme Court to either murder or homicide, with an indication that the same was sexual in nature, based on Ressler et al.'s (1988) criteria.

A total of 115 cases were initially selected based on these criteria, dating from 1933 to 2010. Notably, 91.3% of cases were decided during the period of the 1980s through 2010. Four cases were deleted because of missing data, leaving 111 cases, 36 of which involved multiple offenders.

## Results

The 36 sexual homicide cases involved 136 male offenders. None of the groups were reported to have committed any prior case of sexual homicide. The average number of offenders in a group was four ( $M = 3.78$ ,  $SD = 1.675$ ). The smallest group had two offenders and the largest had nine. The modal number of offenders was three.

Five groups (13.9%) had one or two minor offenders who were under the age of 18 years. Five groups (13.9%) had at least one offender who was related to the victim. Eleven groups (30.6%) also had at least two offenders who were related to each other.

In fifteen cases (41.7%), all offenders in a group directly participated in the sexual assault. The average percentage of offenders in a group who directly participated in sexually assaulting the victim was 82.1%. Likewise, there were only eight cases (22.2%) wherein all offenders in a group directly participated in the homicide. The average percentage of offenders in a group who directly participated in killing the victim was 59.3%. In some cases, the offenders claimed that they were coerced into participating in the sexual assault and killing of the victim, with others insisting that they did not know that the incident would turn out the way it did (e.g. agreeing only to rape the victim but not to kill her).

## Motive

The majority of cases (83.3%) were clearly sexually motivated, with some members of the group expressing their sexual attraction to their victims or their intention to commit rape. The remaining six cases (16.7%) began as burglary or robbery. Eyewitness accounts and confessions by some offenders suggest that most of the homicides were deliberately committed to eliminate a potential witness or were purely accidental (e.g. in an attempt to control the victim by grabbing the neck, the victim died of asphyxiation). Some cases suggest that the infliction of pain that eventually led to the death of the victim was sexually arousing for the offender and, in a few instances, both the sexual assault and homicide seem to be driven by the need for excitement or thrill. Scully and Marolla (1985, p. 259) refer to this as "recreation and adventure" where male camaraderie is maintained by the collective participation in a dangerous activity. In one case, two sisters were abducted from a shopping mall and were subjected to sexual, physical, and psychological abuse for the entertainment of the group. One of the victims was made to dance naked in front of the group. When she

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ran in an attempt to escape, the group followed her in a car and taunted her to "run some more." The other victim was pushed off a cliff.

## Planning

2012

Most of the cases appear to be the result of a spontaneous meeting of the minds among offenders. The crime is initiated by an act of one of the offenders, usually the leader, and the reaction of the other offenders supported such action. In only a third of the cases (33.3%) was there some form of planning in the commission of the offense. "Planning" in this sense varies from having an elaborate plan to a mere agreement to commit a crime without any details. In most of these cases, the victim was either brought by one of the offenders to where the rest of the group was waiting, abducted by the group from one place and brought to where the crime was committed, or ambushed by the group. Detailed planning was more common in cases that started out as burglary or robbery.

## Leadership and Hierarchy

There were 18 cases (50%) where a co-offender assumed the role of group leader. In some cases, particularly those involving politicians and their cohorts, there was a formal recognition of the leadership by one of the offenders. In one case, a town mayor instructed his security staff to abduct a female college student. When the woman and her male friend were brought to his house, he raped the woman and, thereafter, allowed his men to do whatever they wanted with her and her male friend. His men killed the male friend first and then successively raped the woman. They also killed her when they were done. There were also cases where an offender acted as the group leader because of his status, age, or relationship with the other offenders. Otherwise, the leadership role was assumed by one of the offenders through his actions and the rest of the group acquiesced to his role. Only four cases (11.1%) exhibited a clear hierarchy within the group. This is manifested by the presence of "lieutenants" who led the execution of the leader's directive. The "lieutenants" also served as enforcers within the group.

## Summary

As what we believe to be the first such analysis of sexual homicide offending in the Philippines, this study contributes to our understanding of this form of lethal violence internationally. These findings also enhance what is known about multiple-offender sexual assault and murder. In both cases, we expect this to generate additional research of these phenomena on our part and the part of other researchers.

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## Recorder Notes for Intra-Group Interaction in Multiple-Offender Sexual Homicide

**2012**

Vance McLaughlin: the family ties are interwoven over there in law enforcement. If you have an 8<sup>th</sup> cousin you are expected to step in. There are a lot of cases of this happening. Where in corruption has items left out of the briefings.

Napoleon Reyes: We have a serious case of corruption within the national police. Also, there was a massacre where the incumbent killed everyone on the other political side. The women were sexually assaulted.

## I Didn't Come Here to Kill You, It Just Happened

Richard Hough  
Kimberly Tatum

2012

### Introduction

In keeping with the Group's work to transform social problems into social solutions, we summarize our in-progress homicide research. Our research examines homicide data from a Southeastern suburban county. Using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), we are examining the characteristics of instrumental and expressive criminal homicides in this jurisdiction. The subject county is a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) of approximately 300,000 residents. The dyadic relationship, precipitating factors and escalation process, and the individual demographics and situational context factors are being evaluated for commonalities and differences.

The analysis involves 32 homicides incidents during 2010. This area had the highest homicide rate in Florida in 2010 and one of the highest poverty rates. After a discussion of the findings, we hope to examine subcultural violence theory applied to *specific* incidents. Implications of social disorganization and routine activities theories will also be discussed. Our research has already nurtured the development of an ongoing working collaboration between university researchers and the jurisdiction's two major law enforcement agencies. The partnership will be used for researching causes of homicide and the development of policy options to address violence to include community involvement strategies.

The paper presentation involves discussing community responses to homicide or violence, and police-community partnerships. The head of the sheriff's office specifically has commented on the higher than state average homicide rate in this county and the role he believes citizens should play in responding to murder. We have presented the possibility of the process of policy development being at least partly guided by current research. Implications for future research will be outlined.

As the leading violent crime, homicide receives significant media coverage and public attention. While the 24/7 news cycle artificially inflates the perception to reality ratio, people are interested for a number of reasons to include the unique psychological construct of fear for each individual. Murder remains an important research topic as well.

As context there are a number of facts that inform the broader discussion of homicide in the U.S.

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- ❖ Homicide rates have continued to fall and in 2009, the rate was the lowest since the 1960's.
  - ❖ Rates for Black offenders are much higher than for Whites.
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- ❖ Most homicides are committed by young, Black males.
- ❖ Most homicides are intra-racial, not inter-racial.
- ❖ Homicide clearance rates remain a gauge of effective law enforcement.

2012

## Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

The body of research stretching from Wolfgang's watershed Philadelphia cohort examination through today is voluminous. Even as we follow a short distance down the well-trodden path of theory examination made possible by the relatively reliable records of homicide in the U.S., we then backtrack to strike out in a less-travelled direction. We found this direction to be the one explored by Miethe and Regoeczi (2004) in their book *Rethinking Homicide*. In their self-described departure from traditional examination of crime causation, they employ the analytic method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). These researchers examine the homicide *situation* as the unit of analysis as opposed to a focus on victim, offender, and offense circumstances. One element of their rethinking of homicide research is the combination of these factors. The QCA method is an important aspect of their examination of such events.

We choose to utilize the QCA method as appropriate to a case-oriented approach to homicide events and situations. Ragin (2005) states "QCA was developed as a way to formalize case-oriented analysis and thereby provide tools to improve comparative research (p.)." Further that "The goal of the application...is to help researchers represent and synthesize what they have learned about their cases (p.)."

Rather than "...estimate the independent effects of causal variables on outcome variables...QCA seeks to discern the different combinations of causally relevant conditions linked to an outcome (Ragin, 2005, p.)." The complexity of lethal situations legislates toward the use of a method that takes into account the combinations that generate the dynamic ending in (lethal) violence.

## Method

Police reports were the primary data source; still the most common source over the last half-century. The lethal events examined were from both municipal and county incidents. The access to law enforcement incident reports gives the opportunity to examine narrative accounts in addition to "counting." Our access to local law enforcement records speaks to the rapport built in ongoing interactions over multiple crime and policy issues. Both CEOs were completely supportive of our research efforts.

## Findings

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Nationally, firearms remain the majority weapon of criminal homicide. This was similar in our sample with seventeen of the 32 homicides committed with a firearm. Another eight were by edged weapon and seven more classified "other." Most common homicide is single offender, single victim. The majority involve use of drugs or alcohol. In our sample it was

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only verified that a few suspects or victims had been using drugs or alcohol. Homicides generally occur in the evening and on weekends. The temporal breakdown of our study sample showed five homicides between the hours of 6 am and 5 pm, ten between 5 and 11 pm, and another ten between 11 pm and 6 am. Weekend days were not significantly more lethal than weekdays in our sample.

Location of homicide events nationally continues to have the victim's home as most common, but stranger homicide from gang killings occur more in the streets. While 14 homicides occurred indoors and 18 occurred outdoors, we have not yet examined which locations were the home of the victim or suspect.

## Discussion and Conclusion

As Mears (2010) indicates, there is a real need for evidence-based support for criminal justice policy implementation and review. Collaborative research projects like the current one can assist agencies in making policy that is effective. The scope of the current research does not include a great deal of commentary on partnering, however we seek to tie the research on violence and homicide to proactive public policy that addresses the various factors revealed as key in the combination of factors approach used by QCA.

A conclusion of the current study is the utility in using qualitative comparative analysis to assist in understanding deadly incidents. The sample we examined follows the national rates and trends as to time of day for homicide incidents, clearance rates, Black male on Black male violence with firearms, and some anecdotal comment on female violence. We have not yet explored expressive and instrumental violence in our study sample.

Our current study adds to the limited literature that exists which explores the relationship of homicide factors in a non-linear, clustered approach. It is important to identify factors implicated in lethal events, examination of which will enhance public policy efforts. As a not unimportant additional benefit to the research we reflect on the ongoing need to expand the partnering of criminal justice agencies and researchers.

Policy and research implications of the current study include **issues of** gender, race, and class, the Role of guns in lethal violence, drugs and behavior, Police- Community Relations (PCR) and, Clearance rates.

As the project progresses, we will look at Subcultural Violence Theory (SCCT; Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994; Gastil, 1971; Nisbet & Cohen, 1996) to evaluate its utility in understanding lethal incidents. Social Disorganization Theory will be examined for applicability (Krivov & Peterson, 2000; Shaw & McKay, 1942), and Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) will be considered as well. Each of these established theories will be looked at with consideration of the degree to which each complements or tends to exclude the combination of factors approach of QCA.

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## Authors:

Richard M. Hough, Sr., University of West Florida, Instructor School of Justice Studies  
11000 University Parkway, 85-160  
Pensacola, FL 32514  
Ofc. 850-857-6413  
FAX 850-474-2334  
[rrough@uwf.edu](mailto:rrough@uwf.edu)

Kimberly M. Tatum, University of West Florida  
Associate Professor of Justice Studies and Assistant Dean of the College of Professional Studies  
11000 University Parkway, 85-160  
Pensacola, FL 32514  
Ofc. 850-857-6198  
FAX 850-474-2334  
[ktatum@uwf.edu](mailto:ktatum@uwf.edu)

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## Recorder Notes for I Didn't Come Here to Kill You, It Just Happened

Cal: You have 3 homicides per 100,000 people. You could multiply it by 5. You'd have 15 people per 100,000. You could talk to someone and point that out. These are needle in a hay stack. There is media epidemiology.

Hough: Our interests are broader, head start. We are pleased to be able to get into the agencies and have a higher-level conversation. The media likes the current sheriff and officials. We have good things in place. The media covers the high rates. What are you going to do about the homicide rate?

Becky Block: You are thinking about differentiating between expressive and instrumental. How is that defined as confrontational?

Whether there is cases of confrontational homicide that come out of maleness. Whatever crime gone badly into I have to get rid of the victim. Are these just bad aim. Could it be EMS differences? We are interested in those who are getting to shot.

Jay Corzine: how many killings were in 2010 and 2011?

Hough: 18 and 18

Jay Corzine: Are the killings happening in the same area?

The map does not look at cluttered. There are specific areas where we see the majority of those.

Roland: What county?

Hough: Pensacola, Escambia

Dallas Drake: I think it is amazing that a sheriff is actually stepping up to examine these clusters. The difficult part is to convert and map the homicides and look at the different comparisons. This can be frustrating. You have to look at a rich text, you have this access to this and this is a great opportunity. These are occurring in clusters. Why is it only happening in these areas?

When we look at social fabric cases we have to look at

Cal Bell: Why can't we build up protective impacts in these areas? If it is a gang over territorial you know who do it. I don't know how you do public policy for this?

I think the ability in community work, has been impactful. This is tying all this in.

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2012

CHAPTER 5

DATA-SHARING AND DATA ACCESS

Presenters:

Kaye Marz, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Dallas Drake, Center for Homicide Research, Minneapolis, MN

Richard Block, Loyola University, Chicago

Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Chair:

Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Recorder:

Candice Batton, University of Nebraska, Omaha

## DATA SHARING AND DATA ACCESS WITH THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA

**2012**

Kaye Marz  
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

### ABSTRACT

A core tenet of research is that it should be based on the ethical values of honesty, fairness, trust, objectivity, openness, accountability, and respect for others (National Academy of Sciences, 2009; Council of Canadian Academies, 2010). An increasing number of funding agencies, research institutions, and scientific journals are instituting data sharing policies to meet the need for openness and accountability in research. Although data can be shared informally between researchers, an established data archive or data repository provides data depositors with an infrastructure to share research data that benefits both the depositor and the research community as a whole.

### WHY SHARE DATA

The National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (2009) wrote, “when a scientific paper or book is published, other researchers must have access to the data and research materials needed to support the conclusions stated in the publication if they are to verify and build on that research” (p. 11). This expectation that the research data will be made accessible to others is echoed in the National Science Foundation’s Data Sharing Policy that research data collected with the support of public funds should be placed in the public domain (NSF, 2008) and the long-standing archiving requirement of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ, 2012), an agency within the U.S. Department of Justice, that preserves and extends NIJ’s investment in its research grants. Data deposited by NIJ grantees with NIJ’s Data Resources Program, permits original research results to be reproducible by independent researchers and provides the data for research using different hypotheses and methods at a fraction of the cost to collect the original data.

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) data sharing policy (2003) identifies the following benefits from sharing data:

- ❖ Reinforces open scientific inquiry
- ❖ Encourages diversity of analysis and opinion
- ❖ Promotes new research
- ❖ Makes possible the testing of new or alternative hypotheses and methods of analysis
- ❖ Supports studies on data collection methods and measurement
- ❖ Facilitates the education of new researchers
- ❖ Enables the exploration of topics not envisioned by the initial investigators, and
- ❖ Permits the creation of new datasets when data from multiple sources are combined.

Therefore, researchers' ability to use each other's data lead to a total result much larger than the sum of each individual researcher's effort (NAS, 2009). Recognition of the benefits of collective effort in research was a driving force behind the establishment of the Homicide Research Working Group (HRWG) so that research about lethal violence could be coordinated across numerous disciplines and impact the problem of homicide at a practical level. Since its inception, HRWG has the following goals related to data sharing (HRWG, 2012):

- ❖ To promote improved data quality and the linking of diverse homicide data sources
- ❖ To foster collaborative, interdisciplinary research on lethal and non-lethal violence, and
- ❖ To encourage more efficient sharing of techniques for measuring and analyzing homicide.

As simply put by the National Academy of Science committee (2009), "only by sharing research data and the results of research can new knowledge be transformed into socially beneficial goods and services" (p. 69).

## DATA SHARING CHALLENGES

Unfortunately, institutional, financial, and career barriers to data sharing exist. Such barriers include:

- ❖ Need to protecting the confidentiality of study participants
- ❖ Concerns about getting "scooped"
- ❖ Errors discovered in the data or documentation
- ❖ Limited resources to prepare the data and documentation in a condition able to be shared with others
- ❖ No formal training on how to share data
- ❖ Desire to withhold data to protect own or students' ability to publish from the data
- ❖ Academic tenure system counts publications but not published data.

## BENEFITS FROM ARCHIVING DATA

While data sharing is often considered in the context of expanding scientific knowledge, individual researchers receive some benefits from sharing their data. Such benefits include:

- ❖ Data in the public domain generate new research which cites the original research
- ❖ Data are preserved and can be obtained by the original researchers if their copies are lost or destroyed
- ❖ Archiving data helps researchers meet requirements of NIH and NSF data management plans and NIJ data archiving special conditions requirements
- ❖ Information on research community's interest in a dataset can assist with the success of future grant funding proposals.

Indeed, data sharing as a measure of research productivity is of increasing interest, not only in use of the data for its original purpose but also documented uses extending the purpose through another facet of that idea as well as purposes beyond the original intent. In addition,

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data citation practices and norms of scientific practice have changed significantly over recent years so that production of data in itself is now considered a recognized scholarly pursuit. For instance, the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health has been available to other researchers since its inception. Over 3,000 publications have been authored by persons not on the original research team in the last 20 years.

In 2009, ICPSR conducted a web survey of researchers that received funding from NIH or NSF from 1985 to 1991. They received 1,217 responses (24.9% response rate). Of these, 86.6% of the researchers reported having collected social science data from these awards. Results from the survey showed that when data are shared, formally or informally, research productivity was higher. This was true even when controlling for researcher, award, and institutional characteristics. The number of publications from researchers not part of the original team was the most sensitive to these results on data sharing, but all outcome measures showed advantages from data sharing. Therefore, the study concluded that when data are archived, the return on the original investment is the highest (Pienta, et al., 2010).

## PARTNERING WITH NACJD TO SHARE DATA

Although researchers can always share their data informally, centralized repositories and archives offer a cost-effective way of providing access to research data and documentation over the long term. Digital technologies change rapidly. Software and media used to store files may become inaccessible during a researcher's career unless the files are migrated to newer software and media as technology changes.

The mission of the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD, 2012) is to facilitate research in criminal justice and criminology by:

- ❖ Preserving, enhancing, and sharing computerized data resources from Federal and state agencies and investigator-initiated research
- ❖ Distributing these data to practitioners, policy makers, evaluators, academics, and others for analysis
- ❖ Training users in specialized areas of quantitative and qualitative methods
- ❖ Extending the value of these data by facilitating the reproduction of original results, replication of others' conclusions, and testing of new hypotheses.

NACJD makes data accessible for secondary analysis for:

- ❖ Writing articles, papers, or theses using real research data
- ❖ Supporting grant proposals
- ❖ Training graduates and undergraduates in quantitative and qualitative methods
- ❖ Creating data collection instruments.

NACJD staff "clean" data files and prepare a study description to produce datasets sufficiently documented to share with other researchers. Automated processes create standardized, digitally stable data files in SAS, SPSS, and Stata. An integrated search allows researchers to locate data by searching not just the study description (as in the past), but also variable and value labels in the data, citations for related literature, and the full text of PDF and ASCII

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documentation files.

Nearly 400 collections in the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) have data about various aspects of homicide. From the NACJD front page ([www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD](http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD)), researchers can locate data on homicide using the *Homicide Data Resource Guide*. Homicide-related data collections are described using three general categories:

1. Studies focused specifically on homicide
2. Studies in which homicide is one of many offense types or categories
3. Data collections about capital punishment in which the offense for which sentences are given is often homicide

These three groups can be subdivided into collections that are gathered annually or periodically (serial collections), and data collections that resulted from one-time studies.

The Homicide Data Resource Guide provides a quick link to view all homicide studies in the NACJD holdings. This list can be sorted several ways, including by most cited in ICPSR Related-Literature bibliography and most downloaded studies. Variable-level search and online data analysis are provided for several of these studies. Most of these datasets are accessible by downloading the files from the NACJD Web site. Some studies require researchers to complete a Restricted Data Use Agreement due to potentially confidential information present in the data. Researchers sharing their data with NACJD can request the data be “restricted” and/or delayed dissemination of the data in which the data are deposited and prepared for dissemination by the NACJD staff while research project staff are available to answer questions but the data are not made accessible to other researchers until a date arranged with NACJD.

NACJD does not produce published reports, statistics, charts, or other analyses based upon data holdings. However, they do provide citations to publications based on the data available from NACJD and links to the actual publications, when possible. Links allow researchers to search for a known publication (by author or search term) and then link to the data used for the publication, or search for the data and then link to the citation for all publications based on those data in the related-literature database.

Researchers that deposited their data with NACJD can view usage statistics for downloads of their study files that occurred since 2008. Numbers provide counts of unique sessions (not counts of how many files were downloaded). For example, a count of 12 implies that users downloaded one or more files from the study as part of 12 discrete sessions (or visits to the web site) in the time period queried using drop-down lists to specify time ranges. A result table shows downloads by total unique users, faculty, graduate students, undergraduate students, university staff, others, and anonymous. The anonymous group typically provides counts of documentation as a login is not required to access documentation. Another table provides download sessions by ICPSR member institutions.

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## CONCLUSION

An increasing emphasis is being placed on data sharing amongst researchers to meet the scientific need for openness and accountability in research. Although very real challenges to data sharing exist, with advanced planning (because of a data management plan or archiving requirement) and the use of established data repositories, such as NACJD, data sharing is made easier, to the benefit of the original researchers, other researchers, policy-makers, and society.

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## Recorder Notes for Data Sharing and Data Access with the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data

2012

Wendy Regoeczi: I recently noticed that it has become difficult to access actual data sets and instead there is a long and extensive process to download data. Why is this happening and what is the likely impact?

Kaye Marz: One reason is the volume of data that ICPSR is working on; there are a lot of studies coming in and they are increasingly complex in terms (e.g., longitudinal, more variables) of the time it takes to review and ensure that there are no identifiers. In consideration of this, we try to put data up as quickly as possible in a “restricted use” format while we take the time needed to do a more comprehensive review. A higher volume of data coupled with a lack of resources means that it takes time to clean the data and prepare it for public access. ICPSR does recognize that it is more difficult for researchers to access the data, and they are working on it.

Becky Block: I recommend that ICPSR adopt the ability to add FAQs to data set, as does NACJD with a dataset that Becky uses. Researchers can anticipate a number of questions that potential users are likely to have, and FAQs could be useful in addressing them.

Dick Block: I am of two minds when it comes to ICPSR. On the one hand, the Chicago Homicide Data (CHD) has been used a lot for training, teaching, and research. There is likely a very long bibliography associated with the CHD. I also work with CrimeStat and this is another one that is downloaded a lot. I have found that students sometimes use publically available data, which is faster and easier for a dissertation, but the problem is that then they do not get the experience of collecting data, which is not good for students. Thus, an advantage to ICPSR is that it is faster and more likely to get through an IRB review, but it limits students’ experience in terms of collecting their own data and selecting variables.

Kaye Marz: I agree that sometimes people start using secondary data without really getting to know it, and that is a problem. At ICPSR we try to get people to read and use the documentation provided and to access other publications using the data since they tend to articulate caveats and usage issues.

Lynn Addington: I would like to put in a plug for ICPSR – I got my dissertation out of publically available data. I also led a workshop with the goal of educating people in using publically available data. Publically available data are good because they can allow a researcher to increase their publication numbers and researchers can make use of an underutilized resource. Having balance is important – students need to be educated and have strong research design courses so that they learn about the intricacies of research and measurement, and are then better placed to make good use of the public data.

Kim Vogt: I appreciate having access to public data when I teach undergraduate students, especially in a limited time frame like the course of a single semester. Public data has helped get students to a level that I would not have been able to achieve without access to this type of data.

**2012**

Vance McLaughlin: I recently looked at two relatively recent periods of juvenile homicide data in Georgia and wrote an unpublished book. Can the book manuscript be submitted since it has data in it?

Kaye Marz: ICPSR would work with you and gather a little more information to see if this was possible. We work with authors to see if additional work can be done or if a dataset is largely already tapped out before deciding how to proceed with archiving.

Chris Rache: I tend to think of the ICPSR archives as referring to numerical data only. Does ICPSR also archive qualitative data?

Kaye Marz: Yes. At one time, ICPSR only housed quantitative data, but now we have qualitative data too. ICPSR received a good bit of qualitative data from NIJ. ICPSR is now revising their website that will make downloading qualitative data easier.

Chris Rasche: My own academic department is phasing out its graduate qualitative methods course, thus, having qualitative data archived may be quite valuable.

John Jarvis: It is disturbing to think that qualitative methods courses are being eliminated from graduate programs. Is this happening in other places? At the FBI, we are adding qualitative methods classes to get police to think more about the data that they come across. We are going in the opposite direction at FBI in that we see great value in looking at qualitative data.

## Sharing Data from the Center for Homicide Research

Dallas Drake, Center for Homicide Research, Minneapolis, Minnesota

### ABSTRACT

Sharing data is a fundamental component of the scientific method. Science is rooted in equality – that what you know, I can know too. Center staff will share the process of obtaining data from the Center to conduct your own analysis of homicides. We also will address ethical and validity concerns about using such data. Information will be provided as to what data, in what format, will be provided.

### INTRODUCTION

#### **Mission of the Center for Homicide Research**

The Center for Homicide Research is a unique, volunteer-driven, nonprofit organization addressing the issue of homicide in our communities. The mission of the Center for Homicide Research is to promote greater knowledge and understanding of the unique nature of homicide through sound empirical research, critical analysis, and effective community partnerships. The three-fold goals of the Center are to increase case solvability, to articulate homicide issues and to reduce incidence of homicide. Our ultimate aim is to prevent homicides.

The core research is critical. Without sound information about homicide, the community and law enforcement cannot understand, solve and prevent all homicides. For too long, minority, disempowered and disenfranchised communities who are most impacted by homicide and the criminal justice establishment have functioned with incomplete or inaccurate information. The Center aims to develop original research on homicide and use this knowledge to develop, and assist in the creation of, new fact-based tools to more effectively address all homicides. This includes, but is not limited to, research briefs, research publications, compendiums of information and resources, bibliographies, training, seminars, and so forth.

The Center also strives to act as a clearing house of promising strategies to address the homicide problem.

A key component of work at the center is the construction of databases, and subsets of data, called datasets. This presentation will outline the data that is held by the Center and the process by which this data can be accessed. The purpose of sharing this data is not to circumvent any other data repository or archive, but rather to augment these other sources until data has officially been placed. This is especially important given that much homicide data never ever reaches an archive.

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## DATA-SHARING GUIDELINES

The Center for Homicide Research shares data with qualified individuals and organizations at no cost to the requestor. Each year Center staff is contacted by graduate level students seeking data for research projects and dissertation study. CHR provides research data to individuals who meet criteria as set by the Principal Researcher. This requires that the student in question be enrolled in an educational program. In some cases independent researchers not part of a program will also be considered, as will law enforcement crime analysts, and news journalists. The requestor should be able to show that they have the knowledge and capability to analyze and interpret the data, intelligently and cautiously, taking into account all the advantages and shortcomings of the dataset. Data will be granted on a case-by-case basis. Commercial use is not authorized. Data with all identifiers are available to law enforcement agencies.

To be considered for data sharing, a research proposal must be submitted to the Principal Researcher in a format requested by the Center. Proposals need not be long, but ought to be well thought out. Once approved, the requestor must submit a signed contract (provided by CHR), which lays out the agreement regarding restrictions on data use. This agreement will be provided by Center Staff and will help to ensure security and confidentiality of any sensitive data. The data can then be transmitted to the requestor. Access to foundational data (i.e., the actual reports) is rare, though sometimes available.

Format of the data varies and comes in Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, or SPSS. Coding sheets or codebooks should be provided, as will available data documentation. Because some of the data has been collected by third parties, there is no guarantee as to the authenticity or accuracy of that data. It will be received "as is." Many of the datasets come with victim name, and in some instances, offender name. This facilitates the collection of further records through data linking. This is an advantage since data from ICPSR typically does not allow for linking under their terms of service. Further information about research sample methodologies should be obtained from the original gatherer of the data.

Individuals or agencies seeking data that is available from some other source, such as ICPSR (Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research) in Ann Arbor, Michigan, should be referred to that source first. Non-CHR datasets or lists are publicly available compilations of data. As a result, they are not copyrightable. Credit should be given where due to properly source the data. Be cautious about using narrative descriptions that may be copyrighted.

Data that is available from some other source, such as ICPSR (Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research), should be obtained from that source first. Non-CHR datasets or lists are publicly available compilations of data.

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The following list is not all inclusive.

## **CHR Compiled Datasets**

2012

Acquittal in Homicide Prosecutions (80 cases; in-progress)  
Body Found Database (in-progress)  
Convenience Store Homicides (200 cases; in-progress)  
Deceased Bodies Concealed in a Woods (100 cases)  
Deceased Bodies Found in a Pond (120 cases)  
Deceased Bodies in an Auto Trunk (in-progress; 40 cases)  
Execution-Style Homicides in the United States (60 cases)  
Federal Firearm License Gun Shops in MN Database 2010  
Fire Pit Database-US and foreign cases (119 cases)  
Flint, MI Homicides 2009-2011 (in-progress)  
Foreign GLBT Homicide Victims (sporadic)  
Homicide Among the Homeless – Housed or Un-housed (in-progress)  
Homicide Prevention Strategy Database  
Lesbian National Homicide Dataset (100 cases) (SPSS)  
Minnesota GLBT Community Impact Survey 2001  
Minnesota GLBT Firearms Survey 2006  
Minnesota Homicide Database (ongoing, complete 1996 forward)  
Minnesota Homicides Dataset 1996-2000  
Minnesota Rewards 1979-2000 (in-progress) (62 cases)  
Missing Victim Homicides (150 cases)  
National Church Shooting Database 1980-2005  
National GLBT Dismemberment Homicide Dataset (110 cases, 1969-2007)  
National Non-gay Dismemberment Homicide Dataset (in-progress)  
National GLBT Homicide Database 1969-Present (in-progress) (3082 cases)  
New Orleans Homicides 2009-2010  
North Dakota Homicides 1990-2005  
South Dakota Homicides 1990-2007  
Submerged Motor Vehicles Found With Deceased Bodies (100 cases)  
Suitcase Disposals (16 cases)  
Wyoming Homicides 1980-2011 (325 cases; in progress)

## **Archived Death Lists**

Alabama – List of Murders in the District of Alabama 1866  
American Indian Homicides (117 cases) Artist Homicides (as of Dec 2011) (CHR)  
Bahamas – The Guardian Homicides in the Bahamas 2007  
Birmingham Homicides 2006-2010  
Black Serial Killer (Spree, Serial, Mass Murder) List, as of 2011  
Blair County PA Homicides (various years) Boston MA Homicides 2011  
California Death Row Tracking System (as of Dec 2011) Camden NJ Homicides 2011  
Cartel (Mexican) Spillover Homicides

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Charlotte NC Homicides 2010  
Chronology of U. S. Hate Crimes 1998-2001  
Columbus OH Homicides 2008-2010  
Civil Rights Era Homicides – FBI List of Unsolved **2012**  
Dallas National School Safety, Cumulative List of School Shootings  
Dayton Ohio Homicide List – 2005  
Dead Scientists (116 cases) not all homicides  
Denver Coroner’s Homicides 2009-2010  
Drug War Collateral Homicide Victims  
Green River Killer Homicides (Washington State) Hampton Roads  
VA Homicides 2010  
Houston TX Homicides 2008-2011  
Indianapolis Homicides 2011  
Jefferson County (Greater Louisville) Homicides 2011  
Journalists Killed in 2007, National Committee to Protect Journalists  
Lynching Homicide Data from many states & many years  
Mahoning Valley OH Homicides 2010  
Massachusetts Domestic Homicides 2011  
Memphis Homicide List 2006  
Mexico – Murders of Women in Juárez and Chihuahua, Mexico, Jan 04 through May 07  
Michigan Domestic Violence Homicides 2007  
Michigan DV Homicide List 2007  
Milwaukee Homicides 1999-2011  
Milwaukee Unsolved 2010 Homicides  
Minnesota Homicides 1986  
Missing Journalists Internationally 2007  
MNCVA Femicide Reports 1990, 1997, 2004-2007, 2009-2011  
New Hampshire Cold Case Homicides (random years) New Haven CT Homicides 2011  
New York Homicides of the World Trade Center Attack 2001  
New York Times Veterans as Offenders List 2005-2006 (10 cases)  
Oakland Homicides 2006-2009  
Oklahoma City Homicides – Oklahoma City Bombing  
Omaha, NE Homicides 2008-2011  
Peoria, IL Homicides 2010  
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation Homicides – FBI Accounting (57 cases)  
Portland, WA Homicides 2010  
Prince George’s County 2010  
Rapid City SD Racist Homicides 1998-2000  
San Francisco Bay Area – Zebra Homicides (racial killings)  
San Jose Homicides 2006-2010  
Seattle Homicides 2008, 2010-2011  
Springfield MA Homicides 2000-2009  
St. Petersburg Florida Murders 2007  
Staged Hunting Mishaps (20 cases) (CHR)  
Taxi Driver Homicides (606 cases)

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Texas Women Homicides 2005, 2008  
Texas Family Homicides 2010  
Texas Fort Hood Terrorist Homicides 2009  
Transgender Homicides 2011 (TDOR)  
Transgender Homicides 2009-2010 (TR)  
Trinidad Homicide Lists 2007-2008  
Tucson Arizona Homicides 1995  
U. S. List of Assassinated Politicians (as of Dec 2011)  
U. S. List of GLBT Homicides (NCAVP) 2010  
U. S. Lynching Homicides (Project HAL) (2806 cases)  
U. S. Mass Shootings 2006-2007 (CHR)  
U. S. Virgin Islands 2009-1010  
Utah Homicides 2002-2007  
Veterans as Homicide Offenders (NYTimes)  
Washington D.C. Homicides 2010-2011

**2012**

## Works Cited

Center for Homicide Research (2012). Home page: <http://homicidecenter.org/>

Center for Homicide Research (2012). Data-Sharing Page:  
<http://homicidecenter.org/services/data-sharing/>

ICPSR (2012. Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI.  
Home Page: <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/>



## Recorder Notes for Sharing Data from the Center for Homicide Research

**2012**

Becky Block: The work that you have been doing at the Center is amazing.

Dallas Drake: I see us as an intermediary to places like ICPSR. The data we have needs to be cleaned up.

Dick Block: I am wondering about the reliability of the data. How do you know these are real cases with accurate data?

Dallas Drake: We need to do some spot checking to assess validity and reliability. If go through half a dozen cases and all are OK, then it is likely that other cases are too. However, if you find an error, there are likely other errors.

## Publically Available Crime Related Data In Chicago

Compiled by Richard Block **2012**  
Loyola University Chicago  
May 2012

Researchers have studied Chicago for more than a century. With increasing computerized data base management capabilities and capacity, government agencies have compiled vast stores of information. In Chicago, much of this information is electronically available and can be useful in analyzing crime patterns. Chicago pioneered public access to crime incident data in the 1990's at the local level. Today many other data sources are available for mapping and much of the rest has a geographic base.

### **Chicago Data Portal**

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/>

All crimes from 2001 to present

Includes crime type in great detail date and geo-code of incident to centerline of block

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Crimes-2001-to-present/ijzp-q8t2>

Many other data sets

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Administration-Finance/City-of-Chicago-Data-Catalog/7eck-a4hy>

Catalog of Chicago Transit Authority data—some mapped, some not ridership per stop by day, station and bus stop locations etc.

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Transportation/CTA-Views/gzmt-5k8a>

Building footprints

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Buildings/Building-Footprints/w2v3-isjw>

Business licenses by type address and geocoded

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Community-Economic-Development/Business-Licenses/r5kz-chrr>

Major streets

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Transportation/Major-Streets/ueqs-5wr6>

Sex offenders by age race gender and face block but not geo-coded

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Sex-Offenders/vc9r-bqvy>

Liquor licenses and place of amusement by address but not geo-coded

<https://data.cityofchicago.org/Community-Economic-Development/Business-Licenses->

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Current-Liquor-and-Public-Places/nrmj-3kcf  
**Other Publically Available Chicago Data**

CPD detailed crime mapping site—find crimes in your neighborhood  
<http://gis.chicagopolice.org/CLEARMap/startPage.htm>

Chicago Metropolitan Planning Commission  
<http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/>

Land use inventory --- shapes down to very small areas with predominant land use.  
<http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/land-use-inventory>

Metropulse--- a data hub for a variety of regional data sets.  
<http://www.metropulsechicago.com/#>

Illinois Statistical Analysis Center---lots of crime and court data, but at the county level  
<http://www.icjia.org/public/sac/index.cfm>

Chicago historical homicide project 1870-1930  
<http://homicide.northwestern.edu/database/>

Chicago Homicide Data Set  
<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/hc.html>

Harvard Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods  
<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/PHDCN/about.jsp>

What are the Limits?

Criminal Court records are directly available only to concerned parties. Historically it has been poorly managed.

Correctional Data is not open to the public due to privacy and safety concerns. Victim and Offender data are not publically available—Should they be?

To what extent should government collected data be publically available or survey data be accessible?

Given only a few variables, it is often possible to identify an individual. This was a concern of Becky's study of domestic violence. Having exact ages and medical examiner records it is possible to identify many homicide victims. Publically available Police data is limited to center lines, The Chicago Homicide Data is limited to tract. Health Data is also usually limited to census tract. Analysis at the micro level requires more precise. Geographic identification when this is available, but it often cannot be distributed.

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A major question is the combining of records. For example geography can create a link between one data form and another. This will create new information. Data that was not available before.

**2012**

Finally, geography can form a link between data sets where none existed before. Linking data creates new information that should or should not be publically available.

## Recorder Notes for Publically Available Crime Related Data in Chicago

2012

Jay Corzine: The Chicago data is very useful. We have one dissertation that used it UCF and a second one that is in progress.

Dick Block: I have tried to see if other cities have data like this, and there are some that have some data, but not that much and not as extensive as Chicago.

Elise Wisnieski: Any sense of how often it is updated?

Dick Block: Every two weeks.

Elise Wisnieski: Do they go back and update previously loaded data like when a shooting turns into a homicide later?

Dick Block: Not sure about that, but we have tried to study this issue because is particularly important in studying homicide.

Tom McEwen: I think some of your comments get at the issues of privacy. There is a website that has data on every homicide in DC that has occurred including the victim's name and picture and data on the circumstances surrounding the incident. It is an interesting website and all of the data is from publically available sources. The address is [homicidewatch.org](http://homicidewatch.org).

Dick Block: Data for civil cases is much more readily available than for criminal cases. Data on the Chicago Police Department site is available to everyone. One complaint is that when people pull up a neighborhood, the data are not relative, thus, cannot tell if an area is relatively safe or not.

Chris Rasche: Does this knowledge create more fear?

Dick Block: We don't know. You would have to look at several neighborhood maps to get a sense of if anyone is a safe neighborhood or not. You also have to look at the type of crime being committed – shoplifting high in some areas, but doesn't make it unsafe.

Gabrielle Salfati: Is this data leaked to social media, such as Twitter?

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Dick Block: Yes, to some extent. It is made use of by some more than others; our neighborhood makes use of a listserv to communicate news about crime and other things.

Tom Dover: At the FBI Academy I teach a class on crime analysis. I am finding that some of our

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students report having to back out of some problem-oriented and community policing and are being forced to go to these more automated systems. Is that happening in Chicago?

Dick Block: Not intentionally, but to extent it has, it has been ~~been~~ because of budgetary issues.

Vanessa Leggett: Does Illinois have a statute that requires sex offenders to register?

Dick Block: Yes, they should be on the map and it will show where offenders live.

Vanessa Leggett: Is data on the location of those incidents there too?

Dick Block: Yes, it is part of same website, but it does not appear as if they can be over-laid together.

## Reaffirming Our Commitment to Data Sharing and Science as an Open Activity

2012

Roland Chilton  
University of Massachusetts Amherst

I plan to keep the presentation to seven minutes or less by focusing on two simple but basic issues. The first is the periodic loss of dependable city level homicide information and the second is the all too frequent unwillingness or inability of homicide researchers to provide data they have used for a presentation or publication to other researchers. I know that Kaye Marz, Dallas Drake, and Richard Block will have provided us with some good examples of data sharing in homicide research. The data set "Homicides in Chicago 1965-1996" and the data set "History of Homicides in Chicago 1870-1930" are examples of data sharing at its best. Unfortunately, it apparently has not been possible to carry the Chicago data beyond 1996. Nevertheless, the earlier efforts and all of the efforts that will be mentioned in the session are steps in the right direction. But this trend is not universal or inevitable. Setbacks are not only possible but may be increasing.

I think recent examples of police agencies linking the release of crime data to contractual agreements with researchers not to share the data are moving in the wrong direction. This is not a good way to advance knowledge. Nor is the decision of some publicly funded researchers to ignore their commitment to archive the data they collected while funded. This may simply be rumor, but to the extent that it has happened, it represents an abandonment of commitment to science as an open activity, by which I mean science as an endeavor in which the conclusions we reach and the claims we make can be verified by others by reexamining our data before collecting new data.

The absence or abandonment of an open approach to studying crime is also indicated by researchers who refuse to share with others the data they have used to support conclusions presented in published reports. William Pridemore points to instances where researchers who have published articles on inequality and homicide have simply refused to make the data available to others. In his recent article on the topic in the British Journal of Criminology, he indicates that almost none of the scholars doing cross-national work in the area were willing to share their data.

Perhaps an equally important loss of access to useful data is caused because some state agencies and some urban police departments fail to fully participate in the UCR program. Our recent review of victim and offender homicide rates indicated that several large cities and a few large states have stopped submitting arrest data to the UCR Section in recent years. However, my most immediate concern is the decision of the National Center for Health Statistic (NCHS) to stop identifying cities with populations over 100,00 in their the cause of death data. Without this information the data NCHS archives at the Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research (ICPSR) can only provide national estimates. This may be the most important example of the loss of useful information that we have. When

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these codes are available, as they were before 2005, they provide an independent estimate of homicide victimizations for about 140 cities. You can see the utility of these estimates in the “Best Estimates” poster in the current poster exhibit. With the codes, we can compare homicide victimization that is reported in death certificates with police generated homicide victim counts. Without the codes, we lose a valuable homicide measure.

What can be done to halt or reverse these trends? And what can the HRWG do in particular? I am hoping that the HRWG, as an organization, will formally ask the NCHS to make the geographic codes for cities with over 100,000 residents easily available to researchers as they did before 2005. If the concern is that the survivors of those who have died of rare diseases might be identified, It should be possible to provide the geographic codes with a separate data set for external causes of death (homicide, suicide, accident, motor vehicle accident, and undetermined) separately.

Individually, HRWG members in states of cities that have failed to submit UCR data should formally urge state agencies and city police to continue full participation in the UCR program as a way to provide themselves, the people they serve, and others with dependable information on crime. Finally, HRWG should develop a program that would make it easy for members to temporality archive the data they use in annual presentations until it can be formally archived at ICPSR or elsewhere.



2012

CHAPTER 6

TESTING THEORIES OF LETHAL VIOLENCE

Presenters:

Amanda Farrell, Old Dominion University

Gipsy Escobar, Loyola University, Chicago

Aaron C. Poole, University of Central Florida

James C. McCutcheon, University of Central Florida

Melissa Tetzlaff-Bermiller, University of Central Florida

Matt Heisterman, University of Central Florida

Winifred L. Reed, Crime, Violence, and Victimization Research Division,  
Office of Research, and Evaluation, National Institute of Justice

Chair:

Richard Hough, University of West Florida

## Norfolk as a Symbolic City a la Skolnick?

Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc <sup>2012</sup>  
Old Dominion University

To understand the use of deadly force in a given city, region, or relationally between adjacent jurisdictions, a comprehensive examination of the frequency and factors impacting the use of force must be undertaken. But, as noted by Geller and Scott (1992, p. 18), "...enumerating a jurisdiction's shooting cases is merely the first step in attempting to understand the causes and control methods for police-involved shootings...Behind every shooting that is presented as a two-dimensional statistic is a complex human story that must be understood if one is to make genuine progress in devising feasible systems for safeguarding police and their clientele." This paper focuses on a portion of a study that began when, in an effort to contextualize the complex human story behind one police shooting through an elaborated case study, it became apparent that the critical first step—having valid and reliable statistics that document the frequency and characteristics of police shootings—was absent. What is known about police shootings is sadly lacking, and quite shocking, especially when considering that highly regarded policing scholars have been calling for some sort of basic accounting of these incidents for over thirty years (Engel, 2008; Fyfe, 2002; Geller & Scott, 1992; Hickman, Piquero, & Garner, 2008; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979; M. R. Smith, 2008). In the absence of available and accessible two-dimensional statistics that Geller and Scott (1992) suggest are but the first step in understanding police shootings, the current study seeks to explore the use of deadly force in the seven cities of the Hampton Roads region of Virginia between April of 1990 and September of 2010 in order to provide a platform from which to consider and understand police shootings in this area.

Several theoretical approaches have been employed to understand use of deadly force incidents. While this study is exploratory and descriptive in nature, and thus limited in its application and testing of theory, it is important to address these applications and acknowledge that, should better and more reliable data on these incidents become available, theoretical testing may be more useful in these types of analyses. Black (1976, 1980) hypothesized that individuals vary in their abilities to apply and use the law, especially with regards to the amount and effectiveness of the law used; when specifically considering the police, use of force is akin to the application of law, which is in turn impacted by the quantity and quality of law available. Further, Black (1976) indicated that police would show increased aggression and punitiveness towards those who exist outside the dominant groups, particularly those who are poor, minorities and young, which strongly aligns with Bayley and Mendelsohn's (1969) argument that increased aggression and punitiveness will be displayed in lower class and high crime neighborhoods, as well as with White's (2002) conflict model of police use of force.

The concerns regarding over-policing of minorities were addressed by Goldkamp (1976) in a rather controversial way. Goldkamp (1976) asserted that those who are concerned with the disproportionate representation of minorities in deadly force encounters tend to fall into

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two theoretically polarized groups: those who believe minority crime statistics are reflective of differential policing that is rooted in prejudice and discrimination, which also ties strongly to Black's theory of law (1976, 1980), and those who believe that disproportionate crime rates, and involvement in police shootings, are attributed to the fact that minorities are disproportionately involved in crime. In his discussion of each position, Goldkamp (1976) links each side of the debate with a theoretical underpinning—those who believe law enforcement is used as a categorical mechanism of inequality to target and oppress those of lower socioeconomic strata are aligned with a quasi-labeling perspective and those who believe that minorities are simply committing more crimes are framed as ascribing to a more sub-cultural approach, with Goldkamp providing limited evidence in support of the subcultural position. Although controversial, echoes of this dichotomy are still seen today, particularly in citizen reactions to news stories on deadly force incidents.

In newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, there appears to be a segment of the population that blames the police for harassing and murdering young black males and there is a segment of the population that asserts the victim is responsible for his or her own death by the choices they have made. This is not to say that those who author these responses are representative of the population at large, though, as there may be a self-selecting bias for individuals with polarized opinions to respond to such incidents. The second perspective commonly expressed, however, incorporates elements of von Hentig's (1940) attribution of blame to victims in his typology, Feather's (1998) related concept of deservingness of victim and Dietz's (1977) victim.

From a different and less polarized perspective, Smith (1986) used Black's (1976) theory in the context of variables commonly associated with social disorganization, finding that there were significant racial differences in the application of force and suggesting that there is an interaction between the individual and place in these incidents, as the use of force increases were seen in minority and racially heterogeneous areas. This perspective was supported by the findings of Sun, Payne and Wu (2008), who noted increases in coercive behaviors and interactions by police in poor neighborhoods, suggesting that, from a social disorganization perspective, the increased use of force may stem from the causal chain of increased disorganization leading to increased crime leading to increased calls for service and thereby resulting in increased police presence and interaction in disadvantaged communities. Yet, Sun, Payne and Wu (2008) also acknowledge that these results could simply indicate that minorities and the poor are subject to increased coercive police behavior, suggesting a conflict orientation.

Klinger (1997) suggests that there is an interaction that occurs between the crime rate, the seriousness of an offense, and the vigor with which an officer responds, while also noting that use of force does not equate to vigor. Instead, Klinger (1997) suggests that officers in a given area perceive a normative amount of deviance for that particular area and only react to those transgressions that violate that perceived standard, thus formal police work decreases in areas with high rates of deviance. Terrill and Reisig (2003) suggest that Klinger's ecological theory may support the use of neighborhood context as an explanatory factor for police use of force, but caution that Klinger's work utilized police districts, which

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are much larger than neighborhoods, as the primary unit of analysis, thus making application and comparison of this theory at the neighborhood level problematic. However, there have been several other studies that suggest an ecological or geographic patterning of police behavior. Kania and Mackey (1977) and Fyfe (1980) both found significant correlations between measures of community violence and violence perpetrated by police. Much like Skolnick's (1966) symbolic assailant, Terrill and Reisig (2003) found that police display an increased use of force in high crime areas, suggesting that problem places and increased perception of danger lead to the labeling of symbolic neighborhoods. This finding is also supported by Werthman and Piliavin's (1967) concept of ecological contamination, where officers tend to associate neighborhoods with the rate at which they encounter potential suspects.

As demonstrated above, there are mixed and conflicting findings in the extant literature regarding the explanatory and predictive value of neighborhood and situational context on police shootings. Within the limited amount of empirical attention given to neighborhood effects, it appears that analysis utilizing an integrated theoretical perspective, combining elements of social disorganization theory, Black's (1976, 1980) theory of law and Klinger's (1997) ecological theory of police behavior will provide the most holistic approach to understanding police shootings. Yet, it should also be mentioned that the extant literature has failed to consider the differing perspectives of the residents of these communities and police officers, as well as what those differences may mean in terms of policy, cooperation, and community relations, particularly in the aftermath of a shooting incident.

The data for this study is derived from a content analysis of newspaper articles from the Hampton Roads region. Original data was collected through the archives of *The Virginian Pilot*, spanning the time period from April 1990 to September 2010. This time period encompasses the oldest articles in the *Pilot's* online archives to the month that the current study began. The archives were searched using the terms "police shoot\*," "police shot," and "police kill." These search terms were utilized to capture information about all lethal and non-lethal police-involved shootings in the Hampton Roads region during this time period, rather than focusing on the limited official statistics available on only police shootings resulting in fatalities.

The unit of analysis in the current study is individual incident, although follow-up articles often provided additional information that has been included in the analysis. As such, the number of follow-up articles for each incident was noted. Editorials and letters to the editor related to these cases were also included in this analysis to obtain a sense of the community's reaction and response to use of force incidents.

During the analysis of the articles obtained in the initial searches, approximately 26 additional incidents were identified that were not found in the initial search. A second search was conducted for those specific incidents. These additional articles yielded an additional four incidents that required further research. In total, this study includes data from 239 newspaper articles regarding 121 officer-involved shooting incidents.

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In the content analysis, several variables were captured and coded in addition to a brief summary of the article. These variables, when reported in the press, include: the date the article was published; the page and section of the paper where the article was published; the author; the incident date, time and day of the week; if the article was a follow-up to a previous story and the number of follow-ups per incident; the city in which the incident occurred as well as the section of the city in which the incident occurred and the address of the incident; the suspect's name, gender, race, and age; whether or not the officer(s) involved were named in the press, and if named, the officer's unit, race, age, and years on the force; whether or not the suspect was armed and the type of weapon; if the shooting occurred in the context of a pursuit, the commission of another crime, following a domestic violence incident, or in a hostage or barricade environment; whether there was an explicit mention of alcohol use, drug use or involvement, or mental health issues by the suspect; whether the suspect threatened to harm another civilian or themselves; evidence of possible suicide by cop; if and how the suspect was injured or was killed, including designations as fatal, injurious or non-injurious incidents; if and how the officer was injured; if the officer was placed on administrative duties or leave; any charges filed against the suspect or accomplices; any civil litigation mentioned; and general comments about tone and orientation of articles.

The current study identified 121 police shootings covered in the *Virginian Pilot* between April 1990 and September 2010. One case from March 1990 was addressed in follow-up articles thoroughly enough that it was included in the dataset. Data was first analyzed as an aggregate of all seven cities before each city's incidents were analyzed separately. It should be noted that this study is not considered to be a population of shooting incidents, as there are several fatal and non-fatal incidents that have occurred within this region of which the author is aware that did not appear in the newspaper articles examined in the current study. It is likely that there is still a significant dark figure associated with police involved shootings that will only be addressed by open access to police records, to include all instances when officers discharge their weapons. However, even acknowledging the existence of an unknown or unaccounted for number of police shootings, the current study identified 27 fatal police shootings in the Hampton Roads area between 2005 and 2010, six more incidents than reported by the Virginia State Police. On average, there were six shooting incidents per year, and an average of 17 incidents per city, covered in the current study.

These shooting incidents were not distributed evenly across jurisdictions or years, with Norfolk having, by far, the most shooting incidents ( $n = 45$ ) in the time period studied. Virginia Beach and Chesapeake followed Norfolk in terms of frequency of police shootings, with 35 and 22 incidents respectively. There was a wide disparity in frequency of events between the cities, with Suffolk ( $n = 1$ ), Hampton ( $n = 3$ ), Newport News ( $n = 5$ ) and Portsmouth ( $n = 10$ ) having far fewer police shootings covered in the newspaper. Additionally, the number of shootings ebb and flow, with multiple jurisdictions having multiple incidents some years and other years, like 1993, there being no police shootings reported across all seven jurisdictions.

Norfolk also had the most incidents where suspects had guns ( $n = 27$ ), although Virginia Beach had the most incidents where vehicles were used as weapons ( $n = 6$ ) and where the suspect had a knife ( $n = 5$ ). Virginia Beach had the most incidents involving domestic disturbances ( $n = 10$ ), mentally ill individuals ( $n = 9$ ) and potential suicide by cop incidents

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(n = 8). Norfolk had the most incidents involving a pursuit (n = 18), a police shooting in the context of the commission of a crime (n = 27), the most incidents involving drug use or involvement (n = 10), the most females shot by police (n= 3), and the most officers injured or killed in the context of a police shooting incident (n= 14).<sup>2012</sup>

When considering the city level statistics compiled during this study—to include crime rates, murder rates, and the officer to citizen ration—the number and severity of officer injuries, the number of shootings that occurred within the context of other criminal situations, and the number of shootings overall, the current study provides preliminary support for ecological theories of police shootings (Fyfe, 1980; Kania & Mackey, 1977; Klinger, 1997; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Werthman & Piliavin, 1967). The interaction of the above mentioned factors suggest that there is something occurring in Norfolk that differentiates it from the other jurisdictions in the Hampton Roads region. In short, Norfolk may be a symbolic city a la Skolnick (1966), although this finding must be cautioned using the same arguments that Terrill and Reisig (2003) applied to Klinger's (1997) analysis: where Klinger analyzed patrol districts, which are larger than neighborhoods and may obscure support for the impact of neighborhood or ecological context, the current study looks at citywide demographics, possibly further obscuring these effects.

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## Neighborhood Disorganization and the Public Level of Control: A Spatial Analysis of Ecological Predictors of Homicide Rates in Bogota, Colombia **2012**

Gipsy Escobar, Loyola University Chicago  
[gescobar1@luc.edu](mailto:gescobar1@luc.edu)

This study empirically tests the applicability of ecological theories of crime to the spatial distribution of homicides in Bogota, Colombia. The study proposes alternative measures of social disorganization that are analogous to those used in the American literature but that are more reflective of both social realities and data availability in Colombia. In this way, the monograph explores the effect of concentrated disadvantage, social isolation, residential mobility, ethnic and cultural heterogeneity, social disorder, and the presence of voluntary associations on the 2003-2005 cumulative neighborhood homicide rate per 10,000 residents. In addition, the study investigates the potential effect of the public level of control—measured as the local availability of services related to quality of life and social control—on homicide victimization. The research also controls for factors related to Colombia's violence: criminal structures, organized crime, illegal markets, and forced displacement.

Data were collected from a variety of sources including: (1) all officially recorded homicide events for the period 2000-2005 collected by *Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico* (Center of Economic Development Studies, CEDE for its acronym in Spanish) at *Universidad de Los Andes* in Bogota from records kept by the National Institute of Forensic Medicine; (2) socio-structural variables, social disorder indicators, local coverage of basic public services, land use, presence of voluntary associations, and persons displaced by the violence from the 2005 census; (3) information on the location of police stations and *Comandos de Atención Inmediata* (Immediate Response Police Commands, CAI for their acronym in Spanish) from the Metropolitan Police of Bogota; and (4) information on the presence of criminal structures, organized crime, and illegal markets from interviews with police officers conducted between 2003 and 2004 by CEDE researchers.

The study employs Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) to: (1) examine the spatial distribution of homicide rates and the main predictors; (2) identify the existence of spatial patterns, regimes, and atypical observations; and (3) determine whether spatial dependence exists in the dependent variable. Finally, Spatial Regression Analysis (SRA) is utilized to estimate the effects of the predictors on homicide rates, controlling for any patterns of local and global spatial dependence. All spatial analyses were conducted using a second-order queen contiguity spatial weights matrix.

### Purpose

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The main purpose of this study is to identify the ecological characteristics of communities that are associated with the spatial distribution of homicides in Bogota, Colombia, while controlling for the potentially confounding effect of the presence of criminal organizations and illegitimate agents of social control. Three specific aims are pursued: (1) Explore the applicability of the social disorganization model to an urban setting in Latin America; (2) explore the role of the public level of control in facilitating social control at the neighborhood level; and (3) Explore the effect of illegal groups on a neighborhood's capacity to exert social control.

## Study Site

Bogota, the capital of Colombia, is the most populous city in that country with a population of approximately seven million people, and a population density of over 4,000 residents per square kilometer. According to the official census, in 2005 69 percent of its residents were under the age of 40, and 13 percent of the population was composed of males between the ages of 15 and 29. The ethnic distribution of the city was rather homogeneous with only 1.7 percent residents self-identifying as belonging to a minority group (Amerindian, Romani, or Afro-Colombian), of which 86 percent were Afro-Colombian. In terms of economic deprivation, 4.6 percent of the population reported that, during the week prior to the census, they had spent one or more days without consuming any food due to lack of money; and 9.4 percent reported having looked for work during the same time period. Regarding family disruption, the census reported that single, separated, or divorced females are the heads of 15 percent of households with children. There was also a high rate of residential mobility with 32 percent of Bogota residents reporting they changed residences in the five years prior to the census. In fact, 37 percent of Bogota residents were not born in that city, 13 percent of which moved there in the five years before the census. Furthermore, of those who recently migrated to Bogota, 28 percent claimed having difficulties finding a job and six percent having a threat against their lives as their main reason to move. There is variability across neighborhoods for most of the socio-structural characteristics summarized here, particularly those related to issues of disadvantage. By and large, neighborhoods in the northeast area of the city are much more affluent than those located in the south and west of the city, although there is some internal variation such that spatial patterns can be identified (see LISA Maps in Figure 1). This study looks at the effects of ecological predictors on the spatial distribution of the 2003-2005 cumulative homicide rate across 569 official neighborhoods in Bogota.

## Findings

Four ecological predictors in Model 1 (excludes temporal lag of homicide rate) are significant after controlling for the spatially lagged dependent variable. Indeed, concentrated disadvantage and social isolation, residential mobility, and social disorder positively predict homicide rates, as hypothesized in this study. The presence of police units, a proxy measure of the public level of control, on the other hand, behaves in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized and positively predicts homicide rates as

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well. A possible explanation for this finding may be that the allocation of police resources tends to be more reactive than proactive. The only two ecological predictors that remain significant in Model 2 (includes temporal lag) are the concentrated disadvantage and social isolation index, and residential mobility (see Table 1). The ethnic and cultural heterogeneity index, the parochial control measure, and the basic public services proxy of public control did not reach significance in any of the models, and the social disorder index was only significant in Model 1 before the temporal lag was accounted for.

In addition, four of the control variables are significant and two more approximate significance at the .10 alpha level in Model 1. The Land Use Mix Index is significant in all models and performs in the expected direction. The more mixed the land use the higher the homicide rates. Population density, although having a very small effect size, is highly significant in all models, while population composition merely approximates significance in the models excluding the temporal lag of the outcome, and loses its effect in the full model. Surprisingly, though, both are negatively associated to homicide rates. It is possible that in areas with low population density there are less capable guardians with the ability to exercise informal social control and, thus, the opportunity for conflicts to end in lethal violence and for criminals to dispose of victims murdered elsewhere is greater there. The finding regarding the percent of young males in the population is more puzzling, since this measure has been consistently found to explain crime rates in the literature. Some researchers argue that the inclusion of community population characteristics as covariates in models predicting violent victimization might be misleading because neither the offenders nor the victims need be residents of the area where the incident took place (see Pridemore 2011; Rosenfeld, Bray & Egley1999). Thus it is conceivable that the percent of young males in a community does not necessarily account for the levels of violence that neighborhood experiences. Moreover, as hypothesized, forced displacement, the presence of chop shops, and the presence of groups dedicated to committing selective murder (approximates significance) predict higher homicide rates in Model 1, but are not significant in the full model controlling for the temporal lag.

Ultimately, it seems like, once the spatial and temporal lags of homicide rates are controlled for (both have significant effects), only two ecological predictors (i.e. disadvantage and mobility) and two controls (i.e. population density and land use) significantly predict the cumulative homicide rate for the 2003-2005 period (natural log) in Bogota neighborhoods. These findings provide partial support for the application of ecological theories to the study of violent crimes in an urban Latin American context. Indeed, although the Colombian literature tends to find that socio-structural conditions are either weakly or uncorrelated to homicide rates and that the presence of criminal structures, organized crime, illegal markets, and indicators of social disorder, particularly alcohol outlets, are the main factors in explaining violent crime in Bogota, the evidence presented in this study suggests that this might not necessarily be the case. In fact, it seems that conditions of disadvantage, isolation, and residential instability have an effect on homicide rates in Bogota that is above and beyond that of the aforementioned factors. It is entirely likely that social disorganization is a precursor of both high violence levels and the installation of illegal groups in the same communities.

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## Conclusion

In sum, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the research advances social disorganization theory by testing its external and construct validity. Alternative measures are proposed and applied to an urban setting outside of the United States. Findings support the idea that neighborhood disadvantage, social isolation, and residential mobility increase the chances that a community will experience higher levels of violent crime than its wealthier counterparts, regardless of the socio-cultural context.

The study also provided a test of the Systemic Model of Crime Control by including proxy measures of the parochial and public levels of control in the analyses. Although the effects of these variables were not significant, the research adds to the discussion of how these constructs should be measured.


Additionally, the study makes methodological contributions by combining a variety of data sources using a mixed-methods approach. Indeed, exploratory spatial data analyses, spatial regression models, and qualitative interviews complemented each other in providing a more nuanced evaluation of the ecological covariates of homicide rates in Bogota.

In conclusion, the study provides some evidence in favor of the usefulness of social disorganization theories to understand violent crime in Latin American cities. Similar models should be replicated across the region to confirm whether the evidence from Bogota is generalizable to other urban areas in the continent.

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Predictor	Model 1		Model 1	
	OLS B(SE)	Lag B(SE)	OLS B(SE)	Lag B(SE)
Constant	1.71(.55)	1.24(.51)*	.17(.46)	.07(.45)
Disadvantage & Isolation	.29(.06)***	.23(.05)***	.18(.05)***	.16(.05)***
Ethnic & Cultural Heterogeneity	.05(.05)	.02(.05)	.04(.05)	.03(.05)
Residential Mobility	.09(.05)§	.12(.05)**	.10(.04)**	.12(.04)**
Social Disorder	.12(.06)*	.12(.05)*	.04(.05)	.05(.04)
Basic Public Services	-.05(.04)	-.04(.04)	-.04(.03)	-.04(.03)
Police Presence	.24(.09)**	.18(.08)*	.03(.08)	.02(.07)
Parochial Control	-.23(.11)**	-.11(.10)	-.04(.09)	.004(.08)
Temporal Lag	---	---	.58(.04)***	.50(.04)***
Population Density	-.006(.001)***	-.006(.001)***	-.003(.001)***	-.003(.001)***
Population Composition	-.16(.18)	-.32(.16)§	-.06(.15)	-.16(.14)
Land Use Mix Index	1.05(.28)***	.64(.26)*	.66(.23)**	.48(.23)*
Forced Displacement	.72(.23)**	.43(.21)*	.19(.19)	.08(.18)
FARC Militias	-.25(.16)	-.23(.15)	-.04(.14)	-.05(.13)
Paramilitary Cells	.002(.13)	.03(.12)	-.07(.10)	-.05(.10)
Selective Murder Groups	.30(.11)**	.17(.10)§	.12(.09)	.07(.09)
Gangs	-.05(.09)	-.02(.09)	.02(.08)	.03(.07)
Drug Distribution	.001(.09)	-.03(.09)	.03(.08)	.01(.07)
Arms Trafficking	.11(.12)	.07(.11)	-.03(.10)	-.03(.09)
Chop Shops	.10(.10)	.18(.09)*	.06(.08)	.12(.08)
Spatial Lag ( $\rho$ )	---	.53(.06)***	---	.28(.06)***
Spatial Error ( $\lambda$ )	---	---	---	---
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	.36	.46	.57	.60
F-Statistic	18.92***	---	39.99***	---
Log Likelihood	-706.96	-674.89	-596.88	-586.85
AIC	1451.91	1389.78	1233.77	1215.69
SC	1534.45	1476.66	1320.64	1306.91
Jarque-Bera	21.63***	---	56.41***	---
Breush-Pagan	92.68***	82.78***	114.82***	107.51***
Moran's I (error)	.12***	---	.05***	---
Robust LM (lag)	36.48***	---	12.73***	---
Robust LM (error)	1.29	---	.71	---
Likelihood Ratio	---	64.13***	---	20.08***

Figure 1. Univariate LISA Maps\*



\*Empirical pseudo-significance based on 9,999 random permutations, pseudo- $p \leq .05$ .

## Strained to Death: Inequality, Poverty, and Homicide in Chicago

Aaron C. Poole     **2012**  
James C. McCutcheon  
Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller  
Matt Hiesterman

### Abstract

In the last year, there has been much focus on inequalities either through the media or other social networks in the United States. Using an inequality index the current study explores the impact economic inequalities have on homicide in Chicago. Census Tracts from the city of Chicago are analyzed to determine if a relationship exists between areas of inequality and homicide. Strain theory assists in explain the presence of relationships between our main explanatory variable, inequality, and our dependent variable, homicide counts.

### Introduction

In the context of America's current economic climate violent crime has held constant (UCR, 2010; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). This statistic has led to much debate and controversy on the present impact of economic trends on crime. Many such studies seek to explain the theoretical failures of macroeconomic indicators for predicting crime on a grand scale (Dill et. al, 2010). Studies looking at the economy and crime have found viable solutions. Such studies use various economic measures to better understand how such conditions effect violent crime. These studies are important in that we better learn which economic measures have a stronger impact on violent crime. The current study looks to continue this discussion as the GINI inequality index and poverty measures are put to the test.

The current study looks to explain violent crime, specifically homicide, through the use of an inequality index and the measure of poverty. Here we look to explore the link between inequality, poverty, and homicide on the census tract level in Chicago. We posit that a higher proportion of inequality within a census tract leads to an increase in homicides. We predict this relationship is stronger with inequality than the poverty measure. We utilize general strain theory to offer an explanation of this relationship. The authors pose that strain can lead to discontent within spatial areas where inequalities are more prevalent. Those individuals who reside within areas of high inequality will be more likely to perpetrate violent crime than in areas of economic inequality. This is due to an increased strain from being confronted with those who have achieved their goals on a consistent basis (Agnew, 1992).

The most obvious criticism of the role of inequality in homicide is that poverty, not inequality, may be the better indicator for the theoretical model (Hipp and Yates, 2011). In this argument inequality would simply serve as a stand-in variable for poverty. To address

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this criticism the current study accounts for poverty's possible mediating effects on the relationship between inequality and homicide. In short, this article seeks to answer two questions: Is inequality a viable indicator of homicide, and is poverty a mediator of that relationship or does inequality stand on its own?

2012

## Literature Review

Homicide victimization and offending are associated with conditions suggestive of general economic distress (Baily, 1984; Blau and Blau, 1986; Krahn et al., 1986; Hsieh and Pugh, 1993; Brewer and Smith, 1995). Researchers also see economic inequality as a major source of violent crime (Hagan and Peterson, 1995). Williams (1984) points out that Messner made the distinction between "absolute" and "relative" deprivation and that the measure for relative deprivation is the Gini index of family income concentration. Krahn et al. (1986) showed that the Gini index, among other indicators, was the best predictor of homicide rates.

Literature also portrays poverty as a main source for violent crimes and homicide. Tcherni's (2011) research shows that a disrupted family, race, and specifically poverty are all determinants of homicide. Additionally, such research shows that there is a connection between poverty, race, and homicide.

There is also research that shows some sort of relationship between inequality (using the Gini index) and poverty as predictors of homicide (Bailey, 1984; Blau and Blau, 1982; Kposowa et al., 1995; 1990; Williams, 1984). Kovandzic et al. (1998) explored one such affair between homicide, inequality, and poverty in reference to victim-offender relationships. Messner et al. (2010) believe that "the Gini coefficient, as a measure of the overall income distribution, might not fully reflect the social conditions of the theoretically strategic population—the socially excluded and marginalized" (530). They believe that poverty must be included in the picture to strengthen the Gini coefficient and its measurement of income distribution.

## Methods

### *Data*

We hypothesized that the GINI Index is a better predictor for homicide than poverty and stands on its own. To test this hypothesis, we obtain data from two sources. Our dependent variable, homicide, comes from The Chicago Dataset (2010), while the other independent variables are from the Census Bureau: American Community Survey (ACS), 2006-2010 estimates. Our unit of analysis is census tracts in the city of Chicago.

### *Variables and Analytic Strategy*

The dependent variable for this study is a count of homicides per census tract for the year 2010. The data comes from The Chicago Dataset. The data originally contained longitude and latitude to show where the homicide was located. ArcGIS is utilized to aggregate the locations

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into census tracts and then obtain a count of all homicides. We have two primary independent variables, the GINI Index and poverty. The GINI index is available for all places and tracts (of sufficient size) and is summary measure of income inequality. The GINI Index varies from zero to one. A zero indicates perfect equality where there is a proportional distribution of income and a one indicates perfect inequality (American Community Survey Briefs, 2011). Poverty is also obtained from Census data. The control variables utilized in this study are chosen based on similar research regarding homicide. They include: percent of population under 18 years of age, percent black, percent Hispanic, and the total population. All data are uploaded in Microsoft Excel format for cleaning and rate creation. For the analysis procedure we use STATA 11. Since our dependent variable, homicide, is a count variable and the variance is larger than the mean a negative binomial regression is used.

## Results

Model 1 shown in Table 1 is significant. The explanatory variable, inequality (GINI) is significant. For every one unit increase for inequality there is a 2.67 increase in the expected homicide count. As expected, demographic characteristics and population are found to be positively correlated with homicide. Additionally, every one unit increase in the percent of the population that is under 25 years old leads to a 1.01 increase in the expected homicide count. This model supports our initial hypothesis that inequality is related to homicide on the census tract level. Secondly, this model serves as the first step in a three step process to examine the possibility that poverty is a mediating variable in the inequality/homicide relationship.

**Table 1**

Negative Binomial Regression of Homicides in Chicago (2010) and GINI index (N=794)

Homicide Count	IRR	SE	z	P> z
<i>Explanatory variable</i>				
GINI	2.67	1.17	2.26	.02
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Percent Black	1.03	.00	23.20	.00
Percent Hispanic	1.03	.00	12.87	.00
Under 25 years old	1.01	.00	3.39	.00
Population (logged)	1.89	.10	11.54	.00

Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>: .2149

Three multivariate models are examined to learn the contours of the relationship of inequality to homicide once poverty is taken into account. In particular, negative binomial regression and ordinary least squares regression are utilized. As seen in Table 1 GINI is a significant predictor of homicide. In a mediation test x must have a significant relationship with both y and z. Additionally, when z is inserted into the model it must decrease the impact of the relationship of x on y. The first model demonstrates the first step in this process; the next step is model 2 and the final step is model 3.

**Table 2**

OLS Regression of Poverty in Chicago (2010) and GINI (N=794)

Poverty Rate	Coefficient	SE	t	P> t
<i>Explanatory variable</i>				
GINI	50.56	3.25	15.57	.00
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Percent Black	.11	.01	13.89	.00
Percent Hispanic	.09	.02	7.63	.00
Under 25 years old	.12	.03	4.45	.00
Population (logged)	-2.25	.41	-5.51	.00
R <sup>2</sup> : .4957				

Table 2 shows the GINI index as the main predictive variable in an OLS regression with poverty as the dependent variable. This analysis is done as the second step of a process to demonstrate a possible mediation effect. The important feature of this model is that our primary explanatory variable, GINI, is significantly related to our mediating variable, poverty. In fact for every one unit increase in the GINI index there is a related 50.56 percent increase in poverty in a census tract, all else being equal. This result carries the mediation testing process to the final step, establishing that our primary explanatory variable is no longer significant once our mediating variable is introduced into the original model.

In model 3 (Table 3) the mediating variable poverty is added to the original model. This is the third step in the mediation testing process. After inserting poverty into the model, GINI's relationship with homicide becomes insignificant. This last step indicates that poverty has a mediating effect on the relationship between inequality (GINI) and homicide. The relationship is mediated so fully that inequality is no longer significant.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

The *initial* results are promising for providing support for our hypothesis that inequality increases strain which in turn increases homicide on the census tracts level. Inequality is a significant and positive indicator of homicide counts. However, upon investigation of the alternative explanation that inequality is simply a stand in variable for the strains of poverty it is revealed that poverty is indeed a mediating variable for the relationship between inequality and homicide. Once a measure for poverty is introduced into the model it returns significant and the measure for inequality drops completely out of significance. It is important to note that inequality does not co-vary with poverty, indicating that this is a true mediating relationship and not a case of proxy.

**Table 3**

Negative Binomial Regression Homicides in Chicago (2010) and GINI (N=794)

Homicide	IRR	SE	z	P> z
<b>2012</b>				
<i>Explanatory variables</i>				
GINI	1.05	.51	.10	.92
Poverty Rate	1.01	.00	4.16	.00
<i>Control Variables</i>				
Percent Black	1.03	.00	21.50	.00
Percent Hispanic	1.02	.00	12.26	.00
Under 25 years old	1.01	.00	2.40	.02
Population (logged)	1.99	.11	-14.20	.00

Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>: .2199

Theoretically this finding does not challenge Strain Theory directly. What it does challenge is the notion that inequality itself is a source of strain. The fact that poverty mediates the relationship between inequality and homicide points to the conclusion that it is the various stressors associated with *poverty* that make homicide more likely in an area *not* the stress associated with exposure to those with more resources.

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## NIJ 's Effort to Build a Cumulative Body of Knowledge on Violence and Victimization

**2012**

Winifred L. Reed  
Division Director, Crime, Violence and Victimization Research Division  
Office of Research and Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
810 7<sup>th</sup> Street, NW Washington, DC 20531  
Tel: 202-307-2952  
Fax: 202-616-0275  
Email: Winnie.reed@usdoj.gov

### Introduction

#### Mission

The National Institute of Justice — the research, development and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice — is dedicated to improving knowledge and understanding of crime and justice issues through science. NIJ provides objective and independent knowledge and tools to reduce crime and promote justice, particularly at the state and local levels.

NIJ's pursuit of this mission is guided by the following principles:

- ❖ Research can make a difference in individual lives, in the safety of communities and in creating a more effective and fair justice system.
- ❖ Government-funded research must adhere to processes of fair and open competition guided by rigorous peer review.
- ❖ NIJ's research agenda must respond to the real world needs of victims, communities and criminal justice professionals.
- ❖ NIJ must encourage and support innovative and rigorous research methods that can provide answers to basic research questions as well as practical, applied solutions to crime.
- ❖ Partnerships with other agencies and organizations, public and private, are essential to NIJ's success.

#### Strategic Goals

The National Institute of Justice is committed to being a transformative force in the criminal justice field by meeting five strategic challenges:

1. **Fostering science-based criminal justice practice** — supporting rigorous scientific research to ensure the safety of families, neighborhoods and communities.
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2. **Translating knowledge to practice** — disseminating rigorous scientific research to criminal justice professionals to advance what works best in preventing and reducing crime
3. **Advancing technology** — building a more effective, fair and efficient criminal justice system through technology.
4. **Working across disciplines** — connecting the physical, forensic and social sciences to reduce crime and promote justice.
5. **Adopting a global perspective** — understanding crime in its social context within the United States and globally.

**Translational criminology** is NIJ's strategy for transforming criminal justice through research. By bringing evidence to bear on crime policies and practices, NIJ forms a bridge between the work of research and the real-life challenges of fighting crime and enhancing justice. Transformation through research is a cyclical process. Continually, NIJ draws on the needs of practitioners to inform its research agenda; the cycle of transformation continues as research findings are conveyed and translated by researchers in ways that reshape practice and policy. The links in this transforming process take several forms:

- ❖ Technology working groups that provide practical insights about technology needs and challenges among criminal justice professionals.
- ❖ Topical work groups and strategic planning meetings that take stock of the current state of research knowledge.
- ❖ "Listening sessions" with practitioner, policy, and research groups.
- ❖ Cutting-edge communication tools, including print and electronic media, to help NIJ constituents make sense of the research and put it to use.
- ❖ A bi-annual national conference to assemble more than 1,000 criminal justice researchers and practitioners across the social, physical, and forensic science fields.

**Building a cumulative body of knowledge** with ongoing input from practitioners, policymakers and the research community to advance policy and practice. NIJ supports research, evaluation and development in the following areas:

- ❖ Causes and correlates of crime.
- ❖ Crime prevention and control, increasing community safety.
- ❖ Prevention of violence and victimization.
- ❖ Forensic sciences, including the use of DNA evidence.
- ❖ Corrections practice and policy, including community corrections.
- ❖ Law enforcement, including technology, to improve police effectiveness, legitimacy, accountability and safety.
- ❖ Courts and adjudication.

## 100 Building a Cumulative Body of Knowledge about Violence and Victimization

As one can see from the introductory section identified above, an explicit goal of NIJ is to build a cumulative body of knowledge in a number of areas directly related to the efforts of

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the Homicide Research Working Group (HRWG) including: causes and correlates of violence and victimization; prevention of violence and victimization; and crime prevention and control to increase community safety. This presentation will provide an overview of efforts to plan research and evaluation in these areas at NIJ. It will include examples from current efforts that are identified in further detail below.

## **Planning Research Agendas**

NIJ's social science research areas are broadly defined in legislation with particular topics sometimes mandated. Additional information is obtained to more fully develop research agendas from the scientific literature, participation in research and practitioner conferences, and topical working groups. Topical working groups provide NIJ with information regarding the current state of research regarding crime and criminal justice. Participants discuss the latest findings and emerging issues as well as identify questions and gaps in our knowledge base. NIJ disseminates summaries of Topical Working Group discussions so the field can use the information to enhance development of research efforts. Topics are selected by NIJ staff and approved by the Director. Current Topical Research Working Groups include:

- ❖ Community Corrections
- ❖ Crime Prevention
- ❖ Firearms
- ❖ Neighborhood and Crime
- ❖ Gangs

As noted above, topical working groups are one of several mechanisms NIJ uses to bring together researchers, state and local practitioners and federal partners for a comprehensive discussion of research questions, issues and gaps in our knowledge. The last four topical working groups identified above may be of particular interest to HRWG members. Summaries of the crime prevention, firearms, and neighborhoods and crime are available on the NIJ Website. The summary of the gang topical working group will be available soon.

## **Examples of FY 2012 Solicitations**

The current fiscal year included a number of solicitations of potential interest to HRWG members. They are: Research and Evaluation on Violence Against Women: Sexual Violence, Stalking and Teen Dating Violence; Research and Evaluation on Children Exposed to Violence; Violent Victimization Among Racial and Ethnic Minorities; and Research on the Link Between Victimization and Offending.

## **Examples of Current NIJ Projects**

An evaluation of the use of a lethality assessment protocol and intervention with 6 police departments in Oklahoma - In FY 2008, NIJ funded the implementation and experimental evaluation of a Lethality Assessment protocol and intervention with 6 police departments in

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Oklahoma, a state where a substantial proportion of IPV victims are Native American. The intervention consists of 2 components: a brief Lethality Assessment, conducted by police at the scene of an IPV incident, designed to determine whether the victim is at high risk for homicide and, if so, immediate coordination with local social service providers. A nonequivalent groups quasi-experimental design is proposed to examine the effectiveness of a Lethality Assessment Intervention (LAI) at decreasing violence and increasing help seeking behaviors for victims of IPV. This research has four aims. The Evaluation Aim will examine the effectiveness of the Lethality Assessment Intervention (LAI) at decreasing the rates of repeat, lethal and near lethal violence, and increasing the rates of help seeking behaviors among victims of IPV. The Validation Aim will assess the predictive and concurrent validity of the Lethality Assessment (LA), which is a shortened version of the Danger Assessment (DA). The Implementation Fidelity Aim will assess the fidelity of the implementation of the Lethality Assessment protocol with the appropriate high risk victims. Finally, the Satisfaction Aim will assess victim satisfaction with the police response and the Lethality Assessment Intervention. This research will introduce nationally a combined criminal justice and social service intervention that can be implemented in most jurisdictions throughout the US affecting both policy and practice responses to the problem of IPV. The project is in the final phases of recruitment and is expected to be completed at the end of 2013.

An evaluation of the Statewide Automated Victim Information and Notification (SAVIN) Program - This 36-month mixed-method, tiered evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of the Statewide Automated Victim Information and Notification (SAVIN) programs nationwide with the purpose of developing a promising practices toolkit to assist in the ongoing development and enhancement of victim notification programs. The proposed design will not only answer the core question of how to most effectively implement a notification program, but also what components or enhancements of a program work best, what the program outcomes produce, how programs are most likely to sustain their efforts, and how to most effectively allocate costs. To answer these questions and to deconstruct key elements of these programs, the research team will use a three-tiered design: (1) an Implementation and Process Study, which will provide key background information for the other study components, as well as a typology of SAVIN programs, (2) an Outcome Evaluation, which will involve the collection of data from numerous SAVIN stakeholders ' and most importantly, crime victims/survivors, and (3) a Cost Effectiveness and Sustainability Study, which will result in the identification of best practices, and also the best practices for the price.

An evaluation of a school-based prevention program on teen dating violence - This research found that school-level interventions reduced dating violence among middle school students by up to 50 percent in 30 New York City public schools. The study used a multi-level, randomized control trial to find out what is effective in preventing dating violence and sexual harassment among over 2,500 sixth- and seventh-grade students. School-level interventions include using temporary school- based restraining orders, higher levels of faculty and security presence in areas identified as "hot spots," and posters to increase awareness and encourage reporting of incidents to school officials. Classroom-level interventions, when

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delivered alone, had no effect. The classroom-level curricula included sessions that addressed the consequences for perpetrators of dating violence and sexual harassment, state laws and penalties, and discussion of gender roles and healthy relationships. Other critical findings included: The combination of the classroom and the school-level intervention alone led to a 32-47 percent lower sexual violence victimization and perpetration six months after the intervention. Students receiving the school-level intervention were more likely to say they would intervene as a bystander six months after the intervention. Focus groups helped the researchers understand how the interventions were employed and received. The focus groups confirmed that interventions were straightforward to put in place, were implemented as planned, were supported by teachers, and reinforced positive survey results. Research is ongoing to test modifications of the intervention.

A study on approaches to understanding and regulating primary and secondary illegal firearms markets – The overall goal of this project is to enhance the understanding of primary and secondary illegal firearms markets. The project develops methods to better assess, identify and control various types of illegal channels through which firearms are acquired for use by criminal offenders, juveniles and other persons subject to gun-related restrictions. The research focuses on new approaches to firearms tracing to (1) provide a far more complete picture of the characteristics and differences between first-time retail versus secondary market sources of illegal guns, (2) enhance the ability of law enforcement to develop more accurate indicators of primary and secondary sources of illegal firearms and (3) establishing enhanced approaches to integrating state records and trace data for the purposes of optimizing the value of firearms data available to law enforcement. The research suggests that state-level laws backed by a strong commitment to regulate firearms dealers can reduce the ease through which criminals legally divert firearms from legal commerce. The research also suggests that having access to information on the last known purchaser of a firearm significantly reduced the median time-to-crime of crime guns.

A synthesis of research on gang membership prevention – NIJ and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) joined forces to publish a book (working title: *Fighting Chance: Principles of Gang Membership Prevention*), which is expected to be released the end of the year. The primary target audiences for the book are practitioners and policymakers at all levels of government; researchers are a secondary, but important, audience. Its goal is to help policymakers who make decisions on the best use of taxpayer dollars — and practitioners like teachers and police officers, community-services providers and ER doctors who work in the trenches everyday — understand what the research says about keeping kids out of gangs. Topics include: the importance of preventing gang joining; attractions of gang life; complementary roles of public health and law enforcement in preventing gang membership; early childhood risk factors for gang membership; the role of early prevention strategies in supporting families to keep kids out of gangs; schools and gang membership prevention; communities and gang membership prevention; girls and gang membership prevention; the role of race and ethnicity in gang membership; and evaluation of gang membership prevention efforts. A theme of the book is how criminal justice and public health can collaborate at multiple levels to raise awareness about the importance of early prevention in helping to prevent kids from joining gangs and to ensure that the best-

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available evidence of 'what works' is fully utilized. This book provides a foundation for that collaboration by describing the principles and promising practices that practitioners and policymakers can use to guide decisions and long-term planning as we tackle the growing problems of gangs.

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CHAPTER 7

OPERATIONAL CEASEFIRE IN CHICAGO

Presenters:

Dan Cantillon, CeaseFire Chicago Director of Research and Evaluation

Tio Hardiman, CeaseFire Illinois Program Director

Lupe Cruz, CeaseFire South Side Coordinator

Chair:

Carolyn Rebecca Block, Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority  
(retired)

Recorder:

Tom McEwen, McEwen and Associates, LLC

## CeaseFire 101

Dan Cantillon, CeaseFire Chicago Director of Research and Evaluation  
Tio Hardiman, CeaseFire Illinois Program Director  
Lupe Cruz, CeaseFire South Side Coordinator

CeaseFire, a non-profit organization housed at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC), employs a public health paradigm to stop shootings and homicides in some of Chicago's most violent communities. A public health model approaches violence as a learned behavior, reinforced by social expectations and community norms (Akers 1985, Rosenberg 1991). In a community plagued by violence, violent resolutions become the accepted "normal," and often expected responses to conflict. The prevalence of violence as a normative response frequently extends beyond gang-related issues to minor disputes or perceived slights (Anderson 1999). Consequently, violence reduction efforts require changing thinking patterns and normative beliefs as necessary steps to change violent behavior. Through conflict mediation, outreach, community mobilization, and widespread public education campaigns, CeaseFire aims to interrupt the transmission of the norms and behaviors endorsing violence, provide peaceful alternatives in conflict resolution, and ultimately reduce shootings and homicides across target areas.

CeaseFire is a multifaceted program that needs to address various aspects of violence in order to have an effect in the community. The model necessitates that the program consists of the right workers, working in the right area, with the right individuals. The staff that are employed by CeaseFire have a relationship with the people in the community that they are working in. Many of them grew up in the community and they are viewed by residents as credible messengers that can be trusted to intervene in high risk situations. The right area is determined by shooting and homicide data. CeaseFire is working in the areas of the city with the highest rates of shootings and killings. That is where we are needed most so that is where our efforts are focused.

The average rate of homicide in the United States is 5 per 100,000. The average rate of homicide in CeaseFire zones is 34 per 100,000. Finally, the right participants are important. CeaseFire works with those youth in the neighborhood that are most likely to shoot or be shot. CeaseFire uses a list of criteria derived from past research to determine which individuals in the community are the highest risk.

In looking broadly at changing norms and thinking across a community, CeaseFire looks to engage the community as a whole. In order to do that, events are hosted in the neighborhood that not only bring out the highest risk youth that are participants, but also kids, mothers, business owners and residents. The entire community is invited to come out to these events that focus on peace and discussing ways to reduce violence in their neighborhood. In addition, shooting responses or prayer vigils are held in the community in response to every shooting that occurs within the target area. Public education materials are handed out at all

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of these events to inform the public on the purpose of CeaseFire and increase awareness about violence in the area and alternative ways to solve conflicts.


In addition to affecting neighborhood level norms and enhancing community involvement, CeaseFire focuses specifically on high-risk individuals within target areas through the use of Outreach Workers and Violence Interrupters. Outreach Workers are street-smart individuals who identify, engage, and recruit youth who are at risk for becoming involved in violence. Outreach Workers strive to change the behaviors and thinking of youth to redirect them to positive pursuits (e.g. jobs, job training, returning to school). While Outreach Workers carry a specific client base, Violence Interrupters operate in the community at large, tracking and mediating potentially volatile conflicts, calling for truces among combatant groups, and preventing retaliations (Skogan, et al., 2008).

Safer, healthier cities are within our grasp. In urban neighborhoods across America, an innovative approach to ending violence is reducing shootings and killings, strengthening communities and transforming lives. CeaseFire is the catalyst making this happen. CeaseFire approaches reducing violence from a new angle that works alongside existing approaches. Violence is treated as a contagious epidemic like AIDS and tuberculosis that can be overcome not through moral judgment but with science-based strategy. Intervention, not threats, underlies our success, which has been documented by studies sponsored by the Department of Justice and Centers for Disease Control.

The approach is as simple as it is revolutionary. Carefully selected members of the community– trusted insiders– are trained to anticipate where violence may occur and intervene before it erupts. CeaseFire works with high-risk individuals to provide a path out of the despair that leads to violence. The entire community is engaged in order to send a powerful message: violence is unproductive, unacceptable and unnecessary.

This document is intended to broadly describe the major elements and theoretical rationale behind the CF program. The presentation will walk through specific elements of the model and highlight the key components across all aspects of the intervention, from our work directly with individuals, to gangs/groups, to community engagement and mobilization. We will also specifically highlight our work in Little Village since we will be visiting this site during the conference. Finally, evaluation results will be discussed, with a particular focus on eliciting feedback regarding the best avenues to pursue to increase the evidence base and to determine which aspects of CF are responsible for creating individual and community change.

# The CeaseFire Model to Stop Shootings and Killings



The CeaseFire model consists of three main parts:

1. Identification and detection
2. Interruption, intervention and risk reduction using credible messengers
3. Changing behaviors and norms

**Note:** Once a program is established, these three parts occur concurrently.

**References:**

Akers, R. L. (2085). *Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

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## Recorder Notes for CeaseFire 101

Candace Batton: What is the involvement of females in CeaseFire?

Lupe Cruz: We have outreach workers and interrupters who are females and have been incarcerated in the past. They mentor groups of young girls. For example, four girls are graduating Monday from high school and entering college. All were high-risk girls. One wants to be a probation officer and another wants to be a teacher. The girl who wants to be a teacher was thrown out of school last year three weeks from the end of the school year. She refused to get a GED because she wanted to finish high school. We were able to get her into another school and she's now graduating.

Chris Rache: I've heard that the media is implying that funds should not go to gang members. How have you handled that problem with "credible messengers"?

Marcus: I've seen the same articles criticizing CeaseFire and reporting on a few who have not worked out with us. We do have a microscope under us. You have to remember that CeaseFire has been in existence since 2000. Since that time, over 300 young people have been hired and only five have gotten into trouble. The media has not reported on this. We hire these people because they can make a difference and our belief is that no one else can stop the violence.

Dan: CeaseFire is dealing with this at a national level. There's always a need to push back when you're doing grassroots efforts.

Gipsy Escobar: Two questions. First, does CeaseFire have something in place to help interrupters cope with trauma and emotional issues?

Marcus: We address the issues of coping during our initial training efforts through lectures on self-help and avoiding burnout. We also discuss these issues when we train managers and we have people on staff who can provide counseling. We also can give referrals for other help, if needed.

Dan: Mindfulness is our main training approach for telling workers how to cope with what they are doing. We also have two-hour informal meetings each week that include self-help discussions.

Jo-Ann Della-Giustina: What is your relationship with CrossFire in Boston?

Dan: The Boston CeaseFire model has a law enforcement and deterrence orientation. For example, their approach to gang violence is to reach out directly to gangs, set standards for behavior, and pull "levers" when gang don't meet standards. In Chicago, we have minimal interaction with police. The program theory for Chicago's CeaseFire is based on a behavior-change model that emphasizes client outreach and street interventions to change norms and thereby reduce the level of violence.

Jo-Ann Della-Giustina: In some shootings, do you actively participate with the prosecution of the offenders?

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Marcus: No, we do not get actively involved in prosecution. The police do their job and we do ours.

Dan: Usually, police and prosecutors do not need the involvement of CeaseFire in their efforts.

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Jo-Ann Della-Giustina: Has there been displacement of problems in areas where you've worked.

Lupe: there are shootings in other communities. Due to funding, we cannot be everywhere.

Marcus: Most definitely, there has been spillover. In Yonkers, New York, there have been no murders in the area where CeaseFire works, but violence has spilled over into neighboring areas.

Dan: We want to take a close look at displacement and there may be some positive effects because workers are going outside their areas.

John Jarvis: Over the last ten years, what has been the biggest challenge in being effective?

Marcus: The biggest challenge has been in obtaining services for outreach workers, especially jobs. This is true across the board in other cities with CeaseFire programs.

Tom Dover: Have you run into any legal issues due to workers knowing offenders and do you have any legal protections?

Marcus: We do not have any legal protections. However, I know of only one legal situation, which was a subpoena for a trainer (not staff).

Tom Dover: Don't you pose a quandary for law enforcement when you know an offender (e.g., shooter)?

Marcus: I agree we need to get offenders off the street, but it's not our place to be in that position. Also, we don't get a lot of confessions. We hear about why shooting is going on (e.g., a lot of anger in the community), and we see that something may happen. That's when we try to intervene to diffuse a situation. We don't spend time on investigations.

Dan: At the local level, any problems with investigations work themselves out. There is better communication with police in some areas than others, and there may be more friction as you move up the police chain of command.

Kathleen Heide: Given CeaseFire, does attitude change in communities? Do people become more proactive in working with police or cooperate more with a police as a result of CeaseFire?

Lupe: As an example, we had a recent problem where members of the community wanted to retaliate after a murder. Our aim was to stop the retaliation. Two men were arrested so we emphasized that the community had lost three members, in different ways. We held a prayer vigil that included friends of the offenders who said they were sorry about what happened.

Napoleon Reyes: Two questions. Do you offer any promises of confidentiality for those you work with on the street? Does law enforcement respect your efforts?

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Marcus: On the first question, yes, there is a promise of confidentiality so they know we can be trusted. Especially when you are first starting, a lot of public relations is needed so they know CeaseFire is not working with the police. On the second question, a good example is in Yonkers, New York, where the police chief was willing to give drug fund money to support the efforts of CeaseFire.

Dawn McDaniel: Are you going to be looking at the staffing issues and time series analysis in your evaluations?

Dan: Yes, although it will be difficult in Chicago because CeaseFire has been in the city so long. We are focusing on how it works, along with fidelity, dosage, adaptation, and other factors. In other sites, there is interest in implementation studies and studies that include control groups.

Note: After the question/answer session, Jay Corzine thanked the panel and announced that HRWG will be donating \$2,000 to CeaseFire Chicago for their efforts.

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CHAPTER 8

RESPONDING TO HOMICIDE

Presenters:

Paul H. Blackman, Independence Institute  
Vanessa Leggett, Criminal Justice Training Center, University of  
Houston-Downtown

J. Amber Scherer, Federal Bureau of Investigation, John Jay College of  
Criminal Justice, City University of New York

John Jarvis, Federal Bureau of Investigation

C. Gabrielle Salfati, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of  
New York

Chair:

Amanda Farrell, Old Dominion University

## TO RAZE A VILLAGE: A TWENTY-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE ON WHAT WENT WRONG WITH WACO

2012

Paul H. Blackman, Independence Institute

Vanessa Leggett, Criminal Justice Training Center, University of Houston-Downtown<sup>8</sup>

Twenty years ago, in June 1992, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (BATF)<sup>9</sup> began an investigation of possible gun-law violations by David Koresh. Koresh led the Branch Davidian sect of the Seventh-Day Adventists at Ranch Apocalypse—also called Mount Carmel—in Waco, Texas. The investigation culminated in a botched assaultive arrest attempt on February 28, 1993, resulting in the deaths of four BATF agents and six Branch Davidians. An FBI-led siege ensued for 51 days, until the FBI used tanks to gas and destroy the building housing the Davidians. The historic standoff climaxed in a fire—set up if not set, as expected by the FBI, by the Davidians—resulting in the deaths of 76 additional Davidians, about one-third of them children.

Called such things as “the largest massacre of Americans by American Feds since 1890 and the fireworks at Wounded Knee” (Gore Vidal) and the “deadliest law enforcement operation in U.S. history” (Jacob Sullum), the incident inspired the home-grown terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City, taking an additional 168 lives, and was followed through 1995 in various reviews by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, as well as by non-governmental scholars, journalists, protagonists, and others. Results are summarized in David B. Kopel and Paul H. Blackman's *No More Wacos: What's Wrong with Federal Law Enforcement and How to Fix It* (1997), in some cases suggesting possible governmental actions and cover-ups not reported or proved within five years of the start of BATF's investigation of Koresh. A film summary of the critical side of the Waco controversy was presented in the Oscar-nominated/Emmy-winning documentary, *Waco: The Rules of Engagement* (1997), by William Gazecki, Mike McNulty, and Dan Gifford. What has been learned by and of the government since?

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Aside from the aftermath of 1993 - 1995, the most important period related to learning about and from the Waco incident was 1999 - 2001, that last year not so much because of how federal law enforcement approaches (or should approach) possible domestic gun-law violators or terrorists, but because of the added threat of foreign- or foreign-inspired terrorism.

To those who saw a three-branch cover-up of government wrongdoing—intended and

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<sup>8</sup> The views expressed in this summary do not necessarily represent the views of the Independence Institute or the University of Houston-Downtown.

<sup>9</sup> With the addition of Explosives to its jurisdiction, it is now BATFE. Also, BATFE was moved last decade from the Treasury to the Justice Department.

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unintentional—the turn of the millennium saw confirmation of past cover-ups and the development of new cover-ups. The attacks of 9/11 provided more reasons to fear governmental ineptness and misbehavior, likely to be redirected more toward Muslims rather than at odd-ball or fundamentalist Christian (including fundamentalist Mormons) and militias. For the most part, however, possible abuses of authority have not involved violent siege-ending confrontations so much as subtler subversions of civil rights and liberties (entrapment, electronic and other snooping, and arrests without trial).

In some ways, covering items up allows the FBI to avoid having to explain some decisions that might otherwise seem to suggest that a final attack on the Davidians' buildings was more important than capturing Koresh. Two days before the final assault, while secretly planting the “bugs” that would enable them to learn of the planned fire, agents reportedly had the opportunity to capture Koresh but were told not to do so. There might be a reasonable explanation for choosing not to seize the leader of the group, but so long as the opportunity was denied, so was the offering of an explanation. In addition, the FBI apparently knew of a water shortage at the Davidians' Mt. Carmel that would soon have ended the siege, suggesting that the April 19<sup>th</sup> assault did not even shorten the siege by much. In fact, the attack only made the ending more deadly, an ending that conveniently coincided with the birthday of BATF hero Eliot Ness.

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The FBI has always claimed that at no time during the 51-day siege or the final assault did they use firearms against the Davidians. In general, however, firing at the building would have risked universal condemnation when most of the residents were not suspects, and a third were children. In fact, however, “flashbangs” were fired at those who stepped out of the building. The FBI calls them harmless firecracker-like devices. Federal law then considered the potentially lethal explosives to be “destructive devices” comparable to hand grenades. In 1994, flashbangs were included in a list of “weapons of mass destruction.”

By 1999 - 2000, it was reported that spent cartridges were found near the premises of the house used by the FBI during the siege, leading to the suspicion—still denied by the FBI—that shots were fired in ending the siege on April 19, shots allegedly discouraging or preventing some Davidians from escaping the house even as it was gassed and then engulfed in flames.

Limiting FBI credibility regarding shots fired on April 19 are flashes seen in FLIR (Forward-Looking Infra-Red) tapes of the action, which experts interpreted as evidence of gun fire, even some machine-gun fire. To some extent, the FBI could claim authorization, since the Attorney General's approved directive for the final assault called for increased **use** of force if the CS gas attack that began that morning resulted in Davidian gunfire—a response expected apparently by everyone except Attorney General Janet Reno. The FBI continues to deny the gunfire, and “independent” reviewers continue to cover it up, but the surviving Davidians noted it as a reason they were slow—and for many, unable—to leave the compound despite the misery caused by the CS gas and the danger of the tanks and fire

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destroying the structure.<sup>10</sup>

In 1999, the FBI finally admitted that contrary to AG Reno's testimony in 1995 (when she was accompanied by FBI officials who knew the truth and were there to feed her any necessary details), during the morning of the final siege, incendiary devices were fired at the Branch Davidians. The FBI probably accurately denies the devices caused the fire. But, by 1995, it had been established that the FBI knew the Davidians were planning, if attacked, to have flammable material spread out for eventual lighting by Koresh's so-called Mighty Men (the only potential criminal suspects who could have faced trial for actions during the initial BATF misadventure and FBI siege). At best, such foreknowledge indicates a reckless disregard of whether the incendiary devices would light the Davidians' flammable materials—even as tanks systematically destroyed the structure, closing off escape routes the Davidians attempted to use to fend the eventual conflagration, as evidenced by where bodies were concentrated after the fire ended.

AG Reno announced that she was shocked to learn of the use of these devices,<sup>11</sup> and promptly called for another “independent” review of her agency. This review would be headed by former Senator John Danforth, who was reportedly also being considered as a possible Vice-Presidential nominee, and thus anxious quickly to finish his review and clearly not interested in publicly siding with a sexual-predator-led violent “cult.” Danforth’s reported goal was to water down the 61% of the public that believed the government was at fault in Waco rather than, necessarily, to determine what had happened.

Danforth's top aide, chosen by Reno, was Edward Dowd, who, as a U.S. Attorney in Missouri, had apparently illegally—but with the AG's permission—used his office to campaign in favor of gun control on a state referendum, a serious potential bias in a case that began as an effort to enforce federal gun laws. Danforth and Dowd didn't side with the Davidians. The review found nothing substantively untoward about the FBI's actions, except for its failure in a timely fashion to reveal the use of the pyrotechnic devices. This lack of timely disclosure led to the prosecution of the “whistleblower” who eventually reported it, apparently because his whistleblowing made the Department of Justice's defense in the civil trial more difficult.

Based on the FLIR tapes, the Danforth Commission also reviewed the allegations of shots being fired on the morning of April 19, but dismissed them, hiring an outside consulting firm to review the allegations. But the independent review was by a consulting firm dependent upon various federal agencies, including the White House, for its work. The tests were private, and the report concluded that no shots were fired— despite the generally accepted

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<sup>10</sup> While the initial autopsies revealed several Davidians died by gunfire, there was no initial effort to determine the sources of the bullets found. Once the allegations of outside gunfire achieved credibility, an alleged malfunction in the area the bodies were stored damaged them to the point that further analysis was impossible.

<sup>11</sup> Filmmaker Mike McNulty questions her denial of prior knowledge, since he had previously sent her information about it. That she may not have been apprised of what he sent her might reflect more on her staff than on her. On the other hand, Jacob Sullum reported in a 1998 review of the 1997 file, *Rules of Engagement*, that two incendiary devices had been recovered from the site. If Reno had been genuinely surprised to learn of the devices in late summer 1999, she was clearly avoiding learning about the incident.

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FBI allegation that shots were fired—by the Davidians at the FBI. Danforth also was unable to find a plan to demolish the building, even though that had long since been established. Other experts reported that over 200 shots were fired by the FBI on April 19.

**2012**

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Differing jurisdictions contributed to the appearance of a cover-up, by limiting access to the evidence that had been collected. Much of the evidence was in the custody of the Texas Department of Public Safety, but officially under the control of the federal government. So those seeking to look at the evidence were told by the state that the material wasn't under its control, so it couldn't allow access to it. Those going to the federal government were told that it didn't have the evidence in question. To documentary filmmaker Mike McNulty, this arguable Catch-22 looked like a cover-up.

To critics, further evidence that the government's cover-up affected the judicial as well as the other two branches of government stemmed from an injudicious conflict of interest: The judge assigned to the Davidians' civil suit against the government was the same jurist who presided over the criminal trials of some of the surviving Davidians. The nature of lawsuits against the sovereign made victory difficult, and, arguably, Judge Walter Smith was already familiar with the case. The Davidians, however, saw him as biased and sought his recusal, which he denied. Part of the bias was the incongruous sentencing, resulting from the trial jury's misunderstanding of apparently rather shoddy- or biased-judicial instructions. The jury had both acquitted the Davidians of the underlying felonies they were charged with using firearms to commit, but had convicted them of using the machineguns. Judge Smith then sentenced some Davidians for using machineguns in the commission of felonies they were acquitted of having committed.

As clearly established through later information uncovered by attorneys involved in the civil suit and supported by the documentaries, there was only one use of a machinegun against BATF's raiders, and its user, as BATF information showed, was quickly killed. In violation of the *Brady* rule and other requirements that prosecutors reveal exculpatory information to the defense, perjured testimony was used to suggest that the individual defendants in the criminal case had used machineguns.

In the civil trial, Judge Smith could claim he was being fair since he ordered a lot of information discoverable to the Davidians' various attorneys. The appearance would be deceiving since Smith then declined to give them enough preparation time to evaluate the mass of material. This curtailment limited the time they were allotted in court so that little of the material could be offered into evidence. The judge also sharply limited the amount of time allotted the Davidians for presenting their case, and their ability to use the testimony of expert witnesses. Unsurprisingly, Judge Smith dismissed the civil suit.

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In addition to the government's activities surrounding 9/11, 2001 also saw the release of another book summarizing the case against the government and its treatment of David

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Koresh and his Branch Davidians: *This is Not an Assault: Penetrating the Web of Official Lies Regarding the Waco Incident*, by David T. Hardy with Rex Kimball. The title, based on the loudspeaker announcement to the Branch Davidians as the final assault on Ranch Apocalypse began on the morning of April 19, presumably shows the ease of finding lies the government told, quite literally loud and clear. Hardy's book provides more evidence of the overly aggressive and seriously flawed initial BATF move on Mt. Carmel. To begin with, the helicopter chief and the ground command were initially unable to communicate since they were using different frequencies. The panicked effort for the helicopters to be involved leads to some evidence the first shot was fired from the helicopters—a not noticeably worse surmise than earlier critics' view that the first shot was fired by BATF agents attacking the Davidians' dogs: Both assert the first shots were likely by BATF and not related to the confrontation with Koresh at the front door.

Hardy's book also notes how members of the House committee investigating the incident, like Danforth, were not interested in criticizing government law enforcement and seemingly siding with Koresh at a time when Republicans were hoping to take back the White House. The 1995 hearings, at which the Republicans attacked federal law enforcement and Democrats defended it, had not paid off in the 1996 elections. So the House committee belittled its own expert, who had found massive FBI shooting at the Davidians, preventing women and children from leaving Mt. Carmel, except to try to get and destroy their expert's preliminary reports – a copy of which the expert had supplied to Hardy prior to the expert's unexpected death.

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It is difficult to determine what lessons the government may have learned from the Waco incident. There have certainly been incidents during the years since Waco when sieges have been less aggressive than at Ruby Ridge in 1992, and Waco in 1993. Other incidents have included the arrests of various militia members in the Midwest and Montana, and a polygamist breakaway from the Mormons in Texas. On the other hand, the BATF and the FBI managed to make thousands of non-fatal arrests in the decades preceding Waco.

One lesson clearly not learned was the potential danger of inviting the military to assist in domestic law enforcement. Despite the unsavory origins of the Posse Comitatus Act, it served to keep law enforcement efforts less militaristic. At Waco, military assistance, achieved with bogus allegations of the drug nexus exemption from the Posse Comitatus Act, effectively made the arrest and siege both into military operations, with concerns for innocent civilians reduced. Even before foreign terrorist attacks succeeded horribly on September 11, 2001, efforts had been made in Congress to expand the drug trafficking exemption to a terrorist exemption as well.



## Practitioner Views of Controversies in the Use of Criminal Investigative Analysis

2012

Amber Scherer, MA – Behavioral Science Unit, FBI; John Jay College of Criminal Justice  
John Jarvis, PhD – Behavioral Science Unit, FBI  
Gabrielle Salfati, PhD – John Jay College of Criminal Justice

*This paper is an update on research findings that were presented preliminarily during last year's meeting.*

### **Abstract**

Historically, state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies have requested assistance with violent crime investigations. One type of assistance, criminal investigative analysis (CIA), formerly referred to as “profiling”, has been used to provide information about the behavior of an unknown offender in order to narrow down a suspect pool (i.e., Douglas & Burgess, 1986). However, debates have been identified in the literature regarding this investigative tool, including: the training and skills required to practice, the profiling process, the reliability of the methodologies used, the usefulness of the tool, and testifying in court. This paper is an update of preliminary findings which examined these issues. The present study interviewed 40 individuals who have previously or are currently practicing CIA using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) methodologies with the aim of capturing opinions regarding each of the core controversies. Relevant results will be discussed, as well as implications for future research and practice.

### **Introduction**

Thanks to the glorification in the media, while criminal investigative analysis is most well-known for the production of an “offender profile”, other products or services include: indirect personality assessment, equivocal death analysis, and trial strategies (Hazelwood, et al., 1995). More recently, CIA has expanded into assisting with linkage analysis, investigative suggestions, interview strategies, media strategies, threat assessment, search warrant affidavit assistance, expert testimony, geographic profiling, and critical incident analysis (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Therefore to say that criminal investigative analysis is only offender profiling is an oversimplification. The current study looked beyond evaluating the practice of profiling to examining criminal investigative analysis as a whole as it has been practiced.

In addition to examining the practice of profiling, the current study examines debates regarding the methods employed, and the training and expertise required. For example, there are discrepancies outlined in the literature in what skills and training are required (Kocsis, et al., 2000; Kocsis, et al., 2002), the “profiling” process (e.g., Douglas, et al., 1986; Pinizzotto & Finkel, 1990) and variations in its application (e.g., Alison, Smith, Eastman, &

Rainbow, 2003a; Canter, 1995, Salfati, 2008). Furthermore, the expertise of an individual who provides CIA services is regularly debated in the literature, including whether investigative experience is essential or even necessary (i.e., Copson, Badcock, Boon, & Britton, 1997; Gogan, 2007; Hazelwood, et al., 1995; Kocsis, et al., 2002). In addition, expertise and testimony in the courtroom can be debated among the social sciences (Bosco, Zappala, & Zanttila, 2010). Finally, perhaps most important for the practitioner, is what makes the consultation successful and the services useful? The equivocal findings in the literature showcase longstanding controversies within the community of practice and illustrate the obstacles that must be overcome in order to become more accepted as a discipline in both the academic and law enforcement communities.

This exploratory research was designed to address these deficits in the literature and attempt to connect this widespread practice to the empirical research concerning its use. This research examined the scope and application of CIA services and interviewed those who have been FBI-trained and actually applied CIA services. By doing so, it is believed that through this empirical research some of the disagreements regarding the practice of CIA can be resolved.

## Method

### Research Subjects<sup>12</sup>

The subjects were comprised of individuals who have formerly worked with the FBI's behavioral analysis units or FBI-trained individuals who have law enforcement experience in providing criminal investigative analysis (CIA) services. All participants were identified either by current or former criminal investigative analysts as able to explicitly provide data on the knowledge and practices of CIA. The initial participants were identified using purposive and convenience sampling from knowledge and access of working in the Behavioral Science Unit. Snowball sampling was also used to identify the remaining participants to reach a sample size of 40. While this is usually considered a small sample, the number of individuals that practice this analysis, have knowledge of the areas pertaining to the study, and available to participate in studies of this nature is relatively small.

## Results

### Demographics

Of the 40 individuals (male = 87.5%) interviewed for this study, 15% (n = 6) were from an International law enforcement agency. The participants' mean number of years of law enforcement experience was 32.9 (SD = 8.5), with the minimum number of years being 15.5 and the maximum number of years being 51. With regards to prior experience, 97.5% had general prior investigative experience and 75% had both prior general investigative

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<sup>12</sup> Information regarding Materials and Procedures are available upon request.

experience and specifically in violent crime. With regards to education, 87.5% have a Bachelor's degree or higher (in a variety of subjects). It is important to consider the degrees were not always obtained prior to beginning law enforcement. Finally, 47.5% of the interviewees are still currently practicing criminal investigative analysis and 22.5% of them are practicing part-time.

## Summary

In an attempt to shed light on some disagreements revolving around criminal investigative analysis (CIA) that are prevalent in the academic literature, the present research examined the application of services by interviewing those who have practiced the analysis as trained by the FBI regarding issues related to their background, training, expertise, process used, and perceptions regarding the effectiveness of the analysis and utilization in court.

First, the results did not yield a standard definition of CIA; 27.5% of the respondents describe it as a list of multiple services that can be provided to an agency. Another 25% of respondents describe it, similar to the original definition of offender profiling, as deriving characteristics of an offender from the characteristics of the crime scene. Another 22.5% describe it as a "process" to be used for analyzing information. Fifteen percent describe it as both a list of multiple services that can be provided and a "process" to be used. Finally, 10% describe it as something else. This lack of definition of the core concept of CIA, fuels the ongoing debates concerning the methodology. Although there is no common unique definition of CIA, there is a common background of those who have practiced this complex analysis.

With regards to background skills, perhaps the greatest debate is whether or not investigative experience is necessary to practice. The results of the current study agree with the findings of Kocsis, et al. (2000), who reported professional profilers possessed skills which allowed them to perform more accurate on a profiling task. However, to take this one step further, the current study makes the argument that defining how accurate an individual is on a profiling task is not the best measure of this analysis. In other words, providing assistance on an investigation is not simply a checklist of how accurate an individual was with providing characteristics and traits of an offender.

Contrary to Kocsis, et al. (2000), a follow-up study (Kocsis, 2003) found perhaps the most important skill for efficient profiling was logical and objective reasoning over investigative experience. Although, the current study found both to be important to those who actually practice CIA services, through self-report, investigative experience was still reported to be the most important skill necessary to practice this analysis. However, the present study was focused on the opinions of those who provide CIA services in the field and what about their investigative experiences was necessary to be able to practice.

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Those who provide these analytical services report it is miscomprehended, creating a problem of defining success. The participants of the current study agree with previous researchers (e.g. Alison, et al. 2002; 2003b) that measures of usefulness are more appropriate for measuring success than how many characteristics were accurate on an

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offender profile. Comparing written profiles of “profilers” (See Pinizzotto & Finkel, 1990) to show expertise or accuracy does not get at the true function of CIA. Thus, previous academic research (i.e., Kocsis, et al., 2000) is using the wrong measuring stick for accuracy and therefore, conclusions about success and consumer satisfaction would be more appropriate measures.

The overarching controversy regarding the utility of CIA is rooted in how it has been defined and measured. Measuring the utility of the practice by the accuracy of a constructed offender profile is only going to exacerbate the debate. Further attention needs to be given to what the behavioral analysis is appropriately used for and measure needs to be afforded to issues such as consumer satisfaction and other measures of success outlined by the actual investigating agencies.

The current research attempted to describe the process used by the participants when engaging in CIA services. However, the participants were not specifically asked how inferences regarding explicit offender characteristics were made from the crime scene. Therefore, the current study was a summary of what the respondents did report. Yet, a more-detailed examination can be taken at these qualitative descriptions of the processes to analyze the presence of specific steps and/or flow of behavioral analysis concepts (i.e., victimology, crime scene, autopsy, geography, etc.). A closer look at the sequences described will likely show an underlying framework of a general sequence born and modified from Douglas and colleagues (1986). Hopefully in further research this would lead to an eventual standardization of profiling and CIA services in the U.S. as practiced similar to the UK.<sup>13</sup>

Interestingly, as early as 1999, Egger made the contention that: “It is not unreasonable to predict that profilers will be licensed in the not-too-distant future, say 15 to 20 years from now. This, of course, will have to be preceded by a standardization of the process.” He also notes that if a standardized curriculum is not implemented, then at least a combination of experience, education, and training will be required to obtain licensure (Egger, 1999). However, in order to do this, Egger (1999) notes that profiling within CIA must become much more of a science than an art. Overcoming these aforementioned controversies will be a first step to gaining a consistent process for a standardized curriculum, education and training. Although, today, 12 years later, there is still no standardized curriculum that culminates in licensure.

In order to make the profiling process more reliable Salfati (2008) notes that empirical methods should be used. In that regard, Snook, et al. (2008) state that the practitioners of “profiling” are not utilizing the empirical research. Conversely, in the present study three quarters of the respondents report they do use empirical research during analysis to inform the process and support opinions by relying on previous research, reading new research articles or relying on their own research findings. However, they also indicated that the process should not be strictly empirical because value is placed on the experience of the

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<sup>13</sup> See Rainbow (2008) for details.

analyst providing the services and that cannot be replaced with research. Nevertheless, this is the opinion of those interviewed.

Admissibility standards aside, the use of CIA in court is clearly a controversial topic, as most of the participants reported that “maybe” CIA services should be used in court, with the exception of offender profiling. Interestingly, the use of CIA in civil cases is growing as the admissibility standards are much lower, and there is a wider range of uses. The service of offender profiling is still seen very much as an art and not to be used in the courtroom. CIA is used in court as either the analyst testifying themselves or “assisting” the prosecution with the case. There are other services encapsulated by CIA that are seen to be more objective and could be used to educate the jury. Furthermore, there are other services that practitioners believe could be used at some phases of trial but not during others.

Quotes:

Regarding the Profiling Process being standardized for all types of cases:

**Respondent #31:** “Not to my knowledge. I’ve never seen any working standard process. I’ve heard people talk about it before, but I’ve never seen it. It’s kind of like the Lochness Monster. I’ve heard a lot of people talk about it, but I’ve never seen it.”

**Respondent #19:** “It is very simplistic, but it is a skeleton for which you can hang a whole lot of stuff. And I would think it would boil down to that. ... So I think that formula is the standard.” In this instance, the respondent is referring to the analysis process he outlined in the proceeding question as the standard formula to use.

Regarding Criminal Investigative Analysis being Common-Sense:

**Respondent #16:** “It’s common-sense if you are an extremely experienced expert in the field of criminal investigative analysis. It’s not the case if you aren’t. It’s like saying neurosurgery is common-sense if you have a tumor, you want to take it out. But what kind of damage could you do trying to take it out when you are not skilled at doing it? It’s exactly the same thing.”

Benefits of using Criminal Investigative Analysis:

**Respondent #10:** “I think the important thing here is to understand that it is a tool. It is to be used to help the investigator more narrowly focus his investigation. I’ll tell you right now, the biggest critics of profiling, are the guys who developed it. The biggest critics, we were. It was never intended to solve crime. It was intended to be an investigative tool, for the investigator to use in his attempt to solve crime.”

Defining a Successful Consultation:

**Respondent #15:** “I think for me a consultation is a success if I feel that whoever I am assisting, consulting with, walks out of the process with a better understanding of the case, of the theories, of potential suspects and why. If they have a better

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understanding of those things, I look at it, to be quite honest, I look at it as much as an educational sort of endeavor as anything else. I am a firm believer in training and imparting knowledge. It's a train the trainers sort of thing. You want them to become good at what they do. ... So if they can walk out with a better understanding of that, that is a success to me. I don't think you ever gauge success in this sort of field on arrests or convictions or stuff like that because that is not what you do and most of the time the information you are giving them is not giving them their offender. It's helping them in other ways and I think it is more important."

**Respondent #3:** "When they call back and say 'We got him'."

These differing definitions can create a problem determining when an analyst is in fact successful and helpful to an agency.

On uses of Criminal Investigative Analysis in Court:

### *Case Presentation*

"I would much rather sit down with prosecutors and say this is how you can use it in your **case presentation** and your **closing argument**. And you can become your own expert."

**2012**

CHAPTER 9

“STAND YOUR GROUND” LAWS AND LETHAL VIOLENCE

Presenters:

Paul H. Blackman, Independence Institute

Amy Donley, University of Central Florida

Rae Taylor, Loyola University, New Orleans

Chair:

Rae Taylor, Loyola University, New Orleans

## The American Tradition of Self-Help vs. the Rule of Retreat 2012

Paul H. Blackman, Independence Institute  
1514 N. Herndon Street, Arlington, VA 22201; pblackman@scicliffs.com<sup>14</sup>

When the news media began obsessing on the shooting of Trayvon Martin, a visitor to a gated community, by George Zimmerman, a “neighborhood watch” leader, they also focused on Florida’s “stand your ground” law. That Florida law, along with the related “your home is your castle” laws, was one of several enacted around the country with support from the National Rifle Association (NRA) and such of its state affiliates as Florida’s Unified Sportsmen of Florida, headed by Marion Hammer (who had also been the first female president of the NRA). The NRA’s success in pushing the Stand Your Ground and Castle legislation was partly because those measures supported the traditional self-help and voluntarism concepts that are features of American life recognized from de Tocqueville on. In the case of George Zimmerman, this tradition was tied to another major American tradition observed by de Tocqueville, that of voluntarism.

Critics of those American traditions would see Richard Maxwell Brown’s “Strains of violence” in self-help and voluntarism – at their worst resulting in feuds, vigilantism, and lynchings – rather than the voluntarism and self-help referred to as George H.W. Bush’s “thousand points of light,” with some points being such Neighborhood Watch programs as that in which Zimmerman was active.

In addition to being tied to the American tradition of self-help, NRA’s reforms were relatively easy to have enacted because the measures could be seen as anti-crime, reforming legislative and judicial developments that could be described as benefitting criminals by threatening criminal sanction for law-abiding citizens who used guns to protect themselves from criminal aggression. Some of the adverse judicial decisions demanding Retreat were based on the prosecution of women for using deadly force against abusive men. This gave a feminist color to the legislative proposals.

Stand Your Ground was a response to the Retreat rule, intended to prevent mutual affrays by requiring, when claiming a killing of an assailing was excusable, that the killer was obliged to show that the killer had no other means of escaping; there was a “duty to retreat to the wall” before resorting to deadly force. From one perspective, the retreat rule made the aggressor and victim equally liable for prosecution for any ensuing violence. Although limited to assaults, the concern was that the use of force against robberies – where common law traditionally allowed, or even required, the use of force to prevent felonies – was similarly deterred by existing legislation in the several states, as interpreted by their courts.

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<sup>14</sup> The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the Independence Institute.

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There was also, however, a contrary judicial tradition of accepting self-defense and limiting the duty to retreat. According to one of America's most respected jurists, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others . . . . [I]f a man reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant, he may stand his ground. . . .Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife" (Holmes, 1921, p. 343).

It may be hypothesized that the Florida legislation may have been influenced by Hammer's personal experience. Although reported details vary, Ms. Hammer was once walking to her car when she felt threatened by a group of men. When she made it clear to the men that she was armed, they took off. Since she had made no effort to flee – retreat to the wall – rather than to, arguably, commit assault with a deadly weapon, she may have been concerned that her actions were technically prosecutable. Replacing the Retreat rule with the Stand Your Ground law – generally disparaged when first being considered as a Clint Eastwood-like "make my day" or "shoot first" (and ask questions later) bill – meant that only the initial aggressor was liable to prosecution, not the person defending, in this case, herself.

The Retreat rule did not apply to a person in his own home. That inapplicability goes back to the Bible, where Exodus 22:2-3 says, "If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him. If the sun be risen upon him, there shall be blood shed for him . . ." The biblical distinction, as explained in the Talmud, was that the daylight burglar was probably attempting to steal from an unoccupied dwelling, whereas the nighttime burglar would presumably expect there to be occupants, whom he would expect to defend their premises, and whom he was therefore presumably willing to kill to protect himself.

The Retreat Rule was thus trumped by the Castle doctrine, recognized by the British common-law tradition and included in the writings of Blackstone, whose commentaries served as a primary basis for the early American understanding of the common law. The problem those concerned with self-help/self-defense in the home was not the Castle doctrine per se, but its limitations, particularly as interpreted by some courts. In theory, then, there was no obligation to retreat in the home, but occasionally there were issues about the proportionality of home defense and home threat, with some courts insisting that the protective measures be comparable to the level of the threat, leading to the question addressed by Justice Holmes: How, in an emergency, is the home owner was to evaluate the threat level of a home invader? And a Massachusetts court famously – well, famously to NRA activists – applied the Retreat rule to a shooting a woman's own home, upholding the conviction of a woman for shooting her violent fiancé when he threatened to come down to the basement and kill her, even though she could have escaped with the children. Other prosecutors went after a man for using deadly force rather than retreating out his house, where a daughter was sleeping.

For both the Retreat and Castle rules, then, the result was a rather complicated group of state laws, and judicial interpretations of those laws, regarding the use of self-defense. Just as the

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Bible distinguished between two types of housebreaking, various laws regarding self-defense makes numerous distinctions. A recent book takes over 500 pages to explain the variations in state laws on self-defense (Vilos and Vilos, 2010). Among the issues included are: location, such as home, curtilage, business, public places, motor vehicles; the crime, including specifically named or excluded felonies; the relationships of aggressor and defender; weapons used or threatened by the aggressor or aggressors; whether third parties are being attacked; and the ability of the victim safely to flee. Some laws relate as well to the level of fear of the person resorting to force. Where self-defense is allowed, proportionality issues may be involved, limiting gun use depending upon which, if any, weapon the criminal possesses or is using. Modifying the Castle and Retreat rules generally removed much obligation to determine how dangerous the criminal was before using deadly force for protection, and thus made the applicable law more consistent and brought more clarity to what was previously a situation where it was often unclear what and what was not legal.

The shooting of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman has inspired evaluation of the impacts of the Stand Your Ground Laws, including possible effect on criminal and self-defense/justifiable homicide. It is not clear, however, that the Florida law is relevant to the criminal case against Zimmerman, based on the two generally presented scenarios of the confrontation. According to Martin's supporters, Zimmerman defied police advice not to pursue Martin and went after him, shooting him without provocation. If true, Stand Your Ground was irrelevant; Zimmerman was not standing his ground in the face of aggression; he was the aggressor pursuing a youngster who was dutifully retreating. The Zimmerman version of the confrontation has Zimmerman getting out of his car, speaking briefly to Martin, and then turning to go back to his SUV when he was attacked by Martin, who struck him, knocked him to the ground, and was atop him banging his head against the ground when Zimmerman shot him. If true, "retreat to the wall" was irrelevant; the ground was the wall, and further retreat was not feasible. If that was indeed the case, Zimmerman's use of deadly force would have been allowed under Florida's 20<sup>th</sup>-century standards.

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## Stand Your Ground: An Exploration of the Impact of Stand your Ground Laws on Justifiable Homicides in Light of the Trayvon Martin Case.

Amy Donley, UCF, [Amy.Donley@ucf.edu](mailto:Amy.Donley@ucf.edu)  
Rae Taylor, Loyola University New Orleans, [rtaylor@loyno.edu](mailto:rtaylor@loyno.edu)

Trayvon Martin, an unarmed 17-old black teenager, was killed by Neighborhood Watch captain George Zimmerman on February 26, 2012 in a gated community in Sanford, Florida. Zimmerman had called 911 to report a suspicious person walking through the neighborhood. "We've had some break-ins in my neighborhood, and there's a real suspicious guy," Zimmerman told the 911 operator that he called. He was told not to follow Trayvon. After a few minutes, where details of what occurred become blurred, Trayvon was dead, having been shot in his chest.

While these facts are undisputed, virtually every other detail of what occurred has been subject to conjecture and misinformation. This case has fueled racial tension locally and nationally, renewed discussion on gun control and has brought critical attention to state laws allowing for justifiable homicide to the forefront.

Our focus herein is the latter. Specifically, we are examining the justifiable homicide laws in effect across the country, the variations that exist in these laws, and the potential impact these laws have had on justifiable homicide rates. While Trayvon Martin's death was originally ruled to be a justifiable homicide by the State's Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, Norm Wolfinger, a subsequent special prosecutor assigned to the case, Angela Corey, indicted Zimmerman on second degree murder charges on April 11, 2012. Zimmerman has pled not guilty and has stated that he was acting in self-defense.

### *Justifiable Homicide*

According to the Uniform Crime Report, justifiable homicide is defined as:

- ❖ The killing of a felon by a peace officer in the line of duty.
- ❖ The killing of a felon, during the commission of a felony, by a private citizen (p.17).

According to the UCR definition, "justifiable homicide," by definition, occurs in conjunction with other offenses (USDOJ, p. 17).

The UCR definition and Florida's justifiable law are inconsistent, with the Florida statute presenting much greater breadth of context in which a homicide may be deemed justifiable.

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These definitional inconsistencies present a challenge to researchers for purposes of data analysis involving comparisons of national rates.

**2012**

The Florida law 776.013 states:

(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if:

(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and

(b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.

(2) The presumption set forth in subsection (1) does not apply if:

(a) The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; or

(b) The person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used; or

(c) The person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful activity; or

(d) The person against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s.943.10 (14), who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer.

(3) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

(4) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person's dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.

The most important thing to note about justifiable homicides for the proposed study is that they are not a crime. This presents important challenges for data collection for analysis, if **not** precluding the viability of such a study altogether. Cursory data is reported to the FBI on a national and, in some cases, a state by state level. However, Florida is one of the states that does not provide this information to the FBI. Even if Florida did provide these data, the reported numbers would undoubtedly be an underestimate of the actual numbers of justifiable homicides. Because justifiable homicide is not a crime, if the person was deemed

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to be enacting his or her rights at the scene of the homicide and were not arrested, the incident may very well never be reported to any available database.

**2012**

## *Stand Your Ground*<sup>15</sup>

While all states have some provision to allow a person to use lethal force to protect him or herself from imminent death, the provisions under the law vary by state. Twenty-one states have enacted variations of provisions known as the *Castle Doctrine*. The map below indicates which states have these laws.<sup>16</sup>

The Castle Doctrine essentially means that people are not required to retreat if confronted with potentially deadly harm in their home (i.e. their castle). The Castle Doctrine has been extended in 16 states to allow for the use of deadly force outside of one's home when one feels threatened, represented in laws commonly known as "stand your ground" laws. This provision is in Florida's justifiable homicide code in section three:

*A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.*

The stand your ground law was introduced in the Florida legislature and unanimously passed in 2005. Florida's stand your ground law was enacted after an elderly man, James Workman, shot and killed a man who Workman claimed was trying to break into his trailer. This incident occurred after Hurricane Ivan decimated this part of the state, and residents living in temporary trailers were, not surprisingly, on edge. Workman waited ten months before being told that he would not face charges in the incident.

This incident inspired some to draft the legislation that would eventually lead to the stand your ground law in Florida. Interestingly, Workman was never arrested or charged with a crime, even without the stand your ground provision in place. Nevertheless, it was believed that clarification of the law would prevent others like him from having to wait extended periods of time to know that they would not be charged with a crime.

## *Impact of Laws on Justifiable Homicide*

As indicated in the chart on page 5, statistics surrounding justifiable homicide indicate a clear increase in the past three years. However, justifiable homicides are extraordinarily rare (and, as stated above, not well reported or recorded). According to the UCR, between 2001 and 2005, there were 1,225 homicides classed as justifiable, compared to 1,528 from 2006-2010.

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<sup>15</sup> See page with chart displaying changes in justifiable homicides from 2001-2005 and 2006-2010

<sup>16</sup> Retrieved from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-21/stand-martin-Florida/53690608/1>

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
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## HRWG Annual Symposium Proceedings

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Thus there was a 13% increase in justifiable homicides at a time when violent crime rates have otherwise been decreasing. Notably, this overall national number includes all justifiable homicides, not just those whose context is consistent with the stand your ground law, and does not include disaggregated figures for those states with these types of laws. Thus, the rate of justifiable homicides under the stand your ground law could be much higher.

The rates from Florida present evidence to support this possibility, as Florida reported a 200% increase in the number of justifiable homicides between the same time periods (66 between 2001 and 2005 and 180 between 2006 to 2010).




Source: Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence

Perhaps the only way to properly examine the impact of this law on justifiable homicide rates is to review all of the cases that were deemed justifiable in the time periods before and after the stand your ground law was enacted to determine if specific measures within the stand your ground statute are being invoked. This would require extensive state-by-state analysis, and would not lend very well to between-states comparisons.

While the increase in rates nationwide is clear, and the figures from Florida specifically serve to punctuate this trend, causation cannot be easily determined due to the challenges with data and definitional inconsistencies. Thus, we seek to find the most effective way to empirically study the impact of stand your ground laws on the rates of justifiable homicides.

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**2012**



POSTER PRESENTATIONS

Posters:

**2012**

*Violent Crime Data Collections at the Bureau of Justice Statistics*

Lynn A. Addington, BJS Visiting Fellow

*Lethal Violence and Fear: Implications for (In) Security Policy*

April Benard, The University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Bridgetown,  
Barbados

*Differentiating CeaseFire from Ceasefire: A Review of Two Separate and Distinct Interventions to Reduce Violence*

Dan Cantillon, CeaseFire Chicago, Director of Research and Evaluation

*What Can We Learn from Age-, Sex-, and Race-Specific Homicide Trends?*

Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

John P. Jarvis, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Wendy Regoeczi, Cleveland State University

*Is There a "Best" Measure of Urban Homicide? Can We Pick and Choose?*

Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

John P. Jarvis, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Wendy Regoeczi, Cleveland State University

*Research in the Behavioral Sciences*

John P. Jarvis, Federal Bureau of Investigation

*Okay, But What Does that Look Like? Mediating Interpersonal and Gang Conflicts to Prevent Violence in Chicago*

Tina Johnson, CeaseFire Chicago

Elise Wisnieski, CeaseFire Chicago

*Defining Execution-Style Homicides in the United States*

Josh Leis, Center for Homicide Research, Minneapolis, MN

Dallas Drake, Center for Homicide Research, Minneapolis, MN

*Comparing 30-Years of Felonious Killing of Male and Female Police Officers: An Invitation to Theory*

Illya Lichtenberg, Mercy College

2012

*Resources of the NACJF and NAHDAP*

Kaye Marz, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

*The National Violent Death Reporting System (NVRDS): Public Use and the Restricted Access Database*

Dawn McDaniel, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Division of Violence Prevention

*The National Institute of Justice (NIJ): Resources and Publications on Violence*

Winifred L. Reed, Office of Research and Evaluation, National Institute of Justice

*Recidivism into Homicide: A Population Based Cohort 35 Years After Trial*

Joakim Sturup, Department of Forensic Psychiatry, National Board of Forensic Medicine, Division of Social and Forensic Psychiatry, Karolinska Institutet, Sweden

## Violent Crime Data Collections at the Bureau of Justice Statistics

Lynn A. Addington, BJS Visiting Fellow

### Abstract:

The Bureau of Justice Statistics is the primary source for criminal justice statistics in the United States. BJS collects, analyzes, publishes and disseminates information on crime, criminal offenders, victims of crime and the operation of the criminal justice system at all levels of government. Included in this mission is the collection of data related to violent crime. This poster will provide examples of the data collected by BJS that concerns violent crime. This poster also provide information on BJS's new online data tools to facilitate the analysis of data from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, National Crime Victimization Survey, arrest data and prisoner recidivism.

## Lethal Violence and Fear: Implications for (In) Security Policy

April Bernard, Lecturer in Sociology, The University of the West Indies –  
Cave Hill, Bridgetown, Barbados

### Abstract:

Recent crime surveys conducted in Barbados indicate that a majority of persons believe that the murder rate has significantly increased. These beliefs were engrained among the population even though the rate of homicide over recent years has varied only slightly, between 20 – 26 homicides per year (in a population of approximately 280,000). The pervasiveness of these beliefs about crime and violence throughout the residential and business sectors of Barbadian society are also reflected in policy reports which have implications for proposed remedies.

This study reviews the results of recent the Caribbean Human Development Report Victimization Survey which suggest that persons who worry most about violent crime in Barbados may also function as a quasi-interest group that has the power to influence related discourse and policy.

Of interest is the relationship between fear and human development and the way in which fear perpetuates a sense of insecurity which is reflected in remedial action and policy responses.

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## Differentiating CeaseFire from CeaseFire: A Review of Two Separate and Distinct Interventions to Reduce Violence

**2012**

Dan Cantillon, CeaseFire Chicago – Direct of Research and Evaluation

### Abstract:

Currently, there is a good degree of confusion when it comes to describing the CeaseFire violence prevention program. This is for good reason. In addition to two major interventions termed CeaseFire, there are literally dozens of local interventions with the same name. This poster compares and contrasts the two main program models labeled CeaseFire: (1) what has been called the Kennedy or Boston model and (2) what is called the Chicago model. By differentiating between their major program elements, this poster will highlight how each approach leads to a different understanding of American's violence problem, and thus, proposed solutions. Extant literature and outcome data will be presented for each model.

## What Can We Learn from Age-, Sex-, and Race-Specific Homicide Trends?

Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst  
John P. Jarvis, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Wendy Regoeczi, Cleveland State University

### Abstract:

The first thing you should know about the poster shown below is that you can read it on your computer screen. It is a PDF file, and like any other poster in PDF format, your windows computer will read it using the Adobe Reader. When the Adobe Reader reads it you can click on the poster and choose "Marquee Zoom" from the menu that drops down. After that, each click on the poster will enlarge it. After two or three clicks, as you move around the enlarged poster, you can select any table and the numbers will be large enough to read. Moreover, every part of Figure 1 will be legible. [On a Mac machine, when you click on the poster, it will open and can be enlarged by clicking on the plus button (+) at the top of the window.]

The second thing you need to know is that the homicide counts and rates in the poster are not police data. The homicide counts were sent to the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) by state vital statistics agencies. Medical examiners or coroners in each state send death certificates to the vital statistics agencies, and the agencies create electronic records that are sent to the NCHS. [The "Best Measures" poster described below indicates that, for most but not all years, the NCHS counts are very close to the homicide victim counts sent by police departments as Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) to the Uniform Crime

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Reports (UCR) program of the FBI.]

What follows assumes you have the enlarged poster on your screen and that you have positioned it so that the Los Angeles table (Table 6) showing changes from 1990 to 2000 is in front of you. The first thing we learn about Los Angeles is that the race, sex, age category with the highest homicide victim rate is the category “black, male, 15-29.” We can see that the rate for this category dropped to 258 deaths per 100,000 in the year 2000 from a 1990 rate of 365. So we can ask how much of this decrease was the result of a decrease in the number of young, black, men in the population.

To do this we multiply the 1990 rate by the 2000 population for this category ( $365 \times 39,161 / 100,000$ ) to get 143. This is the number of homicides we would see if the rate remained constant and only the population of 15-29 year old black men changed. Since we expected 143 but observed only 101, the expected change from 1990 to 2000 was -64 ( $143 - 207$ ), and the observed change was -106 ( $101 - 207$ ). This suggests that 60 percent of the decrease in homicide in this category can be explained by a decrease in the number of 15-29 year old black men living in Los Angeles.

If we move to Table 7 for Chicago, we see that 72 percent of the decrease in 15-29 year old black, male, homicide victims can be attributed to the decrease in young, black, men in the population. However, both Chicago and Los Angeles are unusual in this respect. Table 8 showing the result for 136 cities with populations over 100,000 suggests that about one-fourth of the drop in homicide for this specific demographic group can be explained by population change. And Table 5 for New York City suggests that only twenty percent of the 1990 to 2000 decrease can be explained by the same kind of demographic change.

Another thing we learn from a race-, sex-, age-specific analysis is that young black men have very high homicide victim rates from 1980 through 2004 for all 136 cities. Figure 1 indicates that the homicide victim rate for young black men starts near 150 per 100,000 around 1980, rises to almost 250 per 100,000, and drops back to 150 per 100,000 by 2000. A comparison of the rates for young black men with those for 15-29 year olds in other race sex categories helps us understand how high this rate of 150 per 100,000 is. It is five times as high as the rate for young white men, ten times as high as the rate for young black women, and thirty times as high as the rate for young white women. In this way, the tables in the race, sex, age analysis indicate again that young black men are the category of urban residents most likely to be victims of homicide, and that this has been the case since at least 1980. Given that the rate for this category of residents in 136 cities remained around 150 per 100,000 from 2000 to 2004, the rate for recent years will probably be very similar.

At least six other interesting points are suggested by the analysis. You may find several more.

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1. The results illustrate the limitation of a focus on over-all homicide rates and over-all population changes. The only way we can conclude that changes in homicide counts were unrelated to demographic changes is to restrict our examination to over-all (total) population changes.
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2. In addition, the tables illustrate the limitation of a focus on the 1990 to 2000 changes. Such a focus blinds us to the very high young black male rates before the 1985 to 1990 increase and the very high rates for this category after the 1990 to 2000 decrease.
3. However, the tables indicate how hard it is to arrive at a logical summary of the impact of changing demographics for a specific city. The patterns for New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago have some similarities and some striking differences.
4. Although no graph is presented, the analysis indicates that the homicide victim rate for black men over 45 has been dropping since 1980. This decrease did not start in 1990, and such patterns would never be noticed without an examination of the trends by race, sex, and age.
5. The tables identify another important pattern for the largest cities in the country, the growth in the proportion of the population describing themselves in the census as “some other race.” These categories have the lowest homicide rates for all three periods. The OM and OW rates are consistently under 7 per 100,000. Increases in the size of these two “other race” categories from 1981 to 2000 were sizable, and as their numbers increased their homicide rates decreased. Looking at these low risk categories in more detail may indicate that they have changed the racial and ethnic composition of America’s largest cities and are indirectly responsible for some of the decreases in violent crime.
6. Finally, we think the analysis, in combination with the “best measures analysis,” demonstrates the importance of having NCHS counts of homicide available as a second measure of homicide victimization by race, sex, and age for the years after 2004. The SHR counts are important, but being able to compare victim trends for both programs gives us greater confidence in each. In addition, the NCHS data provide a measure that can be used in place of an occasional missing SHR annual report. The decision to remove geographic codes for cities with populations over 100,000 from NCHS cause of death data make the kind of analysis shown in this poster impossible after 2004. This is a situation that should be changed as soon as possible.

A PDF version of the poster is available on <https://udrive.oit.umass.edu/lizchil>

*Using the Adobe reader you can click on the image shown to get a menu. If you select Marquee Zoom you can click on the poster again and again to enlarge it to a size that will show the details of any table or chart. You can return to the original view by clicking on Zoom to page level.*

# What Can We Learn From a Race-, Sex-, Age-Specific Analysis?


Roland Chilton      Wendy Regoeczi      John Jarvis

## 1981-1990 Changes in National Center for Health Statistics Homicide Counts

City	New York City			Los Angeles			Chicago			Totals for 136 Cities		
	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983
Population	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904
Male	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452
Female	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452
White	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Black	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000
Other	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904
Total Homicides	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128

## 1990-2000 Changes in National Center for Health Statistics Homicide Counts

City	New York City			Los Angeles			Chicago			Totals for 136 Cities		
	1990	1991	1992	1990	1991	1992	1990	1991	1992	1990	1991	1992
Population	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904	1,946,904
Male	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452
Female	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452	973,452
White	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Black	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000
Other	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904	446,904
Total Homicides	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128



NOTE:- High Risk Categories  
 - Role of Demographics  
 81-90 Changes  
 90-00 Decrease  
 -Question about "Other" races?  
 -Limitation of Focus on 1990 - 2000 Drop

Example of Logic: (using Line 1 of Table 8)  
 -The 1990 rate is applied to the 2000 population (10 x 1,946,904 / 100,000) to compute the Expected homicides (195).  
 - Expected change is the expected homicides minus the 1990 homicides (195-193).  
 - Observed change is the 2000 homicides minus the 1990 homicides (128-193).

## Is There a “Best” Measure of Urban Homicide? Can We Pick and Choose?

**2012**

Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst  
John P. Jarvis, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Wendy Regoeczi, Cleveland State University

The first thing you should know about the poster shown below is that you can read it on your computer screen. It is a PDF file, and like any other poster in PDF format, your windows computer will read it using the Adobe Reader. When the Adobe Reader reads it, you can click on the poster and choose “Marquee Zoom” from the menu that drops down. After that, each click on the poster will enlarge it. After two or three clicks, as you move around the enlarged poster every part of each chart will be legible. [On a Mac machine, when you click on the poster, it will open and can be enlarged by clicking on the plus button (+) at the top of the window.]

This poster uses two different victim focused measures of homicide and two offender focused measures. One of the victim measures and one of the offender measures comes from the Supplementary Homicide Report program (SHR). The SHR effort of the FBI’s UCR Section was a precursor to the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) except that in SHR the only offenses reported are homicides. In the Supplementary Homicide Reports the unit of analysis is the homicide “incident”. Thus, information on victims and offenders is provided for each homicide incident. We have created annual counts of black and white male victims and offenders for each year using the information in each homicide incident reported in a given year. This allows the creation of black and white victim and offender rates for each city and each year. For this poster we have plotted black and white male homicide victim rates.

The second homicide victim measure shown in the charts was provided by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Unlike the SHR counts, these counts are not submitted by police agencies. The NCHS homicide counts are sent to the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) by state vital statistics agencies. Medical examiners or coroners in each state send death certificates to the vital statistics agencies, and the agencies create electronic records that are sent to the NCHS. In this sense they too are “incident based”, and annual counts have to be created using the deaths reported in a given year. The counts are converted to annual homicide victim rates and the rates are merged with the SHR victim and offender rates.

The top four charts show two homicide victim trends for black men (orange and red lines), two homicide victim trends for white men (blue and green lines) for four of the largest cities in the country, New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New Orleans. In each chart we see that the trends for the SHR homicide victim rate and the NCHS homicide victim rate for males classified as white are very similar, especially for Los Angeles. Focusing on New York, the white male SHR victim rate is a little low in 1980 and 1981 and the three year averages for

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## HRWG Annual Symposium Proceedings

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2000, 2001, and 2002 are distorted by the destruction of the World Trade Towers. Chicago's white SHR victim rate is a little low for 1987-90 and missing for 1984-86. This illustrates one advantage of the NCHS data; the NCHS can be used as an estimate for the missing SHR victim rates. The white homicide victim rates for New Orleans are not as similar as the rates for the other cities, but the trends are still reasonably close. 2012

The black SHR and NCHS victim rates diverge more noticeably in each city. In Chicago, for example, there was a lower SHR victim rate for 1987-1991, and the SHR victim and offender rates are missing from 1984-88. In this situation the "best" black homicide victim measure would seem to be the NCHS measure. Something like this appears to be the case in Los Angeles where black, male SHR rates are lower than the black, male NCHS rates. The two measures are a little closer for New York and present essentially similar trends in the New Orleans chart.

The bottom four charts show the homicide offender rates for same cities. As we have seen above, one of the homicide offender measures comes from the SHR program. The other offender measure is provided by homicide arrest reports sent by police agencies to the UCR Section. If we look at Chicago's black homicide offender rates first, we see that there are three trend lines, two red and one orange. The third line, the red line without markers, is the black NCHS homicide victim measure. It is used in this chart to help us evaluate the black SHR offender and the black offender arrest trends.

For Chicago, we see that the black homicide offender arrest rates are lower than the black SHR victim rates until about 2000. The black SHR offender rates are generally lower than the black SHR homicide victim rates except for 1981 and 1982. They are missing from 1984-86. We might decide from this that the best black homicide offender estimate is the black homicide victim (NCHS) measure.

The patterns are different for each of the other cities. For New York both the black offender arrest rates (UCR) and the SHR offender rates appear too low from 1987-94. They appear too high from 1996-99. For Los Angeles, the black homicide offender arrest rate (UCR) is higher than the NCHS victim rate until about 1990. After that it is lower. The SHR black offender rate for Los Angeles is close to the SHR black victim rate except for 1988-94. Comparing both black offender rates for New Orleans with the black NCHS victim rates, we see that both offender measures are lower than the victim measure and that the black offender arrest rate is missing after 1999.

Like the charts showing the victim rates, the charts showing the offender rates suggest that the white offender rates present reasonably similar trends, except for the 2000-02 New York City SHR homicide offender rates. However, it is the black offender rates that present the greatest variation. Together these charts suggest that picking the "best", that is most accurate or most logical, black homicide offender rate for these cities is not an easy task. However, having both offender measures and the victim measures should be invaluable in the interpretation the results of any race-specific analysis.

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# Is There a “Best” Measure of Urban Homicide?


## Can we Pick and Choose?

Roland Chilton

Wendy Regoeczi


John Jarvis

### New York City




**Victim Rates**


### Los Angeles







### Chicago



### New Orleans



**Offender Rates**



For the victim rates, NYC and Chicago force some choices. For offender rates, choices are harder, but necessary.

For NYC SHR & NCHS are distorted by 2001. With no arrests reported after 2002, best to use SHR or NCHS but avoiding 2001.

For L.A. victims it makes little difference. For offenders, pre 1987 rates look too high, post 1987 rates look too low.

NCHS Black and White victim counts seem best. Black arrest rates are high but may make the best Black offender rates.

For N.O. victims it makes some Difference, but black offender rates (SHR and arrest) are low, and no arrests for 2000-2005.

## Research in the Behavioral Sciences

John P. Jarvis, Federal Bureau of Investigation

### Abstract:

This poster will provide an overview of current research that is ongoing in the behavioral science unit of the FBI. Studies pertaining to patterns in homicide and violence are highlighted but other areas of criminal behavior that are being examined will also be delineated. Opportunities and challenges in pursuing these lines of inquiry are also planned to be displayed and discussed.

## OK, But What Does that Look Like? Mediating Interpersonal and Gang Conflicts to Prevent Violence in Chicago

Tina Johnson, CeaseFire Chicago  
Elise Wisniewski, CeaseFire Chicago

### Abstract:

While a major component of the Chicago CF model is to address and resolve neighborhood and individual conflicts through mediation, one of the main questions of individuals new to the model is how that works – what, exactly does it look like, how are workers trained for these high-risk situations, do mediations really work? To obtain a better understanding of the types of conflicts being mediated, and the exact process of mediation, the research team at CeaseFire Chicago selected a stratified random sample of mediations from two sites over a two-year time period. There were two main research questions: (1) what does a high-risk situation look like, and (2) how do CeaseFire workers prevent or stop a shooting? This was accomplished by coding open-ended responses; in total, the sample consisted of 368 conflicts. Qualitative analyses uncovered a number of interesting findings, which, perhaps most importantly, has led to more comprehensive training processes and protocols for workers, and has also led to the development of more comprehensive data collection efforts regarding this critical component of CeaseFire. The results of this investigation documented a number of relevant high-risk situational factors, including location, weapon involvement and type, number of victims, activity prior to conflict breaking out, and conflict cause (e.g., retaliation, money, miscommunication, etc.) and severity. The poster will highlight these findings and provide conference attendees an in-depth and up-close picture of conflict in Chicago and how CF has worked on-the-street to solve thousands of these conflicts in a non-violent manner.

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## Mediating Interpersonal Conflicts to Prevent Violence in Chicago

Tina Johnson, MA & Elise Wisniewski, MA  
CeaseFire Chicago – University of Illinois at Chicago



### INTRODUCTION

While a number of studies have deciphered the inner-workings of the “code of the street” and what gives rise to violent urban encounters, the literature on specifically quelling urban conflicts is scant (Anderson, 1997, 1999; Wilkinson et al., 2006; Brezina et al., 2004).

CeaseFire (CF), an organization dedicated to reducing shootings and killings, is in a unique position to contribute knowledge on the characteristics, outcomes, and strategies used in preventing potentially volatile incidents. One component of the CF model is through conflict mediations by violence interveners (VI). VIs are individuals with knowledge of the streets whose goal is to de-escalate potentially violent conflicts.

Using a systematic sample of conflicts mediated by CF VIs, this study aims to shed light on:


- 1) what a high-risk situation—defined as one very likely to lead to a shooting—looks like; and
- 2) what strategies CF workers employ to prevent a shooting.

### METHODS

Following each conflict mediation, VIs fill out a form containing closed and open-ended questions regarding:

- the location and date of conflict,
- the risk factors of parties involved,
- the cause of conflict,
- why the situation was deemed likely to lead to a shooting,
- and how the staff prevented a shooting.

This analysis utilizes a systematic sample of 2009 and 2010 data extracted from conflict mediation forms for the two CF model sites, located in District 7 and District 11 (see map).



- > 368 mediations were coded independently by two researchers to explore common themes.
- > Inter-rater reliability was computed to assess coder agreement.
- > Any discrepancies in coding were discussed and resolved, yielding final kappa values of .7 or higher.

### RESULTS

What does a high-risk situation look like?

- According to coders, 88% of conflicts mediated were considered turbulent enough to lead to a shooting, 50% of mediations involve individuals who either have a history of violence or are known to be a shooter, 38.3% of mediations involved parties whose emotional state (upset, ready to get down, hyped up, etc.) amplified the likelihood of violence (see Table 1).

- 47% of cases explicitly stated weapon presence, primarily a firearm, in either the conflict or the mediation. However, weapon presence does not always translate into weapon use. Instead, a gun could be present as a threat, a means of protection, or self-presentation (Wilkinson, 2009; Anderson, 1999).

- Victimization plays a central role in dictating whether a conflict is perceived as high-risk—43% of all conflicts involved at least one victim. In 30.1% of these cases, the victim was innocent, including women, children, a case of mistaken identity, and bystanders.

- Level of conflict severity is defined as degree of threat, harm or seriousness of injury. In 75% of mediations sampled, there was some level of violence explicitly stated (see Table 2).

- A second dimension of conflict severity is the magnitude of the conflict, measured by the number of individuals involved. Nearly 50% of conflicts analyzed involved between 5 and 14 people.

- While only 29% of cases specified an exact location, it is worth noting that over half the conflicts with location defined occurred in a public space. Deanna Wilkinson (2009) found that the majority of injury events take place in public spaces and involve third parties.

Table 1 – Person characteristics

Person characteristics	Frequency	Percent
Emotional state (upset, ready to get down, etc.)	70	38.3%
Violent history and/or reputation	65	35.5%
High-risk known shooter	25	13.7%
High-risk violent ties	16	8.7%
Recently released from prison	7	3.8%
Total	183	100%

Table 2 – Level of Conflict Severity

Level of violence	Frequency	Percent
Making threats	60	21.6%
Violence (unknown if physical or verbal)	54	19.6%
Physical violence	49	17.8%
Shooting (person hit)	44	16.0%
Shots fired (no one hit)	27	9.8%
Verbal violence	20	7.3%
Homicide	14	5.1%
Stabbing	7	2.5%
Total	273	100.0%

How do CeaseFire employees navigate high-risk situations? (see Table 3)

- Over 75% of conflicts were mediated by two or more CF staff. The number of CF staff present at high-risk situations reflects the group nature of mediations. It is recommended in CF staff training that staff do not mediate conflicts solo.

- The two most common strategies are middle man (37.6%) and reaching agreement (17.8%). “Middle man” refers to when groups do not come together; instead, the VI serves as a conduit of information and communication between groups. In some instances, the VI literally positions him/herself between parties.

Table 3 – Strategies used by CeaseFire staff

Strategies	Frequency	Percent
Middle man	154	37.6%
Reaching agreement	73	17.8%
Reasoning	67	16.3%
Bring groups together	61	14.9%
Family/friends as a means of communication	38	9.3%
Constructive shadowing	17	4.1%
Total	410	100%

### CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

This investigation provides a picture of the situational and individual factors most prevalent in high-risk situations; and 2) how CeaseFire violence prevention staff respond.

#### Notable findings include:

- High-risk situations are characterized by weapon presence, victimization and multiple player involvement
- Many conflicts are public in nature, occurring in public spaces or involving outside parties
- Potentially violent situations involve known shooters or those with a violent history ties
- The overarching term “mediation” encompasses a number of distinct strategies used by staff to resolve conflict

To date, this investigation has aided in revising the conflict mediation form and developing scenarios for staff training. While the contributions of this investigation are invaluable for violence prevention scholars and practitioners, several study limitations must be acknowledged:

- The dependence on self-reported forms can potentially bias the data. All conflicts are described from the vantage point of the VI, who may or may not be an objective observer.
- CF stresses confidentiality and data de-identification. Thus, many conflict mediation forms lack detail about the events, the actors, and the outcomes.

Future directions in research include:

- > conducting member checking of qualitative data with CF staff,
- > analyzing data generated by revised conflict mediation forms, and
- > further delving into the context, trajectories, outcomes, and complexities of high-risk conflicts.

## Defining Execution-Style Homicides in the United States

Josh Leis, Homicide Researcher, Center for Homicide Research  
Dallas Drake, Homicide Researcher, Center for Homicide Research

### Abstract:

Execution-style homicide is a common phrase used by the lay-public. However, it appears to have no documented or uniform definition, nor theoretical basis. A theory of the nature of these executions was constructed based on an exploratory sample of cases wherein the media reported on and used the contraction, "execution-style."

A sample of 60 cases of execution-style homicides were then assembled using open-source data collection. Each case was coded using indicators of the theoretical concepts. The results reveals a narrow set of required behaviors along with a subset array of optional behaviors, thereby confounding researchers' ability to clearly define the phenomenon. Also apparent is that some cases reported by the media as execution-style may not be properly classified.

## Comparing 30-Years of Felonious Killings of Male and Female Police Officers: An Invitation to Theory

Illya Lichtenberg, Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, NY

### Abstract:

This poster presentation first examines the per capita rates of felonious killings of male and female police officers over a 30-year period (1980-2010). The changes and trends are briefly discussed, followed by theoretical discussions of potential causes of the differences. Some of the causes discussed include organizational issues, approach-to-encounter factors, the offender or offenders, and several others.

## Resources of the NACJF and NAHDAP

Kaye Marz, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

### Abstract:

Almost 400 collections in the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) have data about various aspects of homicide. This table top display will have handouts about the NACJD and available products, including resources for research on homicide. Some of these data sets are also available on the NACJD Web site for use with an online statistical analysis program. Primarily sponsored by agencies within the U.S. Department of Justice, NACJD facilitates the sharing of computerized data resources, encourages the production of original research and instructional exercises based on archived data, and offers specialized training workshops in quantitative analysis of crime and justice data.

The National Addiction and HIV Data Archive Program (NAHDAP) facilitates research on drug addiction and HIV infection by enhancing, sharing, and preserving data produced by research grants funded by the National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug Abuse. NAHDAP does not currently provide data directly related to homicide, yet given the co-occurrence of substance abuse and lethal and non-lethal violence, data from NAHDAP can provide context for attitudes, behaviors, and situations for which substance abuse and violence intersect.

## The National Violent Death Reporting System (NVRDS): Public Use and the Restricted Access Database

Dawn McDaniel, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Center for Injury  
Prevention and Control/Division of Violent Prevention

### Abstract:

The National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) is a state-based, active surveillance system designed to obtain a census of deaths from suicide, homicide, undetermined intent, legal intervention, and unintentional firearm injury. Each participating state collects information from death certificates, medical examiner/coroner files, and law enforcement records, comprising over 270 unique data elements. NVDRS data collection began in 2003 with seven states (Alaska, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia) participating; six states (Colorado, Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) joined in 2004, four (California, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Utah) in 2005, and two in 2010 (Ohio and Michigan), for a total of 19 states. NVDRS data can be obtained through two principal mechanisms—WISQARS™, which is a web-based injury

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statistics query and reporting system and restricted access database (RAD) requests. Further information on using WISQARS™ and making a RAD request will be presented.

## The National Institute of Justice <sup>2012</sup> (NIJ): Resources and Publications on Violence

Winifred L. Reed, Office of Research and Evaluation, National Institute of Justice

### Abstract:

The National Institute of Justice — the research, development and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice — is dedicated to improving knowledge and understanding of crime and justice issues through science. NIJ provides objective and independent knowledge and tools to reduce crime and promote justice, particularly at the state and local levels. This poster session will include a display of recent NIJ publications in the area of violence. Information will also be disseminated on NIJ's ongoing research projects on this topic.

## Recidivism into Homicide: A Population Based Cohort 35 Years After Trial

Joakim Sturup, Department of Forensic Psychiatry, National Board of Forensic Medicine, and Division of Social and Forensic Psychiatry, Karolinska Institutet, Sweden

### Abstract:

Research suggests that 1-3% of all homicide offenders commit another homicide offence (Bjørkly & Waade, 2005). However, the majority of the studies have methodological flaws, such as they have short follow-up, they do not include homicide- suicide cases or that they are register-based. The aim of the presentation is to examine repeated homicide in a well-defined group of homicide offenders followed for a long period of time (35 years). Repeated homicides in an incident cohort of Swedish homicide offenders during the 1970'ties (n=176) were examined 35 years after the index offence (homicide-suicide cases were included). Six percent (n=10) of the offenders did commit a repeated homicide offence (including time before and after the index offence). The study suggests that the prevalence of repeated homicide is higher compared to what earlier has been reported and methodological choices may have large impact on the results when examining repeated homicides.

### Background

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Research on repeated homicide conviction is scarce, mainly due to methodological flaws among the few existing studies (Bjørkly & Waade, 2005). The absence of this type of studies is mainly because of the long periods of incarceration. Often, studies are based on violent convictions alone, and sometimes also includes attempted homicide as well. Another methodological flaw is that most studies are not population based, but rather follow up studies based on clinical samples of homicide offenders, or studies based on people convicted of homicide where data is collected from registers. These studies do not include the cases of homicide-suicide nor the cases where the offender commits suicide while being remanded. Generally it can be noted that research implies that 1 to 3% of homicide offender commit one or more additional homicide offence (Bjørkly & Waade, 2005). However, the majority of the studies have methodological flaws, such as they have short follow-up, they do not include homicide-suicide cases or that they are register-based. The aim of the presentation is to examine repeated homicide in a well-defined group of homicide offenders followed for a long period of time (35 years).

## **Method**

The original cohort comprised of offenders from 176 homicide cases from 1971 to 1980 in Stockholm and 1970 to 1980 in four police districts in the northernmost of Sweden. The cohort was used in an earlier study by one of the authors (Lindqvist, 1989). Homicide was defined as a final court ruling of (I) murder, (II) manslaughter, or (III) (aggravated) assault and causing another's death (n = 155), as well as (IV) cases of homicide followed by the offender's suicide before trial (n = 21). Thus, excluding the 21 people who died before trial, and two cases double-counting in the original series, the number of cases available for follow-up was 153.

## **Variables**

The base line data includes socio-demographic and clinical variables and information regarding the index offense. Type of offense (murder, manslaughter, infanticide and assault AND causing another's death), method, victim related information, social situation and earlier criminality was known. Follow up data came from two registers: the Cause of Death Register and the Register for Criminal Convictions. Firstly, the Cause of Death Register administrated by the National Board of Health and Welfare were consulted to check up on who were alive. The death certificate for all individuals with suicide or suspected suicide were screened to check up on possible homicide-suicide cases. Secondly, data for all 153 patients were collected from the National Register for Criminal Convictions which is administrated by the National Council for Crime Prevention. Outcome variable were at least one major violent conviction. Descriptive data were presented by calculating the percentage of patients that did recidivate. Chi square tests were computed for categorical variables and t-test for numerical variables. P-values below 0.05 were considered as significant. The project was approved by the Regional Research Ethics Committee in Stockholm (Dnr 2008/359-31/5).

## **Results**

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Ten of the 174 offenders committed two homicidal acts at different occasions (6%) during their life-span. Of those ten, five offenders had committed homicidal acts before the index offense, two offenders committed two homicidal acts during the inclusion period in the original study, and three offenders did recidivate into homicide during the follow-up period. All of the ten offenders were males and nine offenders were born in Sweden. Two offenders had committed a homicide-suicide act as an index offense and had previously been convicted for a homicide offence. Eight had a substance misuse disorders, five of the offenders suffered from personality disorder and one were diagnosed with schizophrenia. The mean time period between the first and second offense were 3.5 years (range 2 months to 9 years). Their victims were in half of the cases males and half of the cases females, and nine of ten victims were misusing alcohol or drugs. Four used a knife, two of the offenders used blunt force with an object, and two strangled their victim at the index offence. Over 90% of the offenders were males and the mean age were slightly over 35 years at index offence. The majority suffered from a mental disorder (Table 1). Fifteen of the 153 offenders (10%) committed a new major violent offence after the index homicide offence. The crimes were (n): murder (2), manslaughter (2), aggravated assault AND causing another ones death (1), aggravated assault (4), robbery (4), gross arson (1) and sexual molestation of a child (1). The mean time to recidivism was seven years after the index offence (range 1 year to 17 years). Factors that were significant associated with recidivism were young age, having a psychotic disorder, victim was drunk at the index offence and male victim at index offence.

## Discussion

Earlier research has identified a void of research concerning the area of recidivism after homicide. It has been suggested that 1% to 3% of all homicide offenders recidivate into homicide (Bjørkly & Waade, 2005). Results from the present study rather reports that the prevalence is at least twice as high as suggested. There may be many reasons to that this study found a higher prevalence. Firstly, Bjørkly & Waade (2005) mainly studied register studies conducted on convicted offenders. As offenders that has committed suicide after the homicide is not convicted, register studies do not include these offenders. Mainly were the follow up periods in the studies considerably shorter than in the present study. And also, in older samples, offenders may have committed a homicide offence earlier in history and if register did not hold this information the offender were classified to be a non-recidivistic offender. This study follows a well-defined group of homicide offenders during a long time of their life. Even homicide/suicide cases, which is most often is lacking in register studies, were included. As eight of ten recidivistic homicide offenders in this study had a substance misuse disorder, this is in line with the findings of Tiihonen et al (1995).

Although, it is important to note that the recidivism rate into more severe violent crimes were substantial (10%), the study suggests, along with other studies, that homicide offenders are not always dangerous. Ninety percent of the offenders were not convicted of a new major violent crime. This has impact on public policy as the group of homicide offenders at any given time are seen as dangerous offenders. The results rather imply that there is a small subgroup within homicide offenders which are dangerous and need near supervision and close risk management, rather than stigmatizing the group as a whole. Looking at a

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moral or juridical perspective long punishment may be important, however long punishments may probably not have great impact on preventive measures on the overall homicide rate. Of four significant risk factors for recidivism two were associated to the behaviour during the index offence. Therefore the study support the argument from West & Greenall (2011) that index offense variables are important regarding risk assessment of homicide offenders. Looking at more severe violent recidivism, two out of four significant factors associated with recidivism, were index offense variables. Longitudinal life-course studies, following a well-defined cohort of offenders, will probably add more useful information for risk assessments, than larger clinical crossover studies. Even so, there is a lack of these types of studies and more research is needed. Results from the present study suggest that the prevalence of repeated homicide is higher compared to what earlier found. It is of importance to include index offense variables when conducting risk assessments among homicide offenders and methodological issues seem to be especially important when investigating repeated homicidal acts.

## Methodological issues

The sample in this study was somewhat smaller (n=174), compared to other register-based studies, however other methodological factors, such as long observation period and the detailed information on all offenders, both before and after the index homicide offense add strength to the study. Detailed information regarding the index offence is also strength of the study. One major drawback is the lack of the information regarding the date of release from prison or date of discharge from the forensic psychiatric care. The lack of information is due to that the Swedish Prison and Probation Services do not keep this information longer than ten years, if the individual are not convicted again. Also Sweden is divided into 20 local County Councils, which is responsible for all health care, including general and forensic psychiatric care, making it hard to find all medical records to get a hold of all psychiatric records to find the date of discharge. Another drawback is that information regarding the recidivistic offence was not known (e.g. location, victim and other circumstances).

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